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Abstract 
Given the severity of the impacts arising from climate change and the short 
timeframe available regarding mitigation, it is imperative to reduce emissions 
of greenhouse gases. Road transport is a significant contributor to UK CO2 
emissions, with the majority arising from personal road transport. A working 
model of a Tradable Carbon Permit (TCP) scheme was therefore designed to 
achieve a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions from personal road transport by 
2050. A proportion of the annual carbon budget would be given to individuals 
as a free carbon permit allocation. Following the consumption of the free 
carbon permits, an individual must then purchase any permits required in the 
future from a centralised market. Alternatively, there is an opportunity to sell 
unused permits. 
Fuel price increases were recognised as having the potential to achieve an 
identical emissions target at a much lower cost. Hence, conventional 
elasticities were used to derive a comparative measure to the TCP scheme. A 
range of practical considerations regarding both policies were discussed, 
including approximate costings, social impacts and implementation. 
An innovative survey design was developed to explore the feasibility of 
applying a TCP scheme and a system of fuel price increases (FPI) to the 
personal road transport sector. A series of individual interviews were 
conducted to gather opinions related to the impacts (including costs and 
benefits), effectiveness (ability to meet the emissions target), fairness and 
acceptability of both measures. Bespoke software was used to record 
behavioural response and display respondents' travel data alongside their free 
permit allocation and estimated spending at three points in time. A range of 
qualitative and quantitative results are reported. The findings revealed a stark 
contrast in opinions and attitudes towards the TCP scheme and FPI, with the 
TCP scheme being more favourable in every aspect in addition to achieving a 
much greater level of behavioural response and hence carbon reductions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Transportation is an intrinsic part of society and current lifestyles (Lyons et a/., 
2002; Anable, 2005). However, there are major detrimental impacts of fossil 
fuelled transport in terms of resource depletion and environmental 
degradation. Given the widely acknowledged importance of limiting the impacts 
of climate change and the significant contribution to carbon emissions from 
transport, this research seeks to both identify a method for achieving crucial 
reductions of carbon emissions and to explore public response. 
1.1 Environmental impacts: local and global 
Emissions from transport contribute significantly to levels of local air pollution 
in the UK, accounting for the majority of Nitrogen Oxides (NOX), particulate 
matter (PM10), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Benzene and 1,3 butadiene. Whilst 
there are detrimental impacts on the environment, such as acid rain production 
resulting from NOR, the impacts of local air pollutants on human health are also 
highly undesirable with an estimated 24,000 premature deaths each year as a 
result of exposure (DoH, 1998; COMEAP, 1998). 
Emissions from transport also contribute greatly to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
production. GHG's are an essential component of the atmosphere as without 
them the earth would be uninhabitable. However, anthropogenic (human 
produced) GHG emissions are contributing to warming of the climate beyond 
what would be naturally expected. Carbon Dioxide (C02) is classified as the 
most significant GHG due to the quantity of release and quantity present in the 
atmosphere (IPCC, 2007). The UK contributes 2% to global GHG emissions, of 
which the transport sector is responsible for 28% of CO2 emissions and is 
forecast to increase in comparison to declines in other sectors (DEFRA, 2006a). 
The predicted impacts of climate change are farther reaching and on a much 
larger scale than those related to local air pollution. 
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Evidence of climate change is already apparent. A recent report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC, 2007) states that 
there is high confidence that recent changes in temperature have had 
discernible impacts on many physical and biological systems. Observational 
evidence from continents and oceans shows that many natural systems are 
being affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases. 
The observations include an enlargement and increased number of glacial lakes 
and increasing ground instability in permafrost regions. Based on the evidence 
available, the IPCC (2007) conclude with high confidence that anthropogenic 
warming over the last three decades has had a significant influence on many 
physical and biological systems. Additional evidence is emerging regarding the 
impacts of warming on human systems including effects on agricultural and 
forestry management in the higher northern hemisphere latitudes; an increase 
in heat related mortality in Europe and infectious disease vectors in some 
areas. For example, the heat wave during 2003 caused the premature death of 
14,000 people in France (DoH/HPA, 2007). Due to limitations in evidence 
available the IPCC (2007) have medium confidence regarding the 
anthropogenic influence on human systems. 
Future warming is predicted to have numerous impacts. For example, by mid- 
century annual water availability is projected to increase by 10-40% in high 
latitude areas and decrease by 10-30% over some dry regions at mid- 
latitudes. There is likely to be an increase in the extent of drought-affected 
areas whilst heavy precipitation events are likely to increase in frequency thus 
increasing flood risk. Up to 30% of species will be at increasing risk of 
extinction and around 30% of global coastal wetlands will be lost with millions 
more people experiencing coastal flooding each year. Predicted human health 
impacts include malnutrition, cardio-respiratory and infectious diseases and an 
increase in morbidity and mortality from heat waves, floods and droughts thus 
resulting in a substantial burden on health services. In the longer term, there 
is medium confidence that the partial melting of the Greenland and West 
Antarctic ice sheet as a result of 1°C - 4°C global average temperature 
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increase would cause a sea level rise of 4-6 metres or more. Complete melting 
of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheet would result in a sea level rise of 
up to 7 metres (IPCC, 2007b). As a result of such impacts, there is expected to 
be a mass migration of populations to less affected areas, hence a huge 
pressure on resources world wide. 
1.2 Political action 
In light of such evidence, the G8 reached an agreement in 2005 regarding the 
role of human activity in climate change and the need for urgent action. It was 
agreed that GHG emissions need to slow, peak and reverse and that G8 
countries need to make substantial cuts. Furthermore, at its 33rd G8 summit in 
June 2007, the G8 agreed to aim to at least halve global CO2 emissions by 
2050 from current levels. However, binding figures were not set as the 
president of the USA would only agree to such reductions if China and India 
were also included in the commitment (Elliot and Wintour, 2007). Whilst the 
G8 agreement is a major step forward in terms of climate change policy, 
recent scientific evidence suggests that in order to avoid going beyond a2 °C 
increase in global temperature and thus avoid the most severe and irreversible 
climatic change, it would be necessary to reduce CO2 emissions by 70% - 90% 
by 2050 (Bows et al., 2006; Stern, 2006). 
The UK government set out aims in the Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003) to 
achieve a 60% reduction of UK CO2 emissions by 2050. This target is proposed 
to become legally binding, with a draft climate change bill outlining the 
necessary legislation (DEFRA, 2007). The majority of CO2 emissions resulting 
from transport in the UK are a result of road transport, of which the majority is 
for personal uses (DEFRA, 2006a). Whilst air transport is the fastest growing 
source of CO2 emissions, at a national level personal road transport currently 
accounts for a much larger amount (26% compared to 1%) (DfT, 2006a). The 
UK government currently have a range of transport policies set out in the 
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Climate Change Programme that are expected to deliver a reduction of CO2 
emissions from transport by 13% by 2010 from growth trends (in comparison 
to taking no action) (DEFRA, 2006b). The main policies are outlined in the 
following sections. 
1.2.1 Pricing 
In the 2006 Budget, Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) was altered in order to 
encourage the use of the lowest CO2 emitting vehicles by making vehicles in 
the lowest CO2 emitting band exempt from VED. Furthermore, in the 2007 
Budget the price of VED for the 2nd lowest CO2 emitting band was reduced 
whilst the price for vehicles in the highest CO2 band was increased with plans 
to further increase this in 2008 (DTI, 2007). In addition, fuel duty was 
increased by 2 pence per litre in October 2007 with similar increases planned 
in 2008 and 2009. 
1.2.2 Regulation 
In November 2005 the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) was 
introduced requiring by 2010 that 5% of all fuel sold on UK forecourts 
originates from a renewable source. The alternative Fuels Framework aims to 
promote the development of sustainable alternatives to fossil fuel. The 
government is committed to a3 year rolling guarantee for biofuels and road 
fuel duty rates, with a 20 pence per litre price incentive for bioethanol and 
biodiesel until 2008-09 (DEFRA, 2006b). The 2007 Budget extended the 20 
pence price differential for biofuels to 2009 -10. Together with the RTFO, this 
results in a 35 pence per litre price incentive. 
1.2.3 Voluntary agreement 
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If successful, the UK could also benefit from the voluntary agreement that 
currently exits between the European Commission and European and Asian car 
manufacturers (ACEA/EC, 1998). The aim is to achieve a European average of 
140 grams of CO2 per kilometre for all new cars by 2008 with ambitions to 
achieve an average of 120 grams of CO2 per kilometre for all new cars by 
2010. The UK government are hoping to achieve further efficiency gains 
beyond 120 grams of CO2 per kilometre by supporting the expansion of the 
agreement beyond 2010 (DEFRA, 2006b). 
1.2.4 Future policy direction 
The measures outlined in sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.3 are expected to reduce CO2 
emissions from transport by 13% by 2010 (in comparison to taking no action) 
(DEFRA, 2006b). However, this reduction can not be guaranteed due to the 
reliance on market response in terms of willingness to pay and the uncertainty 
regarding the fulfilment of the voluntary agreement. The measures are likely to 
have an impact on CO2 emissions but will not deliver the significant reduction 
necessary in order for the UK to achieve a legally binding 60% reduction by 
2050. Whilst it is possible that it may be more cost effective to reduce CO2 
emissions in other sectors, in consideration of the possible need to achieve a 
90% reduction of UK carbon emissions (Bows et al., 2006), significant 
reductions from the transport sector are unavoidable. Thus, a new policy 
direction is essential. In recognition of the potential to deliver substantial 
carbon reductions (DEFRA, 2006b; Roberts and Thumin, 2006), the 
government have begun to explore the concept of personal carbon trading as a 
key climate change policy tool. 
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
A personal carbon trading scheme could potentially achieve significant 
reductions with high confidence and hence could be a key contributor in terms 
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of attaining legally binding CO2 reduction targets (Starkey and Anderson, 
2005; DEFRA, 2007, Roberts and Thumin, 2006; Fleming, 2007). However, 
there are currently no detailed designs setting out how such a scheme would 
work in practice including estimated financial costs. In addition, there is no 
empirical evidence available regarding public response and implied policy 
effectiveness. Hence there is clearly a knowledge gap which requires significant 
input in order to determine whether a personal carbon trading scheme should 
progress beyond the concept stage to become a key climate change policy tool. 
This research therefore aims to undertake the first major investigation into the 
feasibility of personal carbon trading. More specifically, the research aims to: 
1. Explore the feasibility of a personal carbon trading scheme used to 
achieve a significant reduction of UK CO2 emissions from personal land 
based transport. 
In particular, the policy design, ability to achieve emissions targets and public 
response are identified as key research areas. Hence, the research aim will be 
achieved through the following objectives: 
1. Fully design a working personal carbon trading scheme for land based 
transport including estimated financial costs. 
2. Explore behavioural response to a personal carbon trading scheme. 
3. Explore public attitudes to a personal carbon trading scheme. 
This research therefore aims to implement an innovative and interactive survey 
design in order to provide a first set of empirical data regarding the feasibility 
of a personal carbon trading scheme in terms of policy design, public attitudes 
and behavioural response. 
The following chapter serves to explore the scope for personal carbon trading 
in the transport sector. Chapter 3 details the design of the personal carbon 
trading scheme, followed by the survey design and implementation. Chapter 4 
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provides survey results on environmental attitudes, with the behavioural 
response presented in chapter 5. Chapters 6 and 7 contain further survey 
results regarding attitudes including perceived effectiveness and acceptability 
ratings. Finally, chapter 8 provides the research conclusions, key findings, 
policy implications and recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
A review of Tradable Permit schemes and their potential to 
reduce carbon emissions from personal transport 
9 
This chapter aims to explore in detail the scope for using a personal carbon 
trading scheme to achieve a significant reduction of carbon emissions from 
personal transport. Section 2.1 provides an overview of Tradable Permit (TP) 
schemes, with a more detailed look at the typical components of such a 
scheme in section 2.2, followed in section 2.3 by possible scheme designs. 
Section 2.4 reviews several examples of current and past working TP schemes, 
highlighting the points of success and failure. Section 2.5 explores recent 
developments in emissions trading and outlines the political interest in the UK. 
Possible approaches to personal trading for all personal energy use in the UK 
are described in section 2.6, whereas section 2.7 details the possible 
approaches to emissions trading in the transport sector including perceived 
strengths and weaknesses in section 2.8. Section 2.9 evaluates the benefits 
and beneficiaries of a personal carbon trading scheme applied in the transport 
sector. The public support for a personal carbon trading scheme is explored in 
section 2.10. Following this, section 2.11 outlines a carbon tax on fuel as a 
possible alternative measure to a personal trading scheme. The final section 
provides conclusions from the chapter. 
2.1 Introduction to Tradable Permit schemes 
TP schemes are economic measures designed to achieve environmental targets 
at the lowest possible social costs. They have the potential to achieve targets 
set under traditional 'command and control' measures but at much lower 
economic costs (Verhoef et a/., 1997) as pollution credits can be transferred 
amongst those who are better equipped to make the desired changes (e. g., a 
reduction in emissions produced) and those for whom the market prices are 
more economically feasible than abatement technology at that time. TP 
schemes therefore provide flexibility and enable new requirements to be 
achieved in a more cost effective manner. 
10 
The use of TP schemes as a means of environmental regulation was proposed 
by an economist in 1968 (Dales, 1968). Following this work, the cost- 
effectiveness of TPs as a regulatory measure was proven in a theoretical 
setting (Verhoef et al., 1997). Tradable permit systems have since been 
applied to point source emissions which are, under normal circumstances, 
regulated by command and control measures. Examples include atmospheric 
pollution (Emissions Trading Programme; Ozone Depleting Chemical 
programme; SO2 allowance trading programme; Regional Clean Air Incentives 
Market (RECLAIM)); the transport sector (between oil refiners (lead in gasoline 
programme); between vehicle manufacturers (Zero Emissions Vehicle 
programme)); the fisheries industry (Individual Transferable Quota); water 
resource management and pollution control; and land-use management 
(Development rights programmes) (OECD, 1999). Whilst this chapter will focus 
upon the application of TPs in the transport sector, examples from other 
sectors will be used where appropriate. 
2.2 Components and workings of a Tradable Permit scheme 
There are several key components that make up a TP scheme. These include 
the aim of the scheme and hence the emissions reduction targets, the basis for 
permit allocation, the distribution of the permits and the scope (for example 
the geographical area to be covered and the types of emissions sources 
considered). The following sections describe the key components of a working 
TP scheme. 
2.2.1 Targets 
TP schemes are typically designed to achieve an emissions reduction target. To 
date they have usually regulated stationary sources of pollution, however TPs 
could also be used to regulate emissions of gas or liquid from stationary or 
mobile sources. Achieving the overall reduction target can be set out in stages, 
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for example with rolling annual sub-targets, or by setting a decadal target in a 
long term scheme. The targets can sometimes vary over the lifetime of the 
scheme, for example if annual sub targets were applied, these could be low in 
the first five years and increased over time as more opportunities for emissions 
reductions became available. Alternatively, a linear reduction could be applied, 
having the advantage of a set reduction each year which is understood and 
known to the trading entities. 
2.2.2 Permit allocation 
The aim of the TP scheme informs the commodity to be traded. For example, if 
the aim was to reduce sulphur dioxide, the commodity to be traded would be 
permits each equating to a set amount of sulphur dioxide. Due to the equity 
impacts, the initial distribution of permits is extremely important (Verhoef et 
al., 1997). There are four main ways of allocating permits as described in the 
following sections. 
2.2.3 Grandfathering 
The 'grandfathering' principle is commonly used in tradable permit schemes 
where allocations are based upon historic emissions patterns and appears to 
have a high degree of acceptability amongst participants as it causes little 
disruption to existing patterns and minimises the financial burden placed upon 
users. For example, a company currently emitting the equivalent of 100 
permits would be given 100 permits free of charge as an initial allowance, 
which would be reduced over time in line with the emissions target (Cramton 
and Kerr, 2002). If the company did not reduce their consumption in line with 
their permit allocation, they would have to buy more permits, thus providing 
an incentive to consume within the allocation. Research conducted in the US by 
Svendsen (1999) revealed a preference amongst the private business market 
for a TP scheme using a grandfathered permit distribution. The preference was 
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a result of the recognised benefits in terms of favouring existing sources 
financially and, moreover, creating a barrier to new market entrants. 
The grandfathering approach is used to allocate permits in the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (see section 2.4). As the permits are 
normally distributed free of charge, the grandfathering approach does not 
provide any revenue for the government, thus requiring the scheme to be 
funded from external revenue. Grandfathering does not consider new market 
entrants who would be disadvantaged by having to purchase permits rather 
than receiving them free of charge, which is a major drawback of this approach 
(Tietenberg, 2000). Moreover, the inclusion of new entrants could increase 
emissions, thus making this allocation method ineffective in terms of attaining 
the emissions target. Grandfathering would be unsuitable for a trading scheme 
where individuals were the trading entity due to the problematic process 
involved in establishing historic emissions levels. In addition, there would be 
significant equity concerns regarding the inclusion of new entrants. 
2.2.4 Auctioning 
Auctioning involves trading entities buying all of their permits from the 
government. This has the advantage of creating funds that could be invested 
into the further development of the trading scheme or other supporting 
measures and reducing the financial burden. However, this method is much 
less popular than the grandfathered approach as users must buy all permits 
rather than be allocated a proportion free of charge. There are also equity 
issues in this approach as those with greater financial power are able to buy as 
many permits as they require, rather than each user receiving an equal 
amount free of charge. However, this could be partly resolved by placing a 
limit on the amount of permits an account could hold and the amount of 
permits that could be purchased at any one time. Auctioning can be used 
where either individuals or businesses are the trading entities. 
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2.2.5 Updating 
Updating involves an allocation based upon information on use which is 
updated over time. This method is popular with users but has disadvantages; 
in particular users are able to increase their allocation by using more permits 
each year, thus increasing their allowance for the following period (Crals et al., 
2003). This system is therefore ineffective as it may encourage greater use of 
the commodity rather than a reduction. 
2.2.6 Free distribution 
Permits could be distributed equally amongst participants free of charge, the 
main advantage being the high degree of social and political acceptance 
(Keppens and Vereeck, 2003). A disadvantage would be that no additional 
funds are created for the government or the operator of the scheme. However, 
this could be resolved by using a combination of methods, such as distributing 
a proportion of permits free of charge and auctioning the remainder. Permits 
could be allocated on an equal per capita basis, which is regarded as the most 
equitable method, or by taking into account, for example where individuals are 
the trading entity, socio economic data relating to personal characteristics 
which influence transport activity, such as age, family size or job type. For 
businesses, permits could be allocated based on the size of the business or, for 
example, on the efficiency of current practices. 
In practice many schemes are likely to use a combination of the allocation 
methods described above. 
2.2.7 Tradability 
Permits can be tradable or non-tradable. Tradable permits can be passed 
between trading entities until they are finally consumed whereas non-tradable 
permits can only be used by the entity they were allocated to i. e. unused 
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permits could not be sold. Most permit schemes use tradable permits as this 
achieves greater efficiency within the system as unused permits can be sold 
rather than 'wasted', hence reductions are made at the lowest cost. Those who 
are able to reduce their emissions easily can do so and sell their excess 
permits to those who cannot reduce their emissions as easily or as cost 
effectively. Tradable permits therefore provide an incentive to reduce below 
the allocation in order to benefit from selling excess permits on the open 
market. 
2.2.8 Geographical area 
Another important aspect of an emissions trading scheme is the geographical 
area to be covered within its remit. This could be on a regional, national or 
international level. Typically, previous schemes have been implemented at a 
national level, with the exception of the EU ETS which includes all power 
stations and energy intensive industries across the EU (see section 2.4). 
However, one of the emissions reduction measures outlined in the Kyoto 
Protocol is an international emissions trading programme, to become 
operational in 2008 (UNFCCC, 1992). It is also possible to apply an emissions 
trading scheme to a particular industry, sector or mode by clearly defining the 
target and eligibility criteria. 
2.2.9 Temporal flexibility 
Within an emissions trading scheme, there can be an element of flexibility 
either in terms of meeting emissions targets or distributing permits. Annual 
targets could be set, which could be waived if banking of emissions credits is 
included in the policy design, as this could possibly result in the over 
achievement of the target during a year where permits were in high supply and 
banked for later use, leading to underachievement in subsequent years when 
permit availability is reduced in line with the overall emissions target. Flexible 
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release of permits is a strategic option that could minimise the risk of permit 
shortages where annual targets are employed, for example permits could be 
released gradually during the year rather than all at the beginning of the year. 
Placing a limit on the amount of permits a permit account could hold at 
anytime and the flexible release of permits could also reduce the scope for 
profiteering. However, there are potential impacts resulting from the various 
methods of temporal flexibility which should be considered prior to 
implementation. For example, in some circumstances it may be necessary to 
have a high level of permits in an account, hence, any limitations could be 
considered unfair. 
2.3 Scheme design 
There are various ways to design and implement a TP scheme. This section 
describes the main approaches. 
2.3.1 Baseline and credit 
In a baseline and credit scheme, permits must be earned before trading can 
begin (UNEP, 2003). A baseline consumption of the resource is established for 
each user. A period of time is then allowed where users can reduce their 
consumption, known as the compliance period. After the set compliance 
period, consumption is recalculated and where actual emissions are lower than 
the baseline, users are given credits equal to the difference. For example, if a 
company had a baseline consumption of 10 units prior to the compliance 
period and 8 units following the compliance period, they would be credited with 
2 units which they could either use or trade. If actual emissions are higher 
than the baseline, the user must purchase credits equal to that amount in 
order to achieve compliance (UNEP, 2003). Examples of baseline and credit 
schemes include the leaded gasoline program and the heavy duty engine 
emissions standards program (UNEP, 2003). 
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A major disadvantage of this method is the establishment of an emissions limit 
for each user, rather than the whole market. This could lead to an increase in 
emissions if new users enter the market (Tietenberg, 2000). A baseline and 
credit scheme is more suitable where companies are the trading entity, due to 
the difficulty involved in establishing baselines for individuals. 
2.3.2 Cap and trade 
The cap and trade approach involves the establishment of an overall emissions 
reduction target or a 'cap' on emissions. Emissions allowances, rather than 
credits, are then provided to each end user (Tietenberg, 2000). Unlike the 
baseline and credit approach, the trading entities do not have to provide a 
baseline consumption, nor are they given a compliance period in which to 
reduce their baseline. Instead, permits are allocated and users then surrender 
the amount of permits equivalent to their consumption back to the regulating 
body. If more permits are required, users can buy from those who have excess 
permits to sell. The allocation of allowances can vary between schemes, 
depending on the method adopted (see section 2.2.2 for methods of permit 
allocation). The major advantage of this method is the high potential to 
achieve a set emissions target at a national or international level. An example 
of a cap and trade scheme is the American ozone depleting substances 
program (UNEP, 2003). As a baseline consumption is not required, such a 
method would also be suitable to apply amongst individuals. 
2.3.3 Open and closed systems 
An open scheme allows smaller emitters to opt in on a voluntary basis. 
Participants would have the same compliance regulations as the non-voluntary 
emitters and would only opt in if they expected to be able to reduce emissions 
in a less costly way and have surplus permits to sell. 
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Closed emissions trading schemes often only include a small fraction of the 
total number of emissions sources, due to the administrative burden and 
financial costs involved, rather than covering all sources of the regulated 
emissions. For example, inclusion of small mobile emitters and large emitters 
could result in the costs of the scheme outweighing the benefits received. 
Examples of closed schemes include the EU ETS, which includes only stationary 
sources of CO2 from power stations and energy intensive industries, such as 
steel and cement, within the European Union (see section 2.4). 
2.3.4 Voluntary versus mandatory schemes 
A trading scheme can be enforced, where all trading entities would have to 
comply, or it can be introduced on a voluntary basis where entities can opt into 
the scheme if they recognise the benefits of doing so. The latter option is likely 
to incur greater levels of political support, however, it could be more 
problematic to achieve a set emissions target. A voluntary scheme would be 
most effective where there is a choice between, for example, paying a tax on 
the commodity for all purchases or opting into a trading scheme where a free 
allocation of permits would be provided, thus enabling a certain amount of the 
commodity to be purchased at no additional cost. 
A mandatory scheme is likely to be more effective at achieving an emissions 
reduction target and provides greater certainty of attainment within a set 
period of time, whereas the voluntary approach could take much longer to 
achieve the same level of emissions reduction. A scheme would be enforced, 
rather than voluntary, where political acceptability is perhaps not such a fragile 
issue, and where it is imperative to achieve a set emissions target within a 
certain timeframe. 
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2.4 Applications of Tradable Permits in environmental regulation: 
successes and failures. 
A worthwhile procedure for any policy maker is to determine the factors within 
previous policies that contributed to their success or failure, in order to avoid 
or implement such factors into future schemes. This section of the review is 
therefore designed to summate, rather than detail, the key points from a 
selection of previous applications of TP schemes which contributed to the 
success or failure. 
The first TP scheme was implemented in the USA during the mid 1970's. The 
Emissions Trading Programme (ETP) was designed to add flexibility to 
stationary sources in meeting the air quality standards required by the Clean 
Air Act 1975 (Tietenberg, 1985). The system has been successful in achieving 
emission reductions at significantly lower costs than those incurred without the 
system (Hahn, 1989). However, the ETP has been described as "falling far 
short of its cost-reducing potential" (Harrison, 1999, p. 27). The main reason 
for the shortfall was the many procedural requirements and restrictions placed 
upon allowable trades (each trade had to be rigorously evaluated and certified 
by the Environmental Protection Agency), which together increased the cost of 
trading and caused uncertainty and delay. As a result, many companies did not 
trade, with the majority of trading carried out internally rather than between 
plants or companies. 
Conversely, the Lead-in-gasoline programme, established in 1982 with a 
purpose of reducing Lead in gasoline from 1.1 to 0.1 grams per gallon over a 
five year period, has been rated a success. There are several reasons for the 
success of the scheme, although it was mainly attributable to the transparency 
of the scheme - the commodity to be traded (grams of lead) and the trading 
mechanisms were well established with all participants which removed any 
uncertainty. In addition, trading was unrestricted, therefore allowing traders to 
trade without the need for permission or certification from the authorities. 
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Other factors contributing to the success of the scheme were the decline in 
consumption of leaded gasoline and the availability of affordable technological 
solutions for replacing lead in gasoline (Raux, 2002). One criticism of the 
system was that permits were not individually identifiable; therefore bogus 
permits were very difficult to trace. Regulators in the Los Angeles air basin 
took this negative aspect of the Lead in gasoline system into account when 
designing the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) programme, 
which was designed to reclaim good air quality and a stable economy. 
Beginning in 1994, the programme features an Allowance Tracking System in 
order to control unorthodox permit transfers and use (Harrison, 1999). 
A vital ingredient for a successful TP system is a strong political will (OECD, 
1999). Without this a system is unlikely to survive, or targets may be reduced, 
as a result of protest and objections. For example, the Zero Emissions Vehicle 
programme, designed to reduce emissions from gasoline-powered vehicles in 
California, was reformed in 1996 when targets to be met in 1998 (seven of the 
most important American and Japanese automakers were required to ensure 
that at least 2% of the vehicles delivered for sale in California were ZEVs') 
were extended to 2003 and voluntary agreements were made with vehicle 
manufacturers rather than enforcing the initial mandatory plans. These actions 
were viewed as victories for the vehicle manufacturers (Raux, 2002). 
Some TP schemes have not progressed beyond the design stage. For example, 
plans to implement a SO2 trading programme in the UK were hindered mainly 
by coinciding regulatory measures imposed upon the European Union (the 
Large Combustion Plant Directive; UNECE Second Sulphur Protocol; the Air 
framework Directive; BATNEEC2; and the Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control Directive) that rendered the system ineffective. Other factors reduced 
1 Genuine Zero Emission Vehicles must have no tailpipe or evaporate emissions, or any 
emissions from fuel production and handling. 
2 Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Costs (BATNEEC), formulated in 
the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and termed BAT in the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) Council Directive (96/61/EC). 
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the necessity of the system, such as the changing composition of energy use 
(coal to gas, reducing SO2 emissions without the need for further regulation); 
and a lack of support from industry and environmental groups. In addition, the 
constantly evolving nature of BATNEEC represented an uncertain trading 
environment. Steedman (1999) believes that the numerous European 
Directives largely explain why TP schemes are much more popular in the USA 
than in European countries. Therefore, TP schemes must be compatible with 
existing regulatory measures if they are to be successful. This problem was 
also evident in the Emissions Trading Programme established in the US in 
1985. The value of emissions credits was uncertain as, if the state failed to 
meet its air quality target, credits would be confiscated, therefore discouraging 
the purchase of credits. This problem has since been resolved but serves as an 
important lesson for future schemes. 
In preparation for the international emissions trading programme due to begin 
in 2008, the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was introduced 
across Europe in January 2005. The programme is established in the European 
Emissions Trading Directive and will serve as a "trial and error' period and 
establish sufficient monitoring and enforcement programmes that can be 
adapted for the international programme before trading commences in 2008. 
The scheme will also "promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a 
cost-effective and economically efficient manner" (DIRECTIVE 2003/87/EC) 
and will therefore contribute to achieving Europe's commitment to the Kyoto 
Protocol, a GHG emissions reduction of 8% below 1990 levels between 2008- 
12 (UNFCCC, 1992). Currently the scheme includes high emitting industries, 
such as cement and steel, and power stations from the 15 countries that made 
up the EU before the expansion to 25 countries in 2004. Phase I ends in 2007, 
with phase II beginning in 2008 - 2012, coinciding with the first Kyoto 
commitment period. For simplicity, the scheme currently includes only CO2 
emissions, with each permit being equal to one tonne 6f C02 or the equivalent 
amount of another gas based upon its Global Warming Potential (GWP). 
However, this will be extended to all GHG emissions in phase II when the 
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international scheme will include trade of permits for six greenhouse gases3. 
Subsequent phases will run over 5 year periods. In order to establish caps on 
emissions, each country provided a National Allocation Plan, specifying the 
total amount of emissions permitted in phase I and how permits would be 
allocated. Governments were given the option of auctioning up to 5% of their 
national allocation, with the remainder being allocated free of charge on a 
grandfathering basis. Phase II will allow up to 10% of permits to be auctioned, 
with the remainder grandfathered. Those installations emitting more than their 
allocation must buy permits from the market, conversely those emitting less 
than their allocation benefit from selling their excess permits. 
Due to the method of cap setting, the EU ETS is predicted to not realise its full 
potential during phase I. The National Allocation Plans (NAPs) reduced the 
effectiveness of the scheme, in terms of achieving the emissions target, as 
member states were authorised to produce their own NAPs and thus set their 
own standards. There is also an issue of fairness in this method, as industries 
within the scheme could have varying allocations depending on their NAP. In 
addition, this process is possibly open to pressure from industries on national 
governments, in terms of increasing their allocations. This highlights the need 
for strong political willpower, as also demonstrated by the underachievement 
of the full potential of the Zero Emissions Vehicle Program. Whilst the 
grandfathering approach is likely to incur high levels of political support, this 
method of permit allocation could also be problematic as it raises several 
fairness issues and discourages and possibly prevents new market entrants. 
However, the Commission have recognised the importance of over allocation 
and have subsequently set the NAPs for phase II to achieve a 7% reduction of 
emissions from 2005 levels (European Commission, 2006a). 
This section of the review has revealed six key points that are essential to the 
success of any TP scheme: 
3 Carbon Dioxide, Methane, Nitrous Oxide, Hydroflourocarbons, Perflourocarbons, and Sulphur 
hexafluoride. 
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o The scheme must be compatible with existing regulations. 
o The regulators must have a strong political will. 
o All aspects of the system must be free of any uncertainty. 
o The scheme must have enthusiastic support. 
o The scheme must be necessary, and therefore its purpose is justifiable. 
o The scheme must be effective by establishing limits and appropriate 
allocation methods. 
2.5 Developments in TP schemes 
Tradable permits are becoming increasingly popular amongst policy makers. 
For example, one of the emissions reduction measures outlined in the Kyoto 
Protocol is an international emissions trading programme, to become 
operational in 2008 (UNFCCC, 1992). Whilst the international trading scheme 
is a new concept, trading schemes have been used previously in order to 
satisfy the demands of a Protocol. For example, the Ozone-Depleting 
Substances programme was established in 1988 by the EPA as part of its 
implementation of the Montreal Protocol. The system was described as a 
success and provided flexibility in phasing out Ozone depleting chemicals 
(Harrison, 1999). 
2.5.1 Political interest in the UK 
There is a growing interest in the use of tradable permits to achieve emissions 
reductions in the UK. In addition to the desire to include aviation in the EU 
ETS, there is a strong interest in the use of personal carbon permits, where 
individuals are given a free allocation of permits and have the onus of reducing 
their own emissions. For example, the DEFRA recently commissioned a review 
of personal carbon trading (Roberts and Thumin, 2006), which investigated 
how such a scheme might work and highlighted the main knowledge gaps. The 
previous secretary for the environment, David Miliband, has also publicly 
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discussed the idea of individual carbon trading (Adam and Batty, 2006). In 
addition, during a speech at the Audit Commission annual lecture, David 
Miliband highlighted several potential benefits of personal carbon trading 
(DEFRA, 2006c): 
"It is easy to dismiss the idea as too complex administratively, too utopian or 
too much of a burden for citizens. Do we really want another Government IT 
programme? Are there not simpler ways of achieving the same objective by 
focusing on business to change their behaviour not citizens? And will it ever be 
politically acceptable? But, as the Tyndall Centre's work shows, in the long 
term, there may be potential to make a system work, and in a way that is 
arguably more equitable, more empowering and more effective than the 
traditional tools of information, tax, and regulation'1. 
In addition, a report commissioned on the economic impacts of climate change 
discussed the application of tradable permits as a possible mitigation measure 
(Stern, 2006). Following the research conducted by Fleming (1996) and 
Starkey and Anderson (2005), a 10 minute bill on Domestic Tradable Quotas 
was presented by a Member of Parliament to the House of Commons in July 
2004. There is also a growing interest in the use of TP schemes to reduce 
emissions from personal transport. For example, the Commission for 
Integrated Transport (CfIT) recently published a piece of research exploring 
the design of a TP scheme suitable for surface transport (Watters and Tight, 
2007). 
2.5.2 The EU ETS 
Whilst the EU ETS does not currently include mobile emissions, the experience 
gained could be used to extend the scheme to include emitters such as 
vehicles (European Commission, 2003). In the EU ETS review, the European 
Commission focused on 2 options - including car manufacturers and including 
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individual motorists (European Commission, 2006b). The UK government have 
also explored the prospect of including road transport in the EU ETS, 
concluding that the earliest date for inclusion would be during phase III in 
2013 (DfT, 2007). In addition, the UK Government have declared their wish for 
aviation to be included in the EU ETS (DfT, 2003; DEFRA/DfT, 2007), which, if 
realised, could be a major step forward for the use of Tradable Permit schemes 
to reduce carbon emissions in the transport sector. Aviation was not included 
in the first phase of the programme, but the Commission is able to propose 
extending the activities covered by the scheme before the second phase begins 
in 2008. The UK Government is hoping to extend trading in aviation emissions 
to an international scale, however it is unknown when such a scheme will be 
established. The 33rd Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) endorsed the development of an open emissions trading scheme for 
international aviation, although reaching a consensus amongst participants is 
likely to be a long process, therefore the UK Government are keen that 
aviation will be included in the European scheme until an international system 
is established (DfT, 2003). However, there is an issue regarding international 
flights in terms of fairness advantages gained by those airlines based outside 
of the EU. Including mobile emitters, such as cars would most suitably be done 
through the inclusion of fuel producers (upstream). Due to the substantial 
differences in buying power and demand for permits, it could be too 
problematic to include individuals in a scheme that also includes industry. 
However, the inclusion of fuel producers would essentially result in an 
additional cost on fuel price, which could incur low levels of public support. 
Such issues require consideration when evaluating the possible extension of 
the EU ETS. 
2.6 Possible approaches to personal carbon trading 
Within the literature, proposals have been developed for schemes designed to 
reduce national emissions of CO2 from other sources of energy consumption in 
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addition to that consumed for transport. The following sections describe and 
evaluate such schemes. 
2.6.1 Domestic Tradable Quotas 
The concept of Domestic Tradable Quotas (DTQs) was originally developed in 
1996 by David Fleming (Fleming, 1996) and is also known as Tradable Energy 
Quotas (TEQs) (Fleming, 2007). The scheme is based on the concept of 
contraction and convergence, developed by the Global Commons Institute in 
1990 (Meyer, 2000) and is designed to achieve a reduction in CO2 emissions 
from domestic sources, including household energy and transportation. 
Fleming (2007) sets out two main reasons for applying TEQs: depleting oil 
supplies and the associated security issues, and the impacts of climate change. 
The scheme would be implemented at a national level with an annual limit 
placed upon the amount of carbon emitted from energy use. This 'carbon 
budget' could then be reduced each year in order to achieve the overall 
emissions target. It is proposed that the emissions limit would be set by an 
independent Carbon Policy Committee, thus being independent of central 
government politics. The carbon budget would be divided up into carbon units 
which would each equate to 1kg of CO2. All fuels would be assigned a carbon 
rating, corresponding to the quantity of carbon emitted on combustion per unit 
of fuel and by the generation of a unit of electricity. As, at the time, roughly 
40% of energy consumption in the UK resulted from domestic purposes, it was 
concluded that 40% of the annual budget would be allocated free of charge to 
adults on an equal per capita basis, and the remainder auctioned to 
organisations. Whenever individuals or organisations purchase fuel or 
electricity, they are required to surrender to the retailer the corresponding 
amount of carbon permits. There would be one emissions market, where the 
residential, industrial and commercial sectors trade together. Thus, adults 
consuming below their free allocation could sell their surplus permits back to 
the market, where they could then be purchased by adults consuming over 
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their free allocation, or by organisations. However, this approach could be 
considered unfair by individuals as they have much lower buying power than 
organisations, thus leaving the latter at an unfair advantage in terms of 
purchasing permits. One approach would be to separate the market, for 
example, into personal and business permits, although by doing so this could 
reduce the overall economic efficiency of the scheme. 
DTQs might be best monitored at the level of fuel producers, who would have 
to surrender carbon units corresponding to the amount of fuel sold. A 
computer data base would contain a carbon unit account for each individual 
and all transactions would be recorded. Each person would have an electronic 
swipe card which would have to be used, for example, when purchasing petrol. 
So far, research has revealed that such a database is feasible using current 
technology and could be linked to all fuelling stations in real-time, therefore 
allowing instant trading of carbon units. The carbon unit accounts have been 
proposed to be included on the national identity cards, should they be 
introduced (Starkey and Anderson, 2005). 
Ongoing work carried out by Starkey and Anderson (2005) explores the use of 
DTQs and provides an evaluation in terms of equity, effectiveness and 
efficiency. Their findings suggest that there is enough evidence within the 
philosophical literature regarding distributive justice that an equal per capita 
permit allocation is equitable. In addition, if the revenue raised from permit 
sales is used appropriately, it should be possible to implement DTQs without 
disadvantaging those on low incomes. As individuals are given permits free of 
charge and on an equal per capita basis, this is likely to be considered as the 
fairest approach and would thus maximise public acceptability of the scheme. 
With the establishment of a fixed annual carbon budget in line with an overall 
emissions target, DTQ schemes should be effective in terms of achieving the 
emission reduction target. In addition, the use of existing credit card 
technologies is well understood and has been operational for a number of 
years. Thus, the scheme should be technologically feasible. Given that costs 
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are likely not to exceed those relating to other government IT projects, DTQs 
could be affordable in public policy terms. In addition, the efficiency of DTQs is 
further increased as individuals would be incentivised to identify ways to 
reduce emissions and benefit from selling excess permits or from buying less, 
thus leading to more efficient emissions reduction (Starkey and Anderson, 
2005). 
2.6.2 Personal Carbon Allowances 
Hillman and Fawcett (2004) propose a mandatory system of personal carbon 
allowances (PCA) to significantly reduce carbon emissions in the UK. This has 
been further developed by Fawcett (2005). Based on the principle of 
contraction and convergence, the PCA scheme uses a very similar structure to 
the DTQs scheme. However, the fundamental difference is the scope of the 
scheme as PCAs regulate emissions arising from personal energy use only, 
whereas DTQs cover all national emissions sources, thus organisations and 
individuals. The scheme would have an overall emissions target, for example, 
in order to stabilise atmospheric levels of CO2 at 550ppm, a 60% reduction of 
CO2 emissions would be required by 2050. There would be a limit on the 
amount of carbon available each year, with this carbon budget being reduced 
each year in line with the overall emissions reduction target. The PCA scheme 
would include all personal domestic energy consumption, thus including 
personal transport. In the UK, personal energy consumption accounts for over 
50% of the total energy consumed. Each adult would receive an equal amount 
of the annual carbon budget in the form of personal carbon allowances (PCAs). 
Children would receive a smaller allocation as they would typically require less 
than adults. Rather than allocate additional permits to groups that could be 
largely disadvantaged by the scheme, Fawcett (2005) proposes government 
subsidies for energy efficiency and/or renewable energy measures for certain 
classes of people. This method is preferred as it is recognised that by providing 
certain groups with more PCAs results in a reduced ration available for 
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everyone else. The equal per capita allocation of PCAs is justified in terms of 
equity, where everyone is provided with equal rights to pollute. The allowances 
would be tradable, thus those that have excess allocations and those who are 
able to reduce their emissions can benefit by selling their excesses to those 
consuming over their assigned amount. The tradability of allocations increases 
the economic efficiency of the scheme as emissions are being reduced at the 
least overall cost. 
The PCAs would be administered using individual electronic cards that would 
contain the full annual allocation. It is proposed that existing technology could 
be used, thus reducing implementation costs. The scheme would be introduced 
with as much information available as possible regarding the carbon impacts of 
everyday decisions. Suggestions include: smart utility bills showing carbon 
emissions in addition to monetary costs; enhanced fuel pumps displaying the 
carbon content of the purchase; carbon-ometers in vehicles to record carbon 
emissions; carbon labels on appliances; and carbon rated homes sold with an 
energy survey. Fawcett (2005) recognises that one of the key benefits of 
carbon rationing is the provision of a framework for carbon reductions. There is 
no need to promote separate polices, such as cycling strategies, as individuals 
would recognise the benefits of energy reduction measures such as renewable 
energy sources, household energy efficiency improvements and low carbon 
methods of transport. The scheme also provides personal flexibility in energy 
reduction as people can choose the most feasible method. Whilst carbon 
rationing places responsibility for carbon reductions on the individual, this in 
turn creates a demand for products and technologies with improved energy 
efficiency, thus creating a competition between manufacturers to sell low 
carbon products. This process has the extra benefit of making manufacturing 
processes and products more energy efficient without the need for regulation. 
2.6.3 Compatibility with existing measures/more extensive trading 
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Section 2.4 revealed the importance of trading schemes fitting in with the 
current policy landscape, which was also noted by Bottrill (2006) and Roberts 
and Thumin (2006) in regard to personal carbon trading. The following section 
therefore explores the compatibility and integration of the national measures 
discussed above (DTQs and PCAs) with the EU ETS. 
Table 2.1: Compatibility of DTQs and PCAs with the EU ETS 
Emissions source 
Stationary emitters: 
Electricity 
High-emitting industrial 
Others 
Mobile emitters: 
Road 
Air 
Other 
EU ETS 
Org Ind 
x 
x 
xx 
X 
X 
X 
DTQs 
Org Ind 
x 
X 
 
X   
X   
X   
PCAs 
Org Ind 
x 
X x 
X x 
X  
X  
X  
Key: x = not included,  = included. Org = organisation, Ind = individual. 
Adapted from Starkey and Anderson (2005). 
Given that all schemes employ carbon permits as the trading commodity, it is 
feasible to explore the possibility of integration. Starkey and Anderson (2005) 
suggest a route from the EU ETS to a DTQs scheme. As the EU ETS includes 
emissions from the electricity sector and large industries, and DTQs includes all 
emitters other than the electricity sector, the EU ETS could be gradually 
expanded to include more emitters and finally, individuals. To avoid double 
counting, it would be necessary to change the entities that surrender permits 
in the electricity sector from the power stations to the end purchasers 
(individuals). A similar evolutionary route could be imagined in terms of 
combining the EU ETS with PCAs. Individuals would surrender permits for their 
electricity consumption, whilst the EU ETS expanded to include other emitters 
and individuals. However, there are several issues to highlight when 
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considering the evolution of a national trading scheme to an international 
scale. Individual countries, for example the UK, could possibly lose the 
authority to set their own caps, as foreseeably the scheme would be 
administered and monitored at an EU level. In addition, the complexity of 
trading between individuals at an EU level has not been investigated although 
it is foreseeable that the complexities involved in monitoring could be 
magnified in comparison to those expected in a national scheme. Integration 
would thus be dependant on the adequacy of monitoring and the technological 
feasibility of administering a database at an EU level. 
2.7 Reducing CO2 emissions from the personal transport sector 
through the application of tradable permits: up stream and 
downstream approaches 
Within the transport sector, trading of CO2 emissions permits could take place 
amongst individuals or companies. The latter option could include fuel suppliers 
and vehicle manufacturers and is referred to as an 'upstream' scheme. A 
scheme where individuals are the trading entity is referred to as a 
'downstream' scheme (Roberts and Thumin, 2006). The following section 
discusses several possible designs for both types of schemes within the 
transport sector. 
2.7.1 Tradable Fuel Permits 
Dobes (1997) suggests allocating Tradable Fuel Permits (TFP) to individuals, 
primarily because it would provide a direct incentive to reduce fuel 
consumption through vehicle choice, driving behaviour and residential location. 
Another benefit would be the creation of a large market due to a large number 
of players, which would increase the efficiency of the system. However, the 
major drawbacks that Dobes (1997) perceives to inhibit implementation of 
such a scheme are the substantial implementation, administration, monitoring 
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and enforcement costs incurred. Whilst the costs involved may be substantial, 
it could be possible to auction permits in order to raise the revenue required. 
Therefore, the monetary requirements of TP schemes designed to regulate 
mobile transport emissions may not be such an inhibiting factor. 
Keppens and Vereeck (2003), also discuss a TFP scheme applied to individuals. 
The scheme would be used in order to meet an emissions reduction target in 
line with the European Kyoto Protocol targets and would thus be implemented 
throughout the European member states. The TFP scheme is proposed to begin 
operation in 2008, with the aim of reducing total CO2 emissions from 
passenger cars by 8% (404 million tonnes of CO2 to 372 million tonnes of 
C02). The cap during the first year of implementation would be set at total CO2 
emissions from passenger cars in 2007, and then be reduced each year to the 
target level. Each TFP would accord to one kilogram of gasoline, the amount of 
fuel would change depending upon fuel type and its carbon content. An 
electronic swipe card would be required to purchase fuel and each transaction 
would be recorded in order to aid monitoring and enforcement of the system. 
The TFPs would be distributed free of charge amongst the population, the 
amount received depending upon age: 0-18 years (youngsters), 18-65 
(active), and 65+ (retired). Whilst this allocation method may be plausible in 
an obvious sense, for example, that a person aged 6 years will not require as 
many permits as a person aged 25, such categorisation could be construed as 
age discrimination. It is also unfair as it is plausible that a person aged 17 
could require as many permits as someone aged 30 years but would have to 
pay more to obtain them. 
The TFPs would be distributed at the beginning of each year, which offers a 
convenient administrative mechanism for monitoring. In order to reduce costs, 
monitoring would be carried out upstream upon fuel producers and importers. 
TFPs would have to be presented in proportion to the amount of fuel sold. Such 
a mechanism would reduce costs as fewer parties require monitoring (in 
comparison to each individual permit holder being monitored). One of the 
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perceived problems of such a scheme is avoidance behaviour, which would be 
highlighted on a continent (compared to an isolated state) if it were possible to 
cross the border in order to refuel in a country that was not participating in the 
TFP scheme. Such problems are possible in Europe and Keppens and Vereeck 
(2003) suggest that all outgoing transport be forced to refuel before crossing 
the border. However, the likelihood of being able to impose such a requirement 
is unknown. A European institution would be formed and would be given 
authority to monitor member states and enforce penalty payments for any 
infringement of the rules. Keppens and Vereeck (2003) state that this is 
essential as each member state would then have direct incentives to 
adequately monitor and enforce national TFP schemes, thus making the 
scheme more efficient. 
Verhoef et a/ (1997, p. 547) believe that "there seems to be sufficient room for 
using tradable permits in the regulation of road transport externalities" and 
describe a TFP scheme for individuals, but rather as part of a package of 
instruments than a sole measure as suggested by Dobes (1997), and Keppens 
and Vereeck (2003). The TFP is proposed as the most attractive option for the 
regulation of non-localised and time independent external costs, such as CO2 
emissions, whilst tradable road pricing smart cards are suggested as a control 
measure for localised and time-dependant externalities, such as congestion 
and local air pollution. However, the focus here will be upon the TFP scheme as 
it would affect all externalities, irrelevant of time and location. For example, 
fuel users would be inclined to optimise their fuel usage and thus waiting in 
congested conditions where an engine would use fuel inefficiently is likely to be 
avoided where possible. In addition, the combustion of fossil fuel is the primary 
cause of local air pollution, thus a focus upon reducing the amount used would 
lower pollution levels. It is also unlikely that the two systems would be 
implemented together, or at all, considering the increased costs involved in 
applying two schemes rather than one. Verhoef et a/ (1997) state that TFPs 
are the most promising direction for the use of tradable permits in the 
regulation of road transport externalities and recognise the benefits of a TFP 
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scheme, being the provision of incentives to reduce car use and purchase 
energy-efficient vehicles, and overall a reduction in road transport 
externalities. No major obstacles are envisaged in terms of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, providing that permits are required to purchase 
fuel. A proposed solution to border problems, as also noted by Keppens and 
Vereeck (2003), would be to gradually decrease the amount of permits 
required for fuel purchase 50km from the border until the border is reached. 
This method is envisaged to discourage individuals crossing the border to re- 
fuel. However, it would have several impacts: individuals would have an 
incentive to travel to the 50km zone where more fuel could be obtained with 
less permits, creating in effect a traffic generator; also, individuals residing 
within the area would benefit from higher fuel consumption in comparison to a 
person who has an equal number of permits residing too far away to warrant 
travelling the distance, thus raising an equity issue. 
In recognition of the significance of, and the threat posed by forecast increases 
in, GHG emissions from the transport sector, a working group of the National 
Transportation Council in France have explored potential applications of 
tradable permits (Raux, 2002). The group also wanted to find ways of escaping 
the 'environmental deadlock', which they perceive as conventional instruments, 
such as fuel taxation, that have reached their limits. The fuel tax protests that 
occurred in the UK during September 2000 is the example used to highlight 
such limits. They describe a TFP scheme distributed downstream, where each 
vehicle would receive an equal amount of permits. However, there are obvious 
drawbacks to this approach. Individuals who owned more than one car would 
have advantages over those who did not, such as the ability to consume more 
travel or profit from selling excess permits. This could provide incentives to 
purchase extra vehicles, perhaps older and very fuel inefficient models, in 
order to gain the benefits outlined above. These issues are very important 
aspects that require consideration in such a proposal. The benefits recognised 
by the group was the incentive to optimise individual travel, as also recognised 
34 
in all of the proposals discussed above. Again, the perceived drawbacks are the 
introduction and monitoring costs. 
2.7.2 Voluntary Tradable Fuel Permits with taxation 
Raux and Marlot (2005) believe that, due to the impending development of 
stringent objectives regarding emissions reduction, a fuel ration seems 
unavoidable. They describe how a system of decentralised transferable permits 
could work, using the case of France as an example for practical application. 
Raux and Marlot (2005) preferred a downstream scheme because an upstream 
scheme would lose its advantages over a tax system as there would be no 
permit allocations and possible acceptability issues could arise as a result of 
allowing private companies to manage the rationing. 
Their proposal is a system of TPs that relate to fuel consumption at the 
individual level. Permits corresponding to the amount of CO2 contained in the 
fuel would be transferred at the point of sale. To reduce problems of social and 
political acceptability, permits would be freely allocated to individuals based on 
their possession and use of a car. This could possibly encourage those who do 
not own cars to purchase one and join the market, or encourage multiple 
ownership. However, Raux and Marlot (2005) highlight the limitations of doing 
so, as a result of the vehicle insurance and maintenance costs. The amount of 
permits allocated to each person would be based on the average consumption 
of fuel per vehicle. The authors also suggest, to avoid the occurrence of equity 
issues, an allocation method based on socioeconomic characteristics could be 
applied where, for example, families with children and those living in rural 
areas are given more permits. However, this could raise fairness issues 
amongst those that have no children but do an equal amount of travelling. 
Thus, the most viable allocation of permits appears to be an equal per capita 
approach, where each person would receive an equal amount of permits 
regardless of their personal choices or circumstances. 
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One of the main benefits regarding the free permit allocation is that a certain 
amount of fuel can be consumed without incurring any additional costs, thus 
having equity and accessibility advantages over a tax system (Raux and 
Marlot, 2005), though it should be noted that a tax system could be set up to 
replicate this to some extent although the process of revenue redistribution 
would arguably be more complex. The regulating authority would introduce 
and publicise a regular reduction in permit availability, with a rolling horizon of 
around a decade. Permits would remain valid for an unlimited period, although 
any unused permits would be taken into account when establishing the free 
allocation of permits the following year. Permit exchange would be centralised 
through a stock exchange, which would yield the daily permit value. Sales and 
purchases could also be made at banks or using the internet. Each person 
would have a permit account held on a chip card which would record debit and 
credit operations. This card would be compatible with existing automatic teller 
machines already installed at fuel stations. The use of existing technology 
would therefore reduce implementation costs. 
Raux and Marlot (2005) propose that the TP scheme be introduced with a 
coinciding CO2 tax, assuming it would be socially unacceptable to suddenly 
apply the permit scheme to all motorists. The permit scheme would then be a 
voluntary measure which motorists could opt into, with the benefit of receiving 
a free permit allocation and thus avoiding the CO2 tax until the allocation has 
been used. Thus, opting into the permit scheme would actually be a less costly 
option then simply paying the CO2 tax. To maintain this benefit, the maximum 
permit price would not increase beyond the level of taxation. Thus, the price of 
permits is bounded by the level of tax. Raux and Marlot conducted a 
quantitative evaluation of both measures to conclude that the main difference 
between the two options results from the transfers between motorists and 
central government. Using an elasticity of fuel demand of -0.3, in the case of 
tax they calculated that motorists as a group would lose approximately ¬7.2 
billion, and central government would gain almost ¬5.1 billion. In the long run, 
applying an elasticity of -0.7, these values become ¬3 billion and ¬1.2 billion 
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respectively. In the case of permits, the transfers are significantly lower as a 
result of the free permit allocation. For the two elasticity values (-0.3 and - 
0.7), the losses to motorists would be ¬374 million and ¬161 million 
respectively. This demonstrates that, as a group, motorists would be less 
worse off under a system of permits rather than tax. The dramatic difference 
would be experienced by central government, which, due to the reduction in 
fuel consumption and thus tax revenue, would loose more than ¬1.7 billion. 
However, as this loss could be reduced if, for example, only 50% of the 
permits available were distributed at no charge, with the reminder being priced 
at cost to offset losses in tax revenue. This method could possibly reduce the 
occurrence of a political versus public acceptability debate which could arise 
given the option of adopting a system where all permits are free, and thus 
maximizing public acceptability, or a system where there are no free permits, 
thus minimising loss of government revenue but incurring lower levels of public 
support. 
Raux and Marlot (2005) suggest that the permit market be operated openly, 
thus allowing the exchange of permits between all emitters of CO2 across 
various sectors. Such a market would include freight and public transport, 
however, due to the international competition between carriers, it is recognised 
that these modes would need to be included in a scheme operational at the EU 
level, or higher. 
In conclusion, Raux and Marlot (2005) recognise that the tax system has 
advantages in terms of the lower implementation costs and governmental 
revenue losses. However, the benefits of a permit scheme are considered to far 
outweigh such advantages, considering the higher levels of public support 
resulting from the free permit allocation, the strong incentives to reduce 
consumption in terms of benefits received, greater certainty of achieving the 
emissions reduction target and the possibility of linking the permit scheme with 
a global market whilst allowing central government complete control over the 
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domestic market, thus having the ability to protect it from fluctuations on the 
world market. 
2.7.3 Trading schemes amongst fuel producers 
A study commissioned by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
(SEPA) (SEPA, 2006) describes the options available for reducing CO2 
emissions from road transport. Following a review, they recommend further 
exploration of a cap and trade scheme amongst fuel suppliers and a baseline 
and credit scheme for car manufacturers, believing that it would improve the 
cost effectiveness of CO2 mitigation. This upstream approach is preferred to a 
downstream scheme amongst individuals as the latter is considered to be more 
difficult to monitor and enforce. In addition, the large number of trading 
entities involved would lead to high transaction costs, with only limited benefits 
in terms of efficiency or effects on competitiveness compared to a scheme 
based on fuel suppliers. Instead the upstream scheme amongst fuel suppliers 
is preferable as it is, in principle, feasible to include all transport modes (e. g., 
freight, shipping, air and cars/vans), although it is recognised that this would 
require a lot of work on improvements in data monitoring, policy design and 
implementation. A step by step approach is thus recommended, where the 
scheme would first be implemented for one or more modes, such as road 
transport, then extended to include other modes at a later stage. In order to 
steer emissions reduction in the transport sector, SEPA recommend a closed 
system with an established cap on emissions. 
SEPA (2006) also recommend the further exploration of a C02 tax on fuel as an 
alternative policy, noting that it would provide similar effects as a cap and 
trade scheme for fuel suppliers whilst being easier and less costly to 
implement. However, there are other important considerations to be made 
here, such as the effectiveness (ability to meet the emissions reduction target) 
and public acceptability. 
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Grayling et al (2006) propose an extension of the EU ETS to include tailpipe 
emissions of CO2 from road transport, indirectly through fuel suppliers. Due to 
the small number of companies involved (20 in the UK account for more than 
99% of fuel used by road transport), and with the fuel duty system already in 
place accounting for every litre of fuel supplied, such a scheme would be 
relatively simple and cheap to administer. If within the UK, the scheme would 
be administered by the Environment Agency and, based on the costs of the 
Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (a tradable obligation on fuel suppliers to 
supply bio fuels), is estimated to cost around £1 million per year for the 
government and £2 million per year for the industry, which is a very small 
proportion of their annual turnover. Currently the EU ETS does not include 
mobile sources of C02, but the possibility of expansion to cover such sources is 
included in the legal framework (Article 24). If extended to an EU level, 
currently there are 102 oil refineries owned by 31 companies, while each 
country has a system of fuel duty, thus providing the administrative 
foundation. As a result, the administration of the scheme is thought to be 
straightforward and cost effective. 
Emissions allowances could be allocated to fuel suppliers at a national or EU 
level. However, given the inclusion of international aviation and the fact that 
the oil industry operates internationally, the authors suggest a more logical 
approach would be to allocate at the EU level. Permits would be allocated free 
of charge, either based on market share (grandfathering) or through 
auctioning, or a combination of these methods. One option would be to auction 
all of the permits available, using the revenue to reduce fuel duty, thus 
demonstrating that the scheme is designed to reduce emissions rather than 
raise revenue. However, in doing so, this could lead to an increase in demand 
for fuel, and hence the increased possibility of shortages. Another option would 
be to earmark a proportion of the revenue for climate change mitigation 
measures, which is likely to be less problematic than reducing fuel duty. 
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Emissions permits would be tradable between suppliers, thus providing 
incentives to produce cleaner fuel supplies. Allowances corresponding to the 
amount of fuel supplied, in terms of CO2 equivalent, would be surrendered 
each year. As their carbon content is renewable, bio fuels would be exempt. 
This provides a double incentive, firstly the fuel suppliers require less permits if 
their sales of bio fuels increases and secondly, the increase in demand for bio 
fuels is likely to increase as it would be sold at no extra charge in comparison 
to diesel or petrol. This creates a positive feedback process between individuals 
and fuel suppliers, with the overall impact being to increase the consumption 
of bio fuels and reduce the consumption of other fuels. However, this does not 
take into account the sustainability issues regarding bio fuels in terms of land 
requirements, deforestation and transportation from the country of production 
to the country of sale. 
An upstream scheme amongst fuel suppliers is preferred to a scheme amongst 
individuals due to the political barriers, the administrative costs and the 
complexity of involving individual car owners in the EU ETS. People would have 
to learn how to use the scheme, which involves understanding carbon 
emissions as a new currency. In addition, large numbers of people are likely to 
require extra emissions allowances to continue their current behaviour or be 
forced to change their behaviour, which could result in low public support for 
the scheme. It is recognised that in the long term, none of the aforementioned 
barriers may be insurmountable, however the inclusion of households in the EU 
ETS is unlikely to be a politically viable option for phase III (beginning in 2013- 
2017). Many of these points are also applicable to a scheme amongst fuel 
suppliers. It is already problematic to ascertain a fuel price across Europe 
(SEPA, 2006; Raux and Marlot, 2005), thus agreeing permit allocations and 
prices has the potential to be equally as problematic. Moreover, under a cap 
and trade scheme, unless the environmental performance of fuel improved in 
line with the cap, the amount of fuel available would decline, for example, each 
year if linear annual reductions were imposed. Thus, it would be impossible for 
individuals to continue their current behaviour without either increasing their 
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expenditure on fuel or purchasing a much cleaner vehicle. Therefore, some 
level of involuntary behavioural change seems inevitable as a result of either 
an upstream scheme amongst fuel suppliers or a downstream scheme amongst 
individuals. In addition, the scheme proposed by Grayling et a/ (2006), could 
be difficult to sell to the public as an environmental measure, instead being 
viewed as an additional fuel tax and another government fund raiser, as 
essentially, the impact on end users would be the same as a tax increase 
(increased fuel price). The strong objections to the fuel tax escalator 
demonstrated in September 2000 in the UK provide evidence of the limited 
public support for fuel price increases (Lyons et al., 2002). To avoid similar 
events, it would be necessary, through information campaigns, to make the 
public fully aware of the aim of the scheme, how it would work, how it would 
be monitored and why it is preferred to the alternatives, for example, people 
would not have the inconvenience of having a permit account with the need to 
exchange permits in addition to money when purchasing fuel. However, many 
people might see the other side to this argument: those that reduce their 
consumption could have permits to sell and thus profit from, whereas reducing 
consumption in an upstream scheme would provide no such incentive. 
2.7.4 Trading amongst vehicle manufacturers 
In response to a critical analysis of the ACEAs voluntary agreement designed 
to reduce CO2 emissions from new vehicles, Michaelis and Zerle (2006) instead 
propose a baseline and credit trading scheme amongst vehicle manufacturers. 
This approach is preferred to an upstream scheme based on fuel consumption 
as this is believed to act as an additional tax, thus being unacceptable to 
consumers and is believed to not fully exploit the potential for increasing 
energy efficiency of vehicle technology. However, this could be achieved 
indirectly by stimulating consumer demand for cleaner vehicles and fuel in 
response to high fuel prices and limited availability. This approach would not 
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require regulation amongst vehicle manufacturers and could thus be more 
politically acceptable. 
The aim of the trading scheme would be to achieve a CO2 emissions target for 
passenger cars placed on the EU market within a given trading period. Each 
car manufacturer would be required to buy an amount of permits equal to the 
estimated amount of CO2 emissions caused by the vehicles sold within the 
given trading period. By gradually reducing the amount of permits available, a 
set reduction in aggregate annual fleet emissions would be achieved across all 
car manufacturers. In addition, the tradability of the permits allows the 
greatest improvements to be made at lowest cost. 
The scheme would be a supplement to the existing fuel tax system, thus 
overall targeting drivers and influencing their driving habits through the tax 
and influencing fuel consumption and CO2 emissions from passenger cars 
through the permit scheme. However, it could be argued that a downstream 
carbon trading scheme amongst individuals alone could achieve this, thus 
requiring only one form of regulation with the possibility of achieving greater 
levels of political support. 
Vehicle manufacturers could achieve reductions in three main ways: 
developing new technologies, reducing the size of vehicles, and marketing to 
promote the sale of such low emissions vehicles. The latter option is thought to 
have a greater impact over time due to the influence that marketing strategies 
are currently thought to exert on consumer attitudes and choice. 
2.8 Strengths and weaknesses: evaluating the options for TP schemes 
in the transport sector 
This section discusses the key strengths and weaknesses of the different 
approaches to reducing CO2 emissions from personal transport through the 
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application of tradable permits. Each approach was evaluated according to its 
scope and design attributes. 
2.8.1 TFPs: upstream 
Due to the relatively small number of trading entities, a trading scheme 
amongst fuel producers would be much easier to implement and monitor than 
a downstream scheme amongst individuals, whilst also having the ability to 
achieve the same emissions target due to the cap on fuel availability. However, 
the impact on consumers would be an increased fuel price with the knowledge 
that fuel availability is limited. Given the public dislike of increased fuel prices, 
this approach could be highly unacceptable. In addition, the impact on 
individuals could be similar to a fuel tax, which could have regressive effects, 
i. e. many losers (particularly those on low incomes). As a result, it would be 
necessary to provide compensation in the form of redistribution of benefits, 
which are likely to be in the form of tax relief elsewhere, for example, income. 
It would be much easier to include fuel producers, rather than individuals, into 
the EU ETS, as it is currently an upstream system. However, it is possible that 
the limits on availability would not be as strong in an upstream scheme as 
individuals are not directly involved in terms of having a permit allocation. 
Hence, it is possible that the risk of permit shortages or very high permit prices 
would be more likely to occur in an upstream design. There could potentially 
be an issue of political acceptability amongst fuel suppliers in an upstream 
scheme. For example, in the UK, only 20 companies supply fuel (Grayling et 
al., 2006). As the UK is dependant on fuel supplies from such companies, it 
could be difficult to enforce any scheme that could have adverse affects on 
profits amongst an industry that could have substantial lobbying power. In 
addition, as highlighted in section 2.4, a strong political will to enforce the 
scheme would be essential. 
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2.8.2 TFPs: downstream 
A downstream scheme is likely to result in fewer inequities than an upstream 
scheme, as individuals have the option of trading and benefiting from selling 
excess permits. A free allocation would also provide a certain amount of fuel to 
be purchased at no additional costs, thus reducing the regressive impacts in 
comparison to an upstream scheme where individuals have no permit 
allocation. The distribution of permits also provides an incentive to reduce fuel 
consumption and thus sell excess permits. An equal per capita allocation 
method that applies to everyone regardless of car ownership would have the 
effect of providing monetary compensation to those that do not purchase fuel. 
In addition, this approach is likely to be considered as the most fair method, as 
everyone would receive the same amount of permits. Thus, this approach is 
likely to attain greater levels of public support than a system based upstream 
amongst fuel producers. Conversely, the upstream scheme could be preferable 
in that permits are not required to purchase fuel, thus removing the 
inconvenience of having to purchase permits. 
There are potential issues regarding the implementation costs of a downstream 
scheme, given the large number of trading entities involved and the level of 
monitoring required. However, such costs can be largely, if not fully, offset by 
auctioning a proportion of the annual carbon budget. 
2.8.3 Vehicle manufacturers 
It is likely that the only acceptable method of permit allocation would be the 
grandfathering approach, as this allows gradual adjustment from current 
emissions levels, whereas a baseline and credit scheme would require the 
purchase of additional permits if a reduction was not made over the 
compliance period. However, there are issues with both approaches as they 
discourage new market entrants and favour those organisations that have 
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relatively higher levels of emissions as they would receive a larger initial 
allocation than a smaller emitter. This could create additional issues of 
fairness, and thus unacceptability amongst those involved. 
The appropriateness of a scheme amongst vehicle manufacturers is dependant 
upon the target to be reached. For example, if the target is to reduce CO2 
emissions from the transport sector by 60% by 2050, the use of an upstream 
scheme amongst fuel suppliers or downstream scheme amongst individuals 
would be better equipped to achieve the target, given the ability to place a cap 
on carbon availability. In addition, a scheme amongst vehicle manufacturers 
could not influence the level of vehicle usage, and thus the amount of 
emissions arising from vehicle use. Moreover, the monetary costs per 
kilometre travelled would decrease which could subsequently result in an 
increase in vehicle kilometres and thus traffic volumes. A TFP scheme could 
possibly stimulate vehicle manufacturers to increase fuel efficiency as there 
would be a demand resulting from individuals wanting to get the most out of 
their TFPs in terms of personal travel. Hence, the same or similar results could 
be achieved through a TFP scheme without the need for additional regulation 
amongst vehicle manufacturers. A scheme amongst vehicle manufacturers 
could only be effective when applied to reducing fleet emissions, i. e., grams of 
C02/kilometre, rather than reducing CO2 emissions across the transport sector 
to a predetermined level. 
Section 2.4 highlighted the need for a strong political will in order to make a TP 
scheme successful. To date, the European Union have a voluntary agreement 
with vehicle manufacturers, hence it is highly possible that changing the nature 
of regulation from voluntary to mandatory could be unacceptable amongst 
vehicle manufactures. 
2.9 Public support for TP schemes in the transport sector 
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Section 2.8 identified a downstream TP scheme to possibly be more acceptable 
than an upstream design, largely as a result of the perceived difference in 
equity impacts. Given the importance of acceptability when deciding whether a 
policy will become operational (Whittles, 2003; Schade and Schlag, 2003; 
Jones, 1995; 2003), this section further examines the issues that could 
possibly influence the acceptability of a downstream scheme of tradable 
permits in the transport sector. For the purpose of the following evaluation, it 
is assumed that each individual would receive a free allocation of permits on an 
equal per capita basis with a predefined cap on carbon availability. 
2.9.1 Effectiveness 
Several studies have revealed that acceptability of a road pricing measure 
(used as a generic term to describe any measure that imposes increased costs 
on consumers), is largely dependant upon the ability to meet its aim (Schade 
and Schlag, 2003; Rienstra et al., 1999; Jones, 2003; Whittles, 2003). A TP 
scheme could, theoretically, be 100% effective as a quantitative approach is 
used, being a limit placed upon carbon availability within a specified time 
period. Therefore, regardless to individuals' willingness to absorb additional 
costs, the emissions reduction target would be obtainable as consumption 
could not go beyond the set carbon allowance. 
2.9.2 Benefits 
Benefits received as an outcome of a pricing measure are fundamental to 
acceptance (Jaensirisak et a/., 2003; Schade and Schlag, 2003). The benefits 
that could potentially arise from a TP scheme are essentially the same as those 
arising from pricing measures such as fuel price increases. For example, both 
measures could result in a reduction of car use and thus subsequent reductions 
in local air and noise pollution, traffic congestion and road accidents (see 
section 10 for further details on benefits). However, the realisation of such 
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benefits is dependant upon the ability to achieve the emissions reduction 
target. As a TP scheme is potentially a very effective measure, it could thus be 
considered acceptable. Benefits exclusive to the TP scheme would be the direct 
financial benefits from selling excess permits. Therefore, individuals are 
provided with positive incentives not to pollute, rather than not being able to 
pollute due to financial restrictions which may occur in a fuel price policy and 
may thus be viewed as less positive. 
2.9.3 Fairness 
Acceptability is strongly connected to fairness (Rietveld and Verhoef, 1998; 
Viegas, 2001; Jakobsson et at., 2000; Fujji et at., 2004; Erikson, 2006; 
Bonsall, 2007). Issues relating to infringement of freedom and exclusion from 
activities are prevalent objections to pricing measures. In addition, extra 
charges may be considered as punitive and unfair as prices will be paid 
regardless due to the inelasticity of car use. Raux (2002) perceives rationing 
the right to freedom of movement to be one of the main public objections to 
the introduction of a TP scheme. However, with any pricing measure, some 
degree of unfairness is inevitable due to the unequal distribution of resources 
throughout society. As also noted by Steg (2003), it is very difficult to fairly 
distribute amongst the public the pains and gains of transport pricing. 
However, the key is to minimise inequities, or keep them to a minimum (May, 
1992). A TP scheme could potentially minimise inequities on the basis that 
each person would receive an equal amount of permits free of charge (in 
comparison to each person having to pay the same increased price for fuel 
immediately following the increase). 
2.10 Perceived benefits of a downstream TP scheme in the transport 
sector 
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Many significant benefits could arise from the implementation of a successful 
TP scheme. Table 2.2 provides a range of possible benefits that a successful 
trading scheme might provide and outlines the main beneficiaries. In most 
cases, society would be the main beneficiary and in many cases this would 
benefit the government in terms of retaining revenue that would otherwise be 
required. It should be noted that some or all of these benefits could possibly be 
obtained through other measures to reduce carbon emissions, such as fuel 
price increases, depending on the level of effectiveness in terms of achieving 
the desired targets. 
Table 2.2: Potential benefits and beneficiaries of a successful TP 
scheme 
Benefit 
Reduced impacts of climate change 
Reduced local air pollution 
Reduced congestion 
Increased trend towards localisation 
Improved health and fitness 
Enhanced community spirit 
Increased use of public transport 
Increased uptake of clean fuels and vehicles 
Beneficiary 
Natural and human systems 
Society, government 
Society, government 
Society, local economies 
Society, NHS 
Society 
Public transport operators, 
society 
Industry, society 
The main benefit of a successful TP scheme designed to significantly reduce 
carbon emissions could be the reduced impacts of climate change, which is an 
international benefit. However, the overall impact on climate change mitigation 
would be dependant on global participation (Hillman and Fawcett, 2004), given 
that the UK currently contributes 2% to global emissions (DEFRA, 2006a), of 
which transport accounts for approximately 26% (DfT, 2006a). As outlined in 
chapter 1, climate change is expected to have a range of negative impacts. As 
the benefits of reducing these impacts would be at an international level, from 
this perspective it would be in the interest of all nations to join or establish an 
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emissions trading scheme. In addition, a recent report by Stern (2006) 
suggests that the result of taking no action against climate change would cost 
around 5% of global GDP each year, whereas the cost of taking action would 
be much less at around 1% per year. Thus, the impact of climate change on 
the global economy could also be significantly reduced. 
Whilst the relationship between carbon emissions and local air pollution is 
indirect, it is possible to assume that, as a result of a reduction in the use of 
petroleum, more efficient driving practices and/or increased use of clean fuel 
technology, all emissions created as a result of transportation would decrease 
in quantity. Congestion levels are likely to decline as a result of the TP scheme 
(people may avoid congestion in an effort to reduce fuel consumption), thus 
accumulation of pollution in congested zones would decline. In addition, a 
reduction in congestion creates a time benefit for the public and a significant 
monetary benefit to the economy, given the estimated cost of traffic 
congestion in the UK, which is currently £20 billion each year (Cook, 2005). 
Given the health impacts associated with local air pollutants (COMEAP, 1998), 
health benefits can also be assumed to result from a reduction in the emission 
of local air pollutants. In addition to providing a public health benefit, this in 
turn would reduce the demand for the National Health Service. There would 
also be an environmental benefit in terms of reducing acid rain formation and 
in turn reducing the impact on vulnerable ecosystems. However, it would be 
difficult to determine a precise reduction in local air pollutants as the amount 
of emissions is dependant upon engine performance, which depends upon 
driving behaviour and driving conditions (i. e. number of engine revolutions and 
temperature). 
A TP scheme could also create a demand for local amenities, as this would 
reduce the need for car use and/or reduce journey length. The provision of 
local amenities would also encourage the use of alternative modes such as 
walking and cycling, as car use may be unnecessary. Thus, another health 
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benefit would result, in terms of increased levels of physical fitness. The 
economic gains from selling permits could provide an important source of 
income to those in lower income quintiles and help to improve living standards 
and quality of life. Individuals would be forced to make decisions regarding 
their travel behaviour which may help to promote an increased sense of 
responsibility for personal actions and environmental consciousness. A major 
perceived outcome of the system would be a move away from car dependency 
and high travel consumption. This in turn would provide an increase in quality 
of life as a result of reduced levels of air and noise pollution, increase in 
physical activity (cycling or walking rather than driving), and increased leisure 
time (less time spent in congested traffic and travelling). An increase in 
socialisation may also be expected due to the use of local facilities and 
services, increase in car occupancy, and trading routes. 
If abatement costs are lower than market prices, or if changes are viable, it is 
likely that those individuals that are able to alter their travel behaviour will do 
so, either to cooperate with the scheme or to benefit from selling excess 
permits. It is possible that in order to maintain car use, modes that consume 
less carbon would be used, such as public transport. As a result, it is likely that 
the provision of public transport would need to be increased substantially in 
order to provide alternative travel modes to car use. The use of public 
transport would be even more attractive if, for example, individuals did not 
require permits to use such modes, but did require permits to purchase fuel for 
car use. The main beneficiaries would be the operators, as a result of the 
business opportunities, and thus increased profit, that would be created. In 
addition, the increased use of public transport could improve social cohesion by 
re-establishing or creating an increased sense of community spirit as people 
would be travelling together rather than separately, thus creating an 
opportunity to socialise. 
The purchase of clean fuel technology (fuel and vehicles) could dramatically 
increase, such as hybrid, fuel cell or electric vehicles, which would require less 
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alteration to personal travel behaviour. The main beneficiaries would be the 
fuel producers and vehicle manufacturers, in terms of business expansion and 
thus increased profits. In addition, the increased up take of clean fuel 
technology could lead to mass production and thus reduced retail prices, 
leading to further uptake as it becomes affordable and eventually creating a 
positive feedback cycle until prices are as low as possible. It is also possible 
that travel distance will be reduced, with individuals living closer to places of 
employment or using local amenities. Frequency of journeys is also likely to be 
reduced, which would be aided by the provision of local amenities; trip- 
chaining; and working from home where possible. Where possible, individuals 
would benefit from increased vehicle occupancy, thus car-sharing activities 
could increase. 
Motorists would be inclined to drive in a manner that utilises fuel most 
efficiently, thus for example, avoiding rapid acceleration and deceleration and 
excessive speed. Keppens and Vereeck (2003) suggest that as high speeds 
would be avoided, an improvement in road safety could be expected. However, 
the opposite effect could also occur where drivers exceed speed limits in order 
to maximise fuel efficiency (e. g. in a 20 mph zone). Therefore, it is possible 
that a TP scheme may require more stringent penalties placed upon speeding 
offences. 
Whilst a number of suggestions are provided here, the real benefits and social 
impacts, and thus the social feasibility of a TP scheme, are largely unknown. 
Thus, further research in this area is of paramount importance to the 
progression of tradable permits in the transport sector. 
2.11 Carbon tax on fuel as an alternative measure 
Whilst the aim of the review was to explore the potential of tradable permits, it 
is important to simultaneously explore the alternative measures in order to 
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determine the most suitable policy. TP schemes were identified as having the 
potential to be 100% effective, however increasing fuel tax could arguably 
deliver the same or similar reductions. According to elasticities of fuel demand, 
fuel tax could be designed to achieve significant reductions in CO2 emissions 
from the transport sector. Further advantages of this fiscal method are the 
relatively low implementation, monitoring and transaction costs, thus in theory 
achieving the emissions target at a much lower cost, and hence being more 
economically efficient. The ability to create large sums of public revenue is a 
strong benefit of fuel tax. Whilst taxation is regressive amongst motorists, the 
inequities resulting from tax increases could be largely offset by revenue 
redistribution and the scheme could be made more attractive to the public by 
hypothecating revenue into supportive measures, such as public transport 
improvements which would provide alternatives for those with the lowest 
willingness to pay for fuel. However, if the revenue was redistributed in the 
form of, for example, reduced income tax, it is foreseeable that the increase in 
personal income (as a result of reduced income tax) could be used to partially 
offset the increased fuel prices and hence cause underachievement of the 
emissions target. In addition to the environmental consequences of 
underachieving the emissions target, the impact on public perception and thus 
acceptability could be detrimental. Hence, revenue redistribution would have to 
be in a form that is not equal to charging people more for fuel whilst at the 
same time partly reimbursing the additional costs through increasing their 
income. 
2.12 Conclusions 
The main aims of this review were to explore the potential for the use of TPs in 
the regulation of emissions arising from personal transport. The review 
indicated a strong and growing political interest for personal trading in the UK. 
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The extension of the EU ETS to include mobile emissions could greatly increase 
the likelihood of the schemes described in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 being realised. 
In addition the UK Governments desire to include aviation in the EU ETS may 
set a precedent for the trading of externalities created by transportation 
modes. At least, it indicates a positive future for the possibility of using TP 
schemes in the transport sector. In addition, the knowledge that decision 
makers at the highest levels are considering TP schemes for such purposes 
validates further research in this area. 
An evaluation of possible applications in the transport sector revealed a 
downstream tradable fuel permit scheme as the strongest design, having 
equity and acceptability advantages over an upstream design amongst fuel 
suppliers. A scheme amongst vehicle manufacturers was also evaluated but 
could not achieve the same level of reduction achieved by a personal scheme. 
Effectiveness, benefits and fairness were identified as key factors in terms of 
public acceptability of a downstream TFP scheme. In order to further the 
investigation into the application of personal carbon trading as a key policy in 
the transport sector, it is imperative to explore such issues. However, as 
highlighted by the review, there is currently no empirical evidence regarding 
public response to a personal trading scheme. In addition, the scheme designs 
outlined in sections 2.6 and 2.7 were lacking details in terms of, for example, 
estimated financial costs, permit price and carbon reductions targets, which 
would be crucial elements in terms of designing a scheme in order to explore 
public response. Hence, to gain empirical data regarding response to a TP 
scheme, it would first be necessary to fully design a TP scheme. 
A carbon tax on fuel was identified as having the greatest potential to achieve 
similar results as a TP scheme. It is likely that trading would be compared to 
taxation at a policy level prior to implementation. In addition, there is a 
growing interest within the literature regarding taxes versus trading (Roberts 
and Thumin, 2006; Keay-Bright and Fawcett, 2005). There are interesting 
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questions regarding the trade-offs between a potentially unpopular policy with 
uncertainty regarding the level of effectiveness delivered, and a TP scheme 
with relatively high implementation and running costs, but a potentially high 
degree of effectiveness in delivery. Whilst TPs were perceived to receive 
greater levels of public support than pricing measures, there is no empirical 
evidence to support such suggestions. 
Chapter 1 identified the need to significantly reduce carbon emissions from the 
transport sector. Given the potential to secure significant reductions and the 
growing strength of political interest, there is considerable scope to further 
investigate the application of TPs (Dobes, 1997; Crals et al., 2003; Verhoef et 
a/., 1997; Raux, 2004). In consideration of the conclusions reached and the 
knowledge gaps highlighted, the following chapter sets out the research 
methodology. 
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Chapter 3 
Survey design and implementation: the Tradable Carbon Permit 
scheme, fuel price increases and interview process 
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This chapter details each part of the survey work. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 
describe respectively the working policy design of the Tradable Carbon Permit 
(TCP) scheme and a system of fuel price increases (FPI). Both policies were 
purposely designed in order to explore public response. Section 3.3 outlines 
the research questions addressed by the survey work, with the research 
hypotheses in section 3.4. The survey design is then presented in section 3.5, 
followed in more detail by the research process and stages of implementation 
in section 3.6, with sample statistics provided for the main survey. 
3.1 The TCP scheme 
This section describes the TCP scheme developed to satisfy the first study 
objective which, to recapitulate, was to design a personal carbon trading 
scheme to significantly reduce carbon emissions arising from the use of 
personal transportation. The TCP scheme was designed to serve as a realistic 
policy scenario for use in the public attitudes survey, hence it does intend to 
fully explore all related technical and implementation issues. The following 
sections provide an indication of how the TCP scheme could work across modes 
and how the scheme would work in terms of the individual, where issues 
related to the allocation of carbon permits, fuel purchase, temporal flexibility, 
trading options and facilities and public transport are discussed. In addition, 
estimates of financial costs relating to the TCP scheme are presented, together 
with estimated permit price and the subsequent effect on fuel price and fuel 
taxation revenue. Such issues were identified as being the most important in 
terms of the purpose of the scheme design (for use in a public survey). 
However, whilst they are not as fundamental to the survey, the requirements 
of the scheme, in terms of technology, trading facilities, and monitoring are 
also outlined. 
3.1.1 Emissions goal to be achieved 
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The overall CO2 emissions target is in line with the aim set out in the UK 
governments Energy White Paper to achieve a 60% reduction of CO2 by 2050 
(DTI, 2003), which is also proposed to become legally binding in the 
forthcoming Climate Change Bill (DEFRA, 2007) (see section 1.2 for further 
details). Thus, the emissions target for the TCP scheme is a 60% reduction of 
CO2 from personal land-based transportation from 2004 levels to be achieved 
between 2005 and 2050. The start date of 2005 was selected for consistency 
purposes relating to the start date proposed in the individual interviews, and 
also to benefit from the use of current statistics relating to carbon and travel 
consumption and thus avoid complex forecasting which may have produced 
inaccuracies. For consistency with the transport statistics used, the TCP 
scheme is discussed and presented in terms of carbon rather than C02- 
Chapter 2 highlighted the cap and trade design to be the most suitable for use 
amongst individuals, hence this design has been adopted. As the scheme is 
focused on personal trading, it would operate as a closed scheme including 
individuals only. In addition, a mandatory basis is assumed (see section 2.3.2 
- 2.3.4 for more detail). In order to achieve the 60% reduction of carbon 
emissions by 2050, a limit would be placed upon the amount of carbon 
(converted into the fuel equivalent) available each year thus creating a carbon 
budget. In line with the emissions target, the carbon budget would decrease by 
1.34% each year from 2004 levels, therefore reducing by 2.68% in 2006; and 
4.02% in 2007,5.36% in 2008 and so on until 2050. The gradual reduction in 
carbon availability allows society to steadily adjust. As the system progresses 
and the reductions become greater, individuals would be less dependant upon 
travel by carbon consuming modes as alternatives would be available, such as 
clean fuelled personal motor vehicles, and public transport. In addition, the 
necessity to travel is likely to decline as a result of the expected increase in 
demand for, and thus the provision of, local amenities, such as shops. 
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3.1.2 Geographic area 
It is likely that a TCP scheme would be introduced initially in an area smaller 
than the EU in order to gain the experience necessary for application on a 
larger scale (i. e. monitoring and enforcement systems; resolving 
impracticalities). Hence, Great Britain is used as a case study. In addition, the 
statistics used in this study are calculated for GB, not the UK. Corresponding 
statistics produced for Northern Ireland are produced in a different format, 
thus making it difficult to combine the two sets of data. Whilst it was 
unnecessary for the purpose of this research to include a carbon budget for 
non GB residents traveling within GB, it is recognised that such issues would 
need to be addressed prior to policy implementation. 
3.1.3 Commodity to be traded 
The scheme would work on the basis that carbon permits are required in order 
to purchase carbon-containing fuel for land-based personal transportation 
modes (e. g. car, motorbike). Each carbon permit would correspond to 1 
kilogram of carbon. Given the direct relationship between fuel carbon content 
and carbon emissions (Keppens and Vereek, 2003), the amount of permits 
required would be equal to the carbon contained within the fuel purchased. For 
example, if the fuel purchased contained one kilogram of carbon, permits to 
represent one kilogram of carbon would be required in order to purchase the 
fuel. Upon introduction of the system, it would be necessary to distribute 
information such as carbon content of fuels, and carbon emissions per mile in 
order to aid individuals to distribute the use of their carbon permits. Measures 
to reduce consumption should also be included, such as car sharing, trip- 
chaining, walking and cycling. Journeys made by public transport, cycling and 
walking require no carbon permits. 
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It is likely that the demand for public transport (PT) services would 
subsequently increase following the introduction of the TCP scheme, hence 
carbon emissions from public transport are likely to increase. In order to 
reduce carbon emissions from PT and thus to avoid partially offsetting the 
carbon reduced from personal transportation, regulation would be required. In 
conjunction with the personal TCP scheme, it is suggested that a business TCP 
scheme be established which would replicate the key principles of the personal 
scheme but would only include business travel. This would include, for 
example, all land based freight travel; self employed people business travel 
and travel undertaken on behalf of an employer. This would essentially create 
two trading schemes which operate on the same basis, however the allowance 
of permit trading between the personal and business market would require 
thorough examination with particular regard to the differences in purchasing 
power amongst the trading entities. PT could be included in the business TCP 
scheme, which would have the same emissions target as the personal TCP 
scheme and would require operators to produce carbon permits corresponding 
to the carbon content of their fuel purchases. This in turn would necessitate 
the uptake of clean fuel technology and increased efficiency of public transport 
vehicles and services. Such a scheme could increase the attractiveness of PT 
modes as personal carbon permits would not be required, therefore 
encouraging the usage of this 'permit free' mode. The amount of carbon 
currently emitted from public transport would be gradually reduced each year 
in line with a 60% reduction. However, placing such limits on carbon- 
containing fuel supply to PT modes may restrict the ability of operators to 
introduce sufficient levels of services to meet demand, which may in turn 
reduce the potential for replacing car journeys with PT modes. The requirement 
of PT operators to purchase carbon permits may therefore be introduced as the 
personal TCP scheme progresses, possibly in 2010 rather than 2005, to allow 
for other measures that reduce the need to travel, such as local shops and 
telecommuting, to become established. Taxis could also be included in the 
business scheme, however it is suggested that the carbon used whilst 
transporting a customer should be payable by the customer and subsequently 
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credited to the carbon permit business account of the taxi owner/company. 
Hence, the remainder (for example, resulting from journeys between customer 
pick up) should be accountable to the taxi driver/owner in order to encourage 
the uptake of increased fuel efficient driving and vehicles in addition to the 
purchase of clean fuel vehicles in the long term. 
3.1.4 Initial carbon permit allocation 
In several places the literature review presented in chapter 2 identified 
suggestions that the provision of a free permit allocation would minimise the 
equity impacts resulting from increased fuel price and could therefore be more 
publicly acceptable (Starkey and Anderson, 2005; Raux and Marlot, 2005). 
Hence, at the beginning of each calendar year, half of the TCP schemes' annual 
carbon budget would be equally distributed free of charge to each person aged 
17 and above. This method would provide individuals with a set allocation of 
carbon permits, during the use of which they would not incur any additional 
costs during fuel purchase. This method also allows individuals to adapt 
gradually and, as the system progresses and carbon availability declines, 
individuals would be less dependant upon travel by carbon consuming modes 
as alternative measures would have been implemented, such as public 
transport, clean fuelled vehicles and local amenities. Therefore, demand for 
carbon would gradually decline over time as carbon availability also gradually 
declined. Chapter 2 described several alternative means of allocating free 
permits, however this method was based on the age that an individual in the 
UK is legally permitted to obtain a driving license. It is recognised that prior to 
policy implementation, it would be necessary to fully explore the various 
methods of permit allocation. 
When the free permit allocation has been used, all additional permits must be 
purchased from the central permit market. Alternatively, any of the free 
allocation that is unused can be sold back to the government, who would then 
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sell to those people wishing to purchase additional permits. The government 
would also sell the remaining half of the annual carbon budget through the 
central permit market in order to raise revenues. The inclusion of 
hypothecation would have several purposes: 
o It increases the financial viability of the scheme as revenue raised would 
be used to fully fund the scheme (monitoring, implementation, enforcement 
and operating costs), thus removing the burden from tax payers (public money 
would otherwise be required to fund the scheme). 
o Funds available to invest in public transport improvements would increase 
political acceptance of the system as 'carrots' such as transport services for 
those unable to reduce their demand for travel or pay for additional permits 
would be provided, thus reducing social exclusion. 
o It introduces visibility into the spending of revenue raised as the 
investment would be visible (e. g. improved public transport and local services). 
Political acceptance is increased if the benefits of the system are tangible 
(Small and Gomez-Ibanez, 2000; Whittles, 2003). In addition, the visibility of 
hypothecated funds and its usage would increase public acceptance as there 
would be no confusion regarding the purpose of fund raising (Jones, 1995). 
o Investment in public transport would provide individuals with more 
options for reducing their carbon consumption, which is particularly important 
in the early stages when personal clean fuel modes are in limited supply. 
o If all permits were distributed free of charge the government would not 
gain any revenue to fund the scheme and invest in supportive measures such 
as public transport. 
3.1.5 Temporal flexibility 
The permits sold by the government could be distributed at the beginning of 
each calendar year along with the free permit allocations. However, in order to 
reduce the risk of a permit shortage, it is proposed that the permits for sale 
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through the central market would be released gradually throughout the year, 
which could be for example an equal amount every month or take into account 
any seasonal changes in demand. Whilst it is unlikely that any carbon permits 
would not be used, any unused carbon permits may be carried forward to the 
next year as this would not affect the overall emissions target. However, there 
are several potential problems to consider regarding permit release. There is a 
risk that demand for permits may outweigh supply to the extent that all 
permits are sold before the year ends. Releasing permits gradually throughout 
the year may partly resolve this, or use of demand to determine permit price, 
but nevertheless it is still a possibility. Such an event has the possibility of 
inducing scenes similar to those occurring in response to the fuel strikes in 
September 2000, where many people were unable to purchase fuel and thus 
use their cars (Lyons et al., 2002). This could be a serious problem for those 
individuals who are car dependant and requires further thought. 
Hoarding of permits is also a concern as this would affect availability and thus 
consumption. It is therefore important to discourage hoarding by removing the 
benefits of doing so, which could be achieved by using a set price for permits. 
Some individuals may wish to stockpile permits for use in possible emergency 
situations, which could also affect permit availability. Placing a limit on the 
amount of permits any one carbon account can hold at any time would perhaps 
resolve this. 
3.1.6 Trading facilities 
Secure facilities for buying and selling permits would be required. All trading 
would have to be conducted in real time in order for carbon availability to be 
established before any transactions are carried out, therefore a real time 
electronic data base must be established. Trading could occur via the internet 
where individuals could also access their own permit accounts in order to check 
the balance and transactions (using the same principles as internet banking). 
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As they are perceivably accessible to the majority of individuals and would 
have the facilities to carry out cash transactions, it may be possible to trade at 
Post Office outlets or using Paypoint machines in newsagents with the use of a 
carbon permit card. Electronic Trading Machines (similar to Automated Teller 
Machines) could be situated at shopping outlets, or be accessed on-street (as 
some cash machines currently are). Alternatively, it could be possible to link 
existing ATMs to the carbon database which would reduce the necessity for 
new equipment (Raux and Marlot, 2005). It would also be possible to buy and 
sell permits whilst purchasing fuel through existing Chip and Pin machines 
which would be adjusted to read the chips in the carbon cards. Research by 
Starkey and Anderson (2005) suggests that it would be possible to create such 
trading facilities using current information technology. 
3.1.7 Technology 
Each person would be issued with an electronic swipe card which must be used 
when purchasing fuel and selling or buying permits. Each person would be able 
to access their account details in real time (check balance, look at transactions 
made) as all information would be stored on a national electronic database. 
Research conducted by Starkey and Anderson (2005) suggests that such a 
database would be possible using current information technology. The accounts 
would be similar to those currently used for individual banking. Carbon 
accounts could be stored on identity (ID) cards, which are currently being 
considered by central Government (Home Office, 2004), and would reduce the 
implementation costs of the TCP scheme. However, should the ID scheme not 
become apparent, or be delayed, then an alternative approach could be used. 
The onus of data collection and production of carbon cards could be removed 
from the government and placed onto the individual by allowing people to join 
the TCP scheme, which would be necessary for anyone wishing to purchase 
fuel. Individuals would be required to complete an application form (or perhaps 
go to a designated registration address in their area) which would provide all of 
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the necessary details. The potential problems related to this method are false 
registration and false use of identification and therefore requires further 
thought. In addition, the distribution of the free permit allocation would vary in 
that only the people registered would receive a free allocation. Whilst this 
could be favourable amongst carbon users as there would be a larger free 
allocation and/or more carbon available to purchase, it loses the benefit of 
providing a form of compensation and a 'stake' in the environment to those 
individuals who do not consume carbon. 
A registration fee would be requested, the amount corresponding to the 
production and administration costs of the carbon card. Similar methods are 
currently used for the administration of passports, television licences and 
driving licences. Such a method would reduce the dependency of the TCP 
scheme upon the introduction of the ID card scheme and also reduce the cost 
burden of data collection, production and administration of carbon cards should 
the TCP scheme not be introduced in conjunction with the ID card scheme. In 
addition, it is possible that the TCP scheme would be more acceptable if it was 
introduced independently of the ID card scheme. 
Trading outlets (see trading facilities) would have to access the real time 
electronic database, which could perhaps be connected to landlines as they are 
already installed in most locations and the network could be expanded, 
therefore reducing the necessity of a separate communications system. 
3.1.8 Monitoring and enforcement 
There are potential problems to consider in relation to the carbon permit 
market. By reducing the availability of permits and increasing their value over 
time, the demand for, and thus supply of, illegal permit markets is likely to 
increase. Hence, the legal permit market would be competing with illegal 
markets. Such activities would jeopardise the emissions target and would also 
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remove value from the carbon permits, revenue from which is likely to be vital 
to the running of the system (this problem could also occur if fuel prices were 
increased as a sole measure to reduce carbon emissions). Hence, adequate 
monitoring of the scheme is essential. In order to reduce costs, it is suggested 
that monitoring of carbon permit consumption would be carried out upstream, 
amongst fuel wholesalers and producers, rather than downstream (upon 
individual fuel consumers). The wholesalers would be required to produce an 
amount of permits equal to the carbon content of their annual fuel sales. In 
order to detect fraudulent activities the scheme would be monitored regularly 
at the individual level, which would be continuous throughout the year. This 
would involve the monitoring of trading transactions in order to track permits, 
monitor usage and detect unusual activity, aided by the use of electronic swipe 
cards (ability to track switch, debit, and credit transactions). The requirement 
of using chip and pin technology in order to purchase fuel and permits would 
enforce the scheme. In addition, in order to aid the identification of illegal 
permits each legal permit could be given a unique identification number. This 
was demonstrated in the RECLAIM programme which featured an Allowance 
Tracking System in order to control unorthodox permit transfers and use (see 
section 2.4). All personal information collected through the TCP scheme 
database would be classed as confidential and hence should not enter the 
public domain. 
3.1.9 Estimated financial costs 
The financial costs of the TCP scheme could seriously affect its attractiveness 
and feasibility as a policy option, and therefore whether or not it would be 
implemented. In order to reduce reliance on public funds, it would be 
preferable if sufficient amounts of revenue to cover all costs related to the TCP 
scheme were raised from the sale of permits. 
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There are several components of the TCP scheme that compose the overall 
costs: 
o Establishment of a permit market; 
o Installation of trading facilities; 
o Information campaign; 
o Investment in PT; cycle and walking facilities; and local amenities; 
o Operating costs (this may include the use of electricity to power 
databases); 
o Monitoring/maintenance costs. 
Investment in public transport, cycle and walking facilities and local amenities 
and operating costs would be annual. The implementation costs could be 
recuperated as the system progresses, therefore dividing the costs over the 
period of the system. Alternatively, the implementation costs may be funded 
by central government revenue as the scheme has an important purpose and 
would greatly benefit all citizens. This may be possible, considering the recent 
estimated investment of £30 billion for an electronic patient record scheme for 
the NHS. 
In order to provide an indication of the amount of revenue required for the TCP 
scheme each year, the costs outlined above must be estimated. Table 3.1 
displays costs that are based on the revenue raised from permit sales being 
sufficient to fund all costs (implementation and operating costs), and also 
replace fuel tax losses. In order to demonstrate the total amount of revenue 
required both with and without implementation costs, the estimates described 
above have been calculated for the years 2005 and 2006. The total amount of 
revenue required from permit sales would increase each year in order to offset 
losses of fuel taxation revenue. For example, the total amount required in 
2005 is estimated to be £594.1 million, increasing to £776.5 million in 2006. It 
is assumed that the system would be introduced in conjunction with the ID 
card system, thus removing costs related to a population register, the 
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production and distribution of swipe cards, and the updating of the population 
register. 
Table 3.1: Example of financial costs relating to the TCP scheme (£m) 
2005 2006 
Information campaign 8.3 - 
Operating costs 175.1 175.1 
Scanning equipment 40.5 - 
Public transport investment 139.0 139.0 
Lost fuel tax revenue 231.2 462.4 
Total costs 594.1 776.5 
Given that the TCP scheme is a new concept, a national information campaign 
would be essential. It is proposed to include leaflets to each household; posters 
on PT; posters on billboards; advertisements in newspapers and on television 
and the radio; and features on national and local news programs. The 
estimates for the information campaign were based on the UK governments' 
campaign "preparing for emergencies'. The costs for this campaign were 
estimated to be approximately £8.3 million and included advertisements on the 
radio (local and national), television, and the delivery of a 22 page booklet to 
over 25 million UK households (HM Government, 2004), and are thus 
considered to be similar in scope to the requirements of the TCP scheme. 
In order to derive an estimate of operating costs, a range of organisations 
were considered. Whilst it is difficult to determine the exact functions of the 
TCP scheme, the UK passports agency was thought to have similar functions as 
it is involved in issuing documents, monitoring accounts and maintaining a 
database. The annual cost of sales in 2003 equated to £115.9 million which 
includes staff costs, telecommunications charges including a call centre, and 
data capturing. The UK Customs and Excise were also considered due to the 
monitoring and maintenance of a database. With annual operating costs of 
£1,097 million in 2003, it was decided that the functional scope was much 
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greater than that required for the TCP scheme, for example it is possible that 
the TCP scheme could be operated from one location as the majority of 
functions would be electronic, in comparison to the Customs and Excise which 
has an office at each port and functions involve manual checks which are more 
resource intensive. The DVLA was considered to be the most indicative in 
recognition of the annual administration requirements (posting reminder letters 
for annual road taxation payments) which may be similar to those involved in 
the distribution of information relating to the annual carbon budget at the 
beginning of each year; the use of one location; and the maintenance and 
monitoring of individual accounts. The annual operating costs equate to £193.7 
million, which includes staff costs, IT expenditure, telecommunications, 
stationary, and postal expenses. There are some costs that are not relevant to 
the TCP scheme, such as the payment to medical practitioners, and Northern 
Ireland agency costs. These costs have therefore been removed to provide an 
estimated annual operating cost of £175.1 million. This cost may be reduced 
further as it is perceivable that more functions could be carried out 
electronically, for example updating the annual carbon budget and individual 
accounts in comparison to the annual requirement for a road tax disc to be 
displayed inside vehicles, and the periodic renewal of driving licenses. 
In order to buy and sell carbon permits using the electronic swipe cards, 
electronic scanning equipment would be required at trading outlets. The costs 
for the scanning equipment (hardware and software) are based upon the unit 
costs of Chip and Pin machines, which equate to £1,500 per point of sale. 
There are approximately 11,000 petrol stations and 16,000 Post Office outlets 
in Great Britain, which equates to costs of £16.5 million and £24 million 
respectively if each location had one machine. The total cost of scanning 
equipment has therefore been estimated at £40.5 million, however this cost 
could increase if more than one machine was required at each trading outlet. 
Conversely, this cost could be reduced if it was possible to integrate the 
trading procedure into the scanning equipment currently used for the Chip and 
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Pin system. This requires further investigation before the cost estimate can be 
improved. 
Car journeys would be displaced as a result of the annual reductions in carbon 
availability, it is therefore important to provide sufficient levels of public 
transport for use as alternative modes. This is particularly important at the 
beginning of the system before there is an adequate provision of local 
amenities that reduce the need to travel and may thus be reduced as the 
system progresses. Whilst it is unknown exactly how many car journeys will be 
displaced onto public transport, for example some journeys may be abandoned 
or made using another mode, an initial estimate can be derived based upon 
the annual reduction of carbon availability. In 2003, car use accounted for 678 
billion passenger kilometres, and public transport (bus and train collectively) 
accounted for 96 billion passenger kilometres. Due to a decline in fuel 
availability of 1.34%, it may be assumed that car passenger kilometres also 
decline by a similar amount. The displaced car passenger kilometres may then 
be added to public transport passenger kilometres, which results in an increase 
of 9.5%4. This percentage increase can then be used to estimate the amount of 
investment required. For example, local government expenditure on public 
transport (including revenue support for subsidised routes) amounted to £1462 
million in 2002/03 (DfT, 2005). Based upon the estimated increase in public 
transport kilometres (9.5%), a maximum of £139 million would be provided 
from permit revenue. However, this estimate does not consider the financial 
profit increases for operators as a result of business expansion which in turn is 
likely to attract private investment, therefore reducing the reliance upon 
carbon permit revenue. It is expected that PT operators would maximise the 
business expansion opportunities offered by the TCP scheme and invest in new 
vehicles and service expansion, which may reduce the requirement of permit 
revenue. In addition, the need to travel would gradually decrease as local 
4 1.34% of 678 billion passenger kilometres = 9.0852 billion passenger Km. 9.0852 as 
a% of 96 billion passenger Km = 9.46%. 
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facilities and services are provided, which would reduce the requirement for PT 
and thus investment. 
Fuel taxation revenue would be impacted negatively as a result of the 
reduction in carbon availability and thus fuel sales. This revenue is an 
important source of government funds and is likely to be accounted for, 
therefore the replacement of lost fuel taxation revenue could also be required 
from carbon permit revenue. The amount of permit revenue required each year 
was estimated using the fuel taxation revenue in 2003 (£17,259 million) and 
the annual reductions in carbon availability. For example, in 2005 fuel sales 
would be reduced by 1.34%, resulting in a loss of £231.2 million. This loss 
would increase each year in line with the annual carbon reductions, as also 
demonstrated in table 3.1 and figure 3.1 (full details are contained in appendix 
1). 
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Figure 3.1: Revenue required from permit sales to fund all costs and 
offset losses from fuel taxation revenue. 
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The amount of revenue required increases each year as a result of the annual 
decrease of carbon availability (1.34% per year from 2004 levels - see 
Appendix 1 for further details), which results in reduced fuel and permit sales. 
There are no estimated costs provided for investment in local amenities, and 
cycling and walking facilities, thus there remains scope for improvement. 
However, there would be additional revenue to that estimated here should the 
permits be sold on an open market with a minimum fixed price. In addition, 
the annual costs are assumed to remain the same each year but could be 
reduced due to technological improvements, therefore reducing the estimates 
calculated here. 
3.1.10 Derivation of permit price and free permit allocation 
Given that the fundamental requirement of the permit sales would be to cover 
the costs of the TCP scheme, the permit prices derived were based on the 
estimated monetary costs (shown in figure 3.1). To derive annual permit 
prices, the total annual cost of the TCP scheme (including replaced fuel tax 
revenue which increased each year in line with the 1.34% reduction in carbon 
consumption) was divided by the annual carbon budget, giving a price per 
kilogram of carbon. To derive the initial carbon budget, the total amount of 
carbon from road transport and rail were used. In 2004, rail and road transport 
consumed 39,000 million kilograms of carbon (DfT, 2005). Car and motorcycle 
use collectively accounted for 59% of this amount, with rail accounting for 
5.1% and bus consuming 3.8%, giving a total of 68%. As the study focuses on 
personal land based transport, the carbon emissions from these modes have 
been used to calculate the initial carbon budget of 26,165 million kilograms 
carbon 5 (see appendix 1 for full details). Thus, for example, in 2005 the total 
costs were £594.1 million and the annual carbon budget was 26,165 million 
kilograms, hence £594.1 million/26,165 million gives a permit price of £0.02 
5 68% of 39,000 million Kg Carbon = 26,520 million Kg Carbon. This amount would 
be reduced by 1.34% to provide the initial Carbon budget: 26,520 - 1.34% = 26,165 
million Kg Carbon. 
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per kilogram carbon. It was assumed that half of the annual carbon budget 
would be allocated free of charge to individuals (see section 3.1.2), thus the 
annual costs of the TCP scheme would have to be obtained from the sale of 
half of the carbon budget, hence the price per kilogram of carbon was 
multiplied by 2. Figure 3.2 displays the price of permits throughout the 
duration of the TCP scheme. 
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Permit price (per kilogram of carbon) during the TCP 
For the purpose of this research, fixed permit prices were used given the 
complexity and potential inaccuracy of predicting prices on an open market. In 
addition, as the TCP scheme does not rely upon willingness to pay to achieve 
its targets, the use of a market to determine price is not essential. However, 
before selection of a pricing method, both should be assessed for their relative 
merits, particularly in terms of costs (for example to establish market 
mechanisms), feasibility (which method is the easiest to implement on a 
practical level) and implications on demand (importance of price signal to 
regulate consumption). 
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To derive the annual free allocation of carbon permits, the annual carbon 
budget related to the personal transport use (i. e. subtracting the proportion 
relating to bus and rail) was divided by 2 (to represent the half that would be 
given free of charge), then divided by the number of adults in the UK aged 17 
and over (46,161,981). This provided a free carbon allocation per person for 
each year of the scheme. For example, 11,351 million kilograms/46,161,981 
adults equates to 245 kilograms per adult in 2005. To obtain the monetary 
value of the free weekly carbon allocation, the annual allocation was divided by 
52 e. g., 245/52 = 4.7 kilograms/week. This was then multiplied by the value 
of the permits per kilogram, for example 4.7 x £0.04 = £0.18 per week in 
2005. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the free permit allocation and monetary value 
during the TCP scheme (also shown in appendix 1). 
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Figure 3.3: Free carbon permit allocation per person per week during 
the TCP scheme 
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Figure 3.4: Monetary value of free carbon allocation per person per 
week 
3.2 The fuel price increase 
A system of fuel price increases (FPI) were designed to provide an alternative 
policy to the TCP scheme. The FPI would be applied throughout Great Britain 
and would affect everyone who purchased fuel for personal motor vehicles. The 
FPI would provide revenue for an annual investment in public transport, an 
information campaign and also cover annual monitoring costs (regular 
monitoring of fuel sales would be required, which could result in the 
adjustment of fuel prices if they were not having the desired effect on 
consumption and/or in response to oil price fluctuations). Surplus revenue 
would be invested into the provision of supportive measures, such as 
localisation of amenities and improved paths and cycle lanes. 
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3.2.1 Derivation of fuel price increases 
The fuel price increases were calculated using conventional price elasticities of 
demand relating to fuel consumption, which were derived by Graham and 
Glaister (Glaister and Graham, 2000; Graham and Glaister, 2002) following a 
survey of the literature on motorists' response to fuel price increases. The 
survey covered numerous international studies which had derived short and 
long term fuel demand elasticities based on empirical evidence (including long- 
run household surveys) over time. Graham and Glaister concluded that, based 
on evidence that has proved to be consistent across studies, there are 
differences between the short and long run elasticities of fuel consumption with 
respect to price, with short term elasticities typically in the region of -0.2 to - 
0.3 and long term elasticities between -0.6 and -0.8. There was clear and 
consistent evidence that, in many countries, in the long run there is a 
significant, although less then proportionate, response. In all cases, the survey 
revealed that it takes time for people to adjust, hence the initial impact effects 
are smaller than effects in the long term. 
Hence, for the current study, in order to achieve a 60% reduction of carbon 
emissions from personal road transport by 20506, a short run elasticity of - 
0.25 was used for the first five years, increasing by -0.05 each year until the 
long run elasticity of -0.7 was reached, which was applied thereafter up to 
2050 (see Appendix 2). In addition to the estimated reduction in vehicle 
kilometers, the elasticities used include the impact of efficiency on fuel demand 
as people would be expected to use more efficient fuels and vehicles as a 
result of the price increases (Glaister and Graham, 2000; Graham and Glaister, 
2002). The increased elasticity value of -0.05 each year until -0.7 was reached 
on the assumptions that individuals would be able to make greater changes to 
6 Based on the assumption that the relationship between fuel consumption and carbon 
emissions is relatively direct i. e., a 60% reduction of fuel consumption would result in 
a 60% reduction of carbon emissions. It is recognised that this assumes current fuel 
types (petrol and diesel) remain the same, which is unrealistic over such a long time 
period particularly given the finite supply of oil and increasing global demand. 
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their fuel consumption in the long run when supportive measures were more 
widely available, such as increased provision of public transport services, 
improved facilities for clean modes (cycle lanes, footpaths), car pools, 
teleworking, and local amenities such as shops that reduce the need to travel. 
As such measures require time to be established, it is likely that the ability to 
reduce fuel consumption in the short run would be limited, hence the smaller 
price increases compared to the long run assumptions. This is demonstrated in 
figure 3.5 which displays the estimated price of fuel per litre over the duration 
of the FPI. 
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Figure 3.5: Fuel price per litre for the FPI policy 
3.3 Research questions 
2050 2060 
Chapter 2 highlighted a lack of research reporting the public response to a 
personal carbon trading scheme. In addition, fuel price increases were 
recognised as having the potential to achieve the same carbon reduction target 
in a more economically efficient way. Thus, to gain empirical evidence 
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related to both policies, the main purpose of the survey work was to 
investigate the following questions: 
o What are the behavioural responses to a TCP scheme/FPI and the 
subsequent implications of such responses upon lifestyles and travel 
behaviour? 
o Is a TCP scheme/FPI perceived to be effective, fair and publicly 
acceptable as a measure to reduce carbon emissions from the transport 
sector? 
o What are the key factors influencing acceptability of the TCP 
scheme/FPI? 
3.4 Research hypotheses 
In relation to the research questions outlined in section 3.3, several outcomes 
were expected based on the evidence contained in the literature review (see 
chapter 2) and perceived logical relationships between personal characteristics 
and response: 
o The TCP scheme will be accepted by the majority of respondents as 
transport will be perceived as a major problem where 'something has to be 
done' (Jones, 1995,2003). 
o Providing the concept of the TCP scheme is understood, it will be 
perceived as the most effective and fair measure. 
o Those individuals with high fuel consumption (car users) will have the 
strongest opposition to the TCP scheme. 
o Those opposing the TCP scheme and FPI will do so mainly on the grounds 
of fairness (policies perceived as another form of taxation, infringement on 
freedom), and necessity (problems do not warrant such a system), the 
latter objection being particularly prevalent amongst those with low 
problem perception. 
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o Acceptability of the TCP scheme will be greatest where personal benefits 
are high i. e. low fuel consumers who can sell excess permits (prevalent 
amongst low income groups), those with high problem perception and 
concern for the environment. 
o Fuel tax will be a preferred measure amongst those with high incomes, 
high value of time and high travel consumption, whereas permits will be 
preferable amongst those with low incomes, those with low travel 
consumption, and those who have equity concerns. 
o Behavioral response will mainly be switching from car to bus for certain 
journeys, walking for short journeys, shortening leisure journeys, and 
reducing the amount of non-essential trips. The most common response will 
be trip combining. 
o Pull measures, such as public transport improvements, will be preferable 
to both the TCP scheme and the fuel price increases. 
o High fuel prices would be preferable to lower prices where fuel availability 
is uncertain, particularly amongst high carbon consumers and high 
incomes. 
3.5 Methodological options 
A crucial aspect of the research was to determine the methodological approach 
in terms of a public survey, a survey amongst 
academics/government/businesses or a more theoretical/econometric 
approach. In relation to the latter, investigating the demand for carbon and 
subsequent price; investigating the impact of varying permit allocations on 
demand; the use of formal Stated Preference techniques to assess preference 
between the TCP scheme and FPI and also assess willingness to pay for 
increased certainty of fuel (in relation to the FPI or an increased allocation of 
free permits in the TCP scheme), are all examples of potential methods. 
However, whilst all of these approaches could provide useful, original and 
interesting information that could contribute greatly to the design of a TCP 
scheme, it was decided to focus the survey on public response as it is possible 
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that this could highlight some key aspects for further investigation given that 
personal carbon trading is essentially still a theory yet to be fully designed and 
implemented in practice. For example, given the lack of empirical evidence 
regarding public response, it is completely unknown whether the concept of 
personal carbon trading would be acceptable to the public and whether it would 
be an effective method of stimulating behavioural change. Hence, in order to 
investigate the issues underlying the political feasibility of personal carbon 
trading and thus whether the policy could progress beyond a concept, it was 
decided that a largely qualitative public response was most crucial at this stage 
of policy formulation. 
3.6 Survey design 
Several methods were considered, including a postal based survey, an internet 
based survey, interviews with individuals conducted using a telephone, focus 
groups and face to face interviews with individuals. Given the perceived 
importance of qualitative data in this study, the use of an internet based 
survey or a postal survey where considered unsuitable as open questions may 
have been a burden and therefore resulted in low response rates. In addition, 
as the TCP scheme was likely to be a new concept for most respondents, it was 
considered essential to provide an opportunity for respondents to ask 
questions and thus to ensure the policy had been understood before the 
questions began. Focus groups were considered, however, the attention and 
time required from each respondent made a group approach unsuitable 
particularly in terms of recording behavioural response. In addition, equal 
treatment was considered important in terms of asking each respondent the 
same questions which would not have been possible in a group environment. 
The influence of group discussion was also considered in that it is highly 
possible that the opinions of others within the focus group could influence 
individuals' responses - in this study it was considered important to capture 
'uninfluenced' opinions. Hence, the approach was narrowed to a focus on 
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individuals. Telephone interviews could have been used, however, the use of 
the software to record behavioural response required individuals to be able to 
see the software in use i. e. the computer screen. Whilst there are recognised 
benefits of using methods such as postal surveys, internet surveys, telephone 
interviews and focus groups, for the purpose of this research face to face 
interviews with individuals were considered the most appropriate method of 
answering the questions presented in section 3.3. A combined approach could 
have been adopted, for example, conducting a series of focus groups and 
individual interviews. However, in consideration of the resources available it 
was essential to fully pilot one method and ensure equal treatment of 
respondents in order to provide a comparative sample of responses. 
Prior to the interview, participants were asked to complete and return a 7-day 
travel dairy, recording for each trip the mode used, origin and destination, 
travel time, journey distance and number of people on the trip (see appendix 
3). The purpose of the diary was to provide for each respondent a calculation 
of current carbon consumption from personal transport, to be displayed and 
discussed with the use of purposely designed software during the interview 
(explained in detail in sections 3.6.2 and 3.7.1). In addition, the diary served 
to provide a baseline against which changes made in response to the policies 
could be measured. A week is considered to be a reasonable period to identify 
most regular trips and is also a good period over which to consider changes 
(Bristow et a/., 2004). Respondents were asked to record only personal trips 
i. e., not trips that were made on behalf of their employer, and to complete the 
diary during a period that they considered to be normal or routine, i. e., 
avoiding holiday periods. The diary also contained space to record the details 
(make and model, age and fuel type) of three vehicles (it was made clear that 
this did not include public transport modes or taxis). A similar approach is used 
for the National Travel Survey conducted annually by the UK department for 
transport. 
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The interviews were formally structured using a combination of open and 
closed questions. The latter were selected in order to gain quantitative data, 
whilst the open questions were designed mainly to follow on from the closed 
questions in order to provide detailed and undirected responses thus adding 
depth and providing respondents with the opportunity to express their exact 
opinion without being constrained to pre-set answers (Coolican, 1999; Robson, 
2002). In all cases, further detail/elaboration was requested where 
appropriate, for example when open questions were answered 'yes' or'no'. In 
order to quantify responses to the attitude measures, likert 7-point bipolar 
scales were used (Coolican, 1999). Each interview was tape-recorded to aid 
data analysis, after obtaining consent from the participant. Participants were 
assured that full confidentiality would be maintained throughout the research 
period and were encouraged to ask questions regarding any aspect of the 
interview or the policy measures discussed, if they were not fully understood. 
In order to avoid the encouragement of response bias, all questions and 
explanations were delivered by the interviewer in an impartial manner. At the 
end of the interview, participants were asked for any descriptive details that 
were considered too sensitive to ask during the selection process, including 
income and age (see appendix 9). The interviewees were offered a monetary 
reward (£10 per person) upon completion of the interview and thanked for 
their attendance. 
The interview was arranged into three main sections, each having a different 
topic and purpose (see appendix 4 for interview questionnaire). The following 
sections outline the purpose of each part of the interview. 
3.6.1 Section 1: Concern for the environment, problem perception and 
knowledge 
Section one was designed to provide for each respondent a measure of concern 
for the environment; problem perception (related to current levels of road 
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traffic); and awareness/knowledge of transports contribution to environmental 
degradation and health problems. Section one was considered to be a crucial 
part of the interview as it is logical to assume that the perceived fairness and 
acceptability of a measure to reduce CO2 from the transport sector would be 
influenced by the degree of concern for the problem and the level of knowledge 
regarding the negative impacts of the problem (Fujji et al., 2004). This 
assumption is supported by results from a study conducted by Rienstra et al 
(1999), where the results from an ordered Probit analysis revealed problem 
perception to strongly influence public support for road pricing. 
3.6.2 Section 2: Behavioural response, impacts and acceptability of the 
Tradable Carbon Permit scheme 
The second section of the interview began with an explanation of the TCP 
scheme, providing information regarding the emissions target, timescale, how 
the scheme would work and what this implied for the individual. Respondents 
were also told that the scheme had been designed to be self funding, which 
included an annual investment in public transport with any additional revenue 
being invested in measures that would support adaptation to the scheme, such 
as local amenities and improved cycle and walking facilities (see appendix 5 for 
full details). Following the explanation of the TCP scheme, respondents were 
introduced to bespoke software designed to record changes to travel behaviour 
at three points in time (2010,2020 and 2030) and provide respondents with a 
visual display of their carbon consumption relative to their free carbon permit 
allocation in each time period. The software was originally designed for use by 
Bristow et al (2004) to record the household response to two predefined policy 
scenarios and the impact of technological improvements on carbon consumed 
from the use of personal transport. The software used in the current study 
calculated carbon consumption per journey entered from the 7-day travel 
diary. The vehicle data provided in the travel diary was used to obtain carbon 
emissions factors from the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT, 
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2005) and/or the Vehicle Certification Agency (VCA, 2005) databases and 
entered into the software. The emissions factors provided by the SMMT/VCA 
databases are based on urban driving conditions, hence to represent different 
journey speeds, the urban vehicle emissions where factored up or down 
according to predefined figures within the software. For rural speeds the urban 
emissions factors were multiplied by 0.87 for petrol engines and 0.72 for diesel 
engines. To calculate motorway speeds, the urban emissions factors were 
multiplied by 1.16 for petrol engines and 0.89 for diesel engines (NAEI, 2005). 
For public transport modes and taxi services, pre-defined emissions factors 
already existed within the software based on 2003 data (Bristow et al., 2004). 
In order to calculate carbon emissions for each journey, information about 
each journey made was entered into the software. The calculation is based on 
mode and personal vehicle used (where details for more than one vehicle were 
provided), average journey speed (urban, rural or motorway), number of 
people on the journey, and distance travelled. On separate interfaces, the 
software displayed carbon emissions by mode (see figure 3.6), carbon 
emissions per journey on a daily view which could be changed to separately 
show each week day (see figure 3.7), and total carbon emissions from all 
journeys made during the diary week. In order to maintain anonymity, the 
respondent's name has been changed. 
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Figure 3.7 Example screenshot of carbon software: daily carbon 
emissions per journey 
Following the introduction to the software and display of current carbon 
emissions calculated from the travel diary, respondents were shown their free 
allocation of carbon permits in 2010 (according to the derivation described in 
section 3.1.5 - also see figure 3.3) alongside their current carbon consumption 
and asked if they would make any changes to their travel behaviour should the 
TCP scheme be introduced. This was an open question and hence responses 
were not restricted to a list of options. In anticipation of some respondents 
choosing to replace their vehicle with a more efficient model, a list of emissions 
factors for the most fuel efficient models available were derived which could be 
entered into the software if required. Respondents were asked to assume their 
current circumstances in terms of employment, income and living situation 
remained the same as now. Where feasible, changes were made to stated 
journeys and carbon emissions were recalculated. This process was repeated 
for each time period. The details presented via the software in relation to both 
the TCP scheme and FPI changed following the pre-pilot study and are thus 
discussed in detail in sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2. 
Before introducing a policy that would undoubtedly impact on travel behaviour 
and lifestyles, it is imperative to investigate the likely behavioural response 
and subsequent impacts in order to assess the requirements, in terms of aiding 
response and minimising the negative impacts, at the implementation stage 
and thus the overall feasibility of the scheme. For example, this was 
recognised by Transport for London (TfL, 2003), which commissioned a survey 
to explore the impacts of the London Congestion Charging Scheme prior to 
implementation. Thus, following the questions regarding behavioural 
response, questions were centred upon impacts of the TCP scheme on lifestyle, 
barriers to change and measures to aid adaptation. Personal and social costs 
and benefits, personal and social (how society might rate the scheme) fairness, 
effectiveness (ability to achieve emissions target) where then explored, 
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followed by personal and social (how society might rate the scheme) 
acceptability of the TCP scheme. As previously discussed in chapter 2 (see 
section 2.8), acceptability is a major determinant of policy implementation and 
would thus be explored prior to operation of such a scheme (Schade, 2003). 
The order of questions was chosen to allow the interviewee to think about the 
scheme and its impacts before rating their acceptability. Steg (2003) also 
notes the importance of allowing respondents to consider the consequences of 
policy measures before evaluating their effectiveness and acceptability. 
Following these questions, the interviewees were asked if they would alter any 
aspect/s of the proposed TCP scheme in order to increase acceptability to 
themselves and/or to society, providing an explanation for their chosen 
alteration/s. They were then asked to re-rate their acceptability of the scheme, 
assuming that their suggested changes had been implemented. 
3.6.3 Section 3: Behavioural response, impacts and acceptability of the 
fuel price increases 
In the final section, questions were focussed on fuel price increases proposed 
as an alternative measure to the TCP scheme. The order of presentation of the 
two policies was alternated, therefore reducing the possibility of response bias 
that could occur if the interviews were always conducted in the same order, for 
example, the TCP scheme in section 2 followed by the pricing scheme in 
section 3. Instead, the TCP scheme was discussed first in 50% of the 
interviews and the pricing policy discussed first in the remaining interviews. 
Before the questions began, respondents were informed that, as an alternative 
measure to the TCP scheme, based on economic theory gained through 
empirical evidence on public response to fuel price increases, fuel prices could 
be gradually increased each year to achieve the same emissions target as the 
TCP scheme. Again they were told that the policy had been designed to be self 
funding, which included an annual investment in public transport, with the use 
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of surplus revenue to fund supportive measures such as local amenities and 
improved cycle and walking facilities (see appendix 6). In order for 
comparisons to be made, the questions in sections 2 and 3 were identical. In 
the final question, respondents were asked if they thought there was a more 
effective way to reduce CO2 from the transport sector, rather than the two 
measures discussed. This was included to allow respondents the opportunity to 
suggest other methods, as it was expected that pull measures, such as 
improvements to public transport services, would be preferable (see section 
3.4). 
3.7 Research process/ implementation 
Prior to implementation of the main survey, a pre-pilot and pilot study were 
conducted. The following sections describe each part of the study including the 
alterations made as a result of the pilot work. 
3.7.1 Pre-pilot 
To test the interview structure, technique and software used to record 
behavioral response, a pre-pilot study was conducted in July 2005, where 5 
individuals were interviewed for approximately 1.5 hours each (see appendix 7 
for questionnaire). Such studies are recommended as it is vital to have the 
interview schedule correct before the main survey is carried out in order to 
receive the most worthwhile information (Robson, 2002). Following this, 
significant changes were made to the questionnaire and software. 
The first section of the interview used a quality of life ranking to assert which 
issues were of most importance to respondents. The question included national 
and international issues such as terrorism, war, crime, transport and quality of 
the National Health Service. However, following analysis of the pre-pilot 
interviews it was decided that this question was difficult to answer for most 
people and thus did not provide a useful measure of quality of life indicators. 
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As a result this question was removed from the interview questionnaire. 
Following this, statements were used to measure environmental concern, with 
responses given on a 7-point scale ranging from 'very strongly disagree' to 
'very strongly agree'. Flash cards were used to display the statements and in 
order to minimise the risk of response bias, the statements were randomly 
presented in negative and positive form. The content of the statements was 
centered on key environmental topics such as climate change, air and water 
pollution, deforestation, recycling and renewable energy. A similar method was 
also used by Fujii et a/ (2004) to measure environmental concern. Several 
statements were altered following the pre-pilot in order to include an equal 
number of positive and negative questions. Problem perception was measured 
using an open question regarding problems that respondents associated with 
current levels of road transport. This question was considered useful and 
therefore remained unchanged following the pre-pilot. Respondents were then 
asked to rate on a scale of 1-7 the contribution made by road transport to 6 
environmental issues including global warming, destruction of wildlife habitats 
and water pollution. Following the pre-pilot it was decided that more specific 
questions were required in order to assess levels of knowledge, hence a new 
question was devised which asked respondents the percentage contribution 
(within 20% bands) of road transport to total UK emissions, including carbon 
dioxide, carbon monoxide and particulates. The final questions in section 1 
regarding the association of pollutants and health effects with road transport 
were considered too general and did not yield useful information (the majority 
of respondents answered 'no' to both questions) and were therefore removed 
from the questionnaire. 
Section 2 began with an explanation of the TCP scheme followed by 'the 
software (as described in section 3.5.2). Respondents were shown their free 
allocation of carbon permits in 2010,2020 and 2030 and asked if they would 
make any changes to their travel behaviour. Figure 3.8 provides an example of 
carbon consumption and free carbon permits in each time period. 
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Figure 3.8: Carbon consumption and free permit allocation 
Figure 3.8 notes: from left to right - current consumption calculated from 
travel diary; free permit allocation in 2010; carbon consumption in 2010; free 
permit allocation in 2020; carbon consumption in 2020; free permit allocation 
in 2030; carbon consumption in 2030. 
During the software exercise several respondents asked how much the permits 
would cost (in monetary terms), therefore following the pre-pilot it was 
considered necessary to provide an estimation of permit price hence estimated 
financial costs and corresponding permit prices were derived (described in 
sections 3.1.9 and 3.1.10). The software was adjusted to include an estimate 
of current spending on fuel (based on the average litre of fuel containing 0.62 
kilograms of carbon) and fuel and permits in each time period displayed as 'to 
pay for' which was the difference between the free permit allocation and 
consumption. This provided respondents with an indication of the monetary 
impact and the effect on their carbon consumption of the changes they 
considered to be feasible. The software was able to recalculate estimated 
spending when changes to travel behaviour were made. Respondents were 
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informed that the prices derived by the software did not include inflation or 
fluctuating oil prices and that the permit prices displayed were based on fixed 
permit prices and could increase unlimitedly if sold on an open market were 
they would be subject to demand. Figure 3.9 shows an example of carbon 
consumption and estimated spending in each time period. 
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Figure 3.9: Screenshot of carbon consumption and free permit 
allocation post pre-pilot 
Notes for figure 3.9: from left to right - current consumption and spending on 
fuel; free carbon allocation in 2010; carbon consumption in 2010 with 
estimated spending on fuel and permits; 2020; 2030. 
In the pre-pilot study, software was only used when discussing the TCP 
scheme. Thus for consistency, following the pre-pilot, the software was 
redesigned to represent the FPI. Respondents were again shown their current 
carbon consumption with estimated spending on fuel and also their carbon 
consumption in 2010,2020 and 2030 with estimated spending on fuel taking 
into account the price increase as a result of the FPI (see figure 3.5 and 
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appendix 2 for fuel prices used in the software). Figure 3.10 provides an 
example of the software representing the FPI. 
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Figure 3.10: Screenshot of the FPI post pre-pilot 
Notes: from left to right - current carbon consumption and spending on fuel; 
carbon consumption in 2010 and estimated spending on fuel; 2020; 2030. 
Following the software exercise, respondents were asked an open question 
regarding how they would adapt in the long-term. However, this was largely a 
repeat of the behavioural changes recorded with the software and was thus 
recreated following the pre-pilot study into a quantitative style question where 
respondents indicated on a scale of 1 to 7 their likeliness of carrying out stated 
behaviours, including moving house to live closer to work and telecommuting, 
in the long-term i. e., beyond 2030. In recognition of the importance of fairness 
on acceptability (Jakobsson et al., 2000; Fujii et al., 2004), a question 
designed to provide a measure of perceived fairness of both policies was added 
following the pre-pilot. In addition, as the policies were discussed separately 
throughout the interview and not directly compared, 2 open questions were 
added to the end of the questionnaire which were designed to provide a direct 
comparison of the policies in terms of effectiveness and acceptability. 
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The pre-pilot revealed that some of the questions were resulting in repetitive 
answers. For example, a question regarding the role of the government, fuel 
producers, and vehicle manufacturers in the policies was removed as most 
respondents had already talked about this when discussing their behavioural 
response. In addition, many respondents found the question difficult to 
understand which is undesirable in terms of maintaining interest over the 
period of the interview. 
3.7.2 Pilot study 
Following the extensive changes arising from the pre-pilot study, a pilot study 
was conducted between September 2005 - November 2005 (see appendix 8 
for interview questionnaire). Ten people were interviewed, which served to test 
the recruitment technique, modified interview questionnaire and software 
before the final survey was conducted. The pilot revealed very few problems 
with the whole interview process, with the only changes being the reordering 
of two questions, the merging of the costs and benefits questions into one 
question and the amendment of the knowledge question in the first section of 
the questionnaire. For the pilot, the knowledge question asked respondents to 
state the percentage contribution (within a range) of road transport to five key 
pollutants. However, it was noted that many respondents were guessing rather 
then basing their answer on their actual knowledge. It was therefore decided 
to redesign the knowledge question using 10 statements regarding transport 
and environmental facts that could be answered as 'true', 'false' or 'not sure'. 
It was thought that respondents might have greater awareness of wider 
transport issues rather than the percentage contribution of road transport to 
air pollutants, given the specialist nature of such knowledge (see appendix 5 
for main survey questionnaire). Given the nature of the policy targets, an 
additional measure of problem perception related to climate change was 
included. Using an open question, respondents were asked if they considered 
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global warming to be a serious threat, whether the problem was human 
induced and if it could be reduced. 
Following the analysis of the pilot results, it was noted that the average rating 
of effectiveness of the TCP scheme was lower than expected, given the 
potential to be 100% effective as a result of the limit placed on carbon 
availability. It therefore seemed apparent that respondents had possibly not 
fully understood the concept of the TCP scheme, in terms of achieving the 
emissions target through the limit placed on availability. Several respondents 
appeared to forget about the carbon budget and thought that people would 
buy additional permits when required, for example: 
"People will just buy more when they run out. They won't care about sticking 
to the limit',. 
This implies that an unlimited amount of permits would be available and 
achieving the target would be reliant on the publics' good will to reduce their 
fuel consumption. In an attempt to correct this, it was decided that the limit on 
carbon availability should be made very prominent during the behavioural 
response section when the software was introduced. When discussing each 
time period, respondents were asked if they would make any changes to their 
travel behaviour and whether they would try to consume within their free 
permit allocation or buy extra permits as required if they were available. It was 
explained to respondents that their free allocation of carbon permits would be 
their only guaranteed source of carbon, hence beyond this carbon availability 
would be uncertain, with the possibility that they might not be able to 
purchase any more permits. The reduction in the amount of carbon allocated 
each year was also highlighted using the software. 
Two questions related to the inclusion of air transport in the TCP scheme and 
FPI (support and whether current use of air transport would be altered) were 
added following the pre-pilot. Whilst the policies were based on road transport, 
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it is recognised that carbon emissions from air transport are the fastest 
growing source (DEFRA, 2007), thus it could become imperative to regulate 
emissions from this sector. Whilst the UK government are currently proposing 
to include aviation in the EU ETS (as explained in chapter 2), instead it could 
be possible (and possibly preferable amongst the public) to include aviation in 
a personal carbon trading scheme. Hence, the questions were included to 
provide some public perspective. 
During the pilot it was noted that many of the responses to the open questions 
were very similar and could thus be grouped into categories. Hence, for the 
main survey, the categories identified during the pilot were included in the 
main survey questionnaire in order to aid analysis (they were only visible to 
the interviewer and were thus not provided as options for the interviewees). 
Extra space was also provided in order to record responses that did not fall into 
the categories listed. 
3.7.3 Main survey 
From February 2006 to May 2006,60 people were interviewed, with each 
interview lasting approximately 1 to 1.5 hours. The original aim was to conduct 
90 interviews, based on three main sub groupings with each requiring a 
minimum of 30 people to allow a full statistical analysis to be conducted. The 
main factors perceived to influence acceptability were narrowed into two 
categories: knowledge (problem perception, environmental awareness, 
knowledge of transport issues and the ability to understand explanation of TCP 
scheme), and travel consumption (level of inconvenience and costs and 
benefits posed by TCP scheme). Both of these categories could be divided into 
three sub groups to test relationships with acceptability. For education, these 
groups would be basic (G. C. S. E standard), further (further education, A level 
standard), and high (higher education - degree level and above). Travel 
consumption could be segregated by low (below average), average, and high 
94 
(above average) groupings. The aim was to make comparisons between 
responses by separating the data into the categories described. However, the 
working design of the TCP scheme required more time than anticipated given 
the need for the scheme to be detailed and realistic and thus presentable to 
the public. The extensive changes to the software (which required the 
derivation of estimated costs for the TCP scheme - see section 3.1.4) and 
questionnaire following the pre-pilot, greatly reduced the amount of time 
available for recruitment, interviewing and data analysis. In addition, as the 
questionnaire developed the interview duration increased to almost 3 times the 
original estimate of 30 minutes (this was also based on the original aim of the 
interviews which was to investigate attitudes only towards the TCP scheme 
before the scope of the study was expanded to necessarily include the FPI). 
However, this resulted in a much richer data set, with in-depth qualitative and 
quantitative responses to the majority of key issues regarding both policies. 
Delays were also encountered during the recruitment and interview process, 
including several respondents dropping out after having their diary data 
entered into the software and many cancelling and rearranging interviews. 
Thus, the sample size was reduced to 60 as a result of time availability. 
Many road pricing studies have selected particular groups that would be 
affected by road pricing, such as urban dwellers and motorists (for example, 
Jakobsson et a/., 2000; Whittles, 2003; Schade and Schlag, 2000). However, 
as everyone would be affected by the TCP scheme, it was considered important 
to recruit a varied sample which included urban and rural dwellers; and 
motorists and non-motorists. A selection process was therefore established. A 
screening questionnaire was completed by all interested parties (see appendix 
9) taking into account demographic criteria such as travel consumption (annual 
car mileage), car availability, gender and place of residence (urban, rural). This 
method was also used in the AFFORD study (Schade and Schlag, 2000; Schade 
and Schlag, 2003). It was recognised that a small sample would not be 
representative of the UK population, therefore the employed population were 
selected as the focus for the study as they tend to consume the most travel 
95 
(DfT, 2005b), and would therefore have to make the greatest changes in 
response to the policies. Thus, staff members from two of the largest 
employers in Leeds - the University of Leeds and the Leeds City Council, were 
recruited via an email that provided a brief explanation of the study, details of 
participation and offered a small monetary reward on completion of the survey. 
Table 3.2 displays the main stages of the survey, from recruitment to interview 
completion, with response rates at each stage. 
Table 3.2: Response rates at all stages 
Activity 
Stage 1: 
Emails 
Responses 
Stage 2: 
Screening questionnaires sent 
Screening questionnaires returned 
Stage 3: 
Number completed Response rate 
Diaries sent 
Diaries returned 
Stage 4: 
Diaries returned 
Interviews completed 
1014 
116 
116 
94 
94 
70 
70 
60 
11.4% 
9.3% 
6.9% 
5.9% 
Whilst the response rate at stage 1 is very low in comparison with similar 
public surveys (e. g., Jakobsson et al., 2000), the method used was much less 
resource intensive than recruiting via post or on-street, thus offsetting to an 
extent the low overall response rate of 5.9%. In addition, email contact 
appeared to be the most suitable choice given the extensive email network at 
both the University of Leeds and the Leeds City Council. However, in 
consideration of the high level of commitment and input required from 
respondents, a low response rate was anticipated hence the large amount of 
emails originally sent at stage 1. In addition, it was expected that a proportion 
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of the emails sent would not be viewed. Such problems were encountered by 
Shannon et a/ (2006) who decided not to use email contact to recruit 
participants again following the uncertainty regarding the number of emails 
that were actually read, thus making the response rates difficult to estimate at 
the beginning of the recruitment process. Groot and Steg (2006) used emails 
to recruit participants to complete an internet survey, however they asked 
email recipients to forward the internet survey link to as many people as 
possible. Whilst this method was successful for Groot and Steg (2006), 
achieving a sample size of 490 people, this 'snowball' method was unsuitable 
for the current study given the strategic targeting of the employed, mostly car 
using population. The response rate could have possibly been improved by 
advertising the study in internal news letters around departments across the 
university and city council. This method was used by Kingham et a/ (2001) who 
recruited employees at two UK companies via internal news letters and emails, 
achieving a response rate of 38% and 42%. However, the study involved the 
completion of a post back questionnaire which is much less time consuming in 
comparison to the completion of a 7-day travel diary and attending an 
interview, therefore even with the addition of internal adverts in the current 
study, comparable response rates would not be expected. 
Response rates could have been increased if the interviews were conducted 
using the telephone. For example, Jensen achieved a very high response rate 
(79%) when conducting telephone interviews. However, in the current study it 
was imperative to conduct the interviews face to face as the policies were 
visually represented using the low carbon software (see sections 3.5.2 and 
3.6.1). Recruitment via post typically provides a response rate of around 15%, 
thus it is possible that the response rate would have been higher if initial 
contact was made through post instead of email. However, Brand et al (2006), 
achieved a higher response rate to an internet survey (23.4%) than a postal 
survey (19%) conducted as part of the same study (the questionnaires were 
identical). 
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Table 3.2 shows a low drop out rate from stage 2 of the study onwards (19% 
at stage 2,23% at stage 3 and 14% at stage 4). Hence, when a person had 
shown their interest by replying to the initial emails they were quite likely to 
continue to the end of the study with a 64% completion rate from stage 2 to 
stage 4. This has also been discovered in other studies, for example Shannon 
et a/ (2006) contacted potential participants via post inviting them to complete 
an internet survey with an overall response rate of 49%. Rienstra et at (1999) 
also achieved high response rates by conducting a survey in stages, with 
potential respondents being initially sent an invitation by post to state their 
interest in completing a questionnaire, achieving a response rate of 25%. Of 
those that replied, 53% completed the questionnaire. 
Table 3.3 details the characteristics from the main sample. 
Table 3.3 Sample characteristics 
Variable Respondents UK average 
Female 63% 51.2% 
Age (years) 38.6 
18 - 35 53% 
36 - 53 37% 
>54 10% 
Education 11% of population 
Basic 7% has higher education 
Further 18% qualifications 
Higher 75% 
Gross household £28,000 
Income/annum 
<£ 10,000 - £20,000 27% 
£21,000 - £40,000 38% 
>£40,000 35% 
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Car availability 
0 17% 
1 53% 
2+ 30% 
Annual car kilometres 
Below average (>0 - 8,000) 39% 
Average (8,000-9,000) 14% 
Above average (>9,000) 47% 
Sample average: 12,064 km/person 
72% households have 
access to 1 or more 
cars 
8,796 km/person 
Average distance per mode of 
transport (km)7 
Car 232 178 
Bus 28.7 10.9 
Train 80.2 14.2 
Motorcycle 1.1 1.1 
Taxi 1 1.8 
Cycle 4 1.1 
Walk 5.5 6.1 
The sample was over representative of females and younger age groups, with 
the majority of the sample aged below 35 years old. People with higher 
education were also over represented as only 11% of the UK population has 
higher education qualifications (ONS, 2001). However, the small sample size 
should be considered, in addition to the strategic targeting of the employed 
sub-population, hence it was expected that the sample would above average in 
terms of education. The majority of the sample were earning above the UK 
average income (ONS, 2001), which again was anticipated given the method of 
recruitment. As intended the sample exhibits higher than average car use and 
7 For the travel week recorded in the 7-day diaries. The UK figures are derived from 
Transport Statistics (DfT, 2006a) provided in distance traveled per person per mode 
per year, which were thus divided by 52 to obtain a weekly figure and multiplied by 
1.609 to convert from miles to kilometres. The data used in Transport Statistics is 
collected through the National Travel Survey, which is an annual survey using 7-day 
travel diaries to record personal travel. 
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car ownership. Car availability was 11% higher than the national average, 
which was expected to be higher still given the above average income levels. 
In addition, in comparison to the national average, the sample travelled almost 
6 times further by train, more than twice as much by bus, and almost 4 times 
as much by cycle, whilst walking and taxi use amongst the sample was below 
the national average. The higher than average use of public transport was not 
anticipated and could possibly result in fewer responses in terms of behavioural 
change, in particular changing from car to bus and/or train. This is discussed in 
more detail in chapter 5 together with the results recorded by the low carbon 
software (see sections 3.6.2 and 3.7.1). 
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Chapter 4 
Concern for the environment, knowledge and problem perception 
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This chapter provides the responses to the attitude measures and questions 
contained in the first section of the interview questionnaire. Hence, this 
chapter serves to provide the sample characteristics in terms of concern for the 
environment, knowledge of transport issues and problem perception. All data 
shown is based on the full sample of 60 respondents. Quotations taken directly 
from the interview discussions are included to provide examples of responses 
to open questions - at the end of each there is a respondent identification 
number in brackets which corresponds to the list of respondents given in 
appendix 10. 
4.1 Concern for the environment 
As explained in chapter 3 (see section 3.6.1), respondents were asked to state 
their concern towards a range of environmental issues. To derive an average 
'score' of concern, the responses were subsequently given a score of 1 to 7 
with 7 represented the highest concerned for the environment and 1 the least 
concerned. Figure 4.1 below shows the averaged scores for each respondent. 
The respondent numbers correspond to those provided in appendix 10. 
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Figure 4.1: Concern for the environment - average scores 
Figure 4.1 shows that all respondents were concerned for the environment to 
some degree, with the majority of scores above 5. Overall, the sample had an 
average score of 5.7 (maximum score = 7), thus on average respondents were 
very concerned about the environment. A Cronbachs Alpha test was used to 
measure the internal consistency of the concern for the environment question. 
Cronbachs Alpha is designed to measure the reliability of psychometric 
instruments and will increase towards 1 when the correlations between items 
increase (Coolican, 1999). Each environmental statement was classed as an 
item. The test provided a score of 0.76, therefore indicating an adequate 
degree of internal consistency that is comparable with other studies measuring 
environmental concern (Weigel and Weigel, 1978; Dunlap et a/., 2000; Walton 
et al., 2004). 
The level of concern for the environment across the sample is consistent with 
other findings. For example, in a survey conducted by DfT (2006c), 84% of 
respondents were very or fairly concerned about environmental issues and 
81% were very or fairly concerned about climate change. In addition, the 
results suggest that the level of concern is increasing, for example between 
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2005 and 2006 the proportion of adults very concerned about the environment 
increased from 26% to 31% and the proportion of adults very concerned about 
climate change increased from 48% to 54%. 
A correlation analysis was conducted in order to explore the relationships 
between concern for the environment and the socioeconomic variables shown 
in table 3.6. Given the categorical nature of the majority of the variables, a 
Spearman's rank correlation was selected as the most appropriate method as it 
does make any assumptions regarding the frequency distribution of the data, 
hence it does not assume that the relationship between the variables is linear. 
The test also measures whether the relationships are significant and hence 
whether the correlation occurred by chance. The test also provides a 
correlation coefficient which shows the strength of the relationship, with a 
value of 1 indicated a perfectly correlated relationship. Concern for the 
environment was revealed to have a positive and significant (p<. 05) 
relationship with age. The following tables show the average levels of concern 
for the environment for each category of the socioeconomic variables 
measured. 
Table 4.1: Average levels of concern for the environment split by 
gender, age, income and education 
Variable 
Gender Male 
Female 
18-35 
Age 36 -53 
>54 
<£10,000 - £20,000 
Income >£20,000 - £40,000 
>F-40,, 000 
Basic 
Education Further 
Higher 
Concern for the environment score 
5.76 
5.69 
5.58 
5.82 
6.03 
5.76 
5.67 
5.74 
5.93 
5.93 
5.65 
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In terms of gender, males and females had very similar levels of concern for 
the environment with slightly higher levels amongst men. The average levels 
of concern amongst the different age groups demonstrate the positive 
relationship identified by the Spearman's rank correlation, with concern 
increasing with age. This was also a finding by the DfT (2006c), where the 
number of people fairly concerned or very concerned about the environment 
increased with age. 
The income data shows that concern was highest amongst the lowest income 
group, with very similar levels in the highest income group. The DfT (2006c) 
also found little variation in levels of concern across income groups. In terms 
of education, concern was lowest amongst the most educated group. 
Conversely, the DfT (2006c) found that concern about the environment was 
lowest amongst those with the lowest levels of education. It is possible that 
the sample characteristics are having an effect as the majority of respondents 
had higher education qualifications. 
4.2 Problem perception 
On average, each respondent stated 2.6 problems associated with current 
levels of road transport, the main problem being congestion, with air pollution 
and safety being the next most commonly mentioned problems. These findings 
are consistent with those reported by CfIT (2002), where congestion was the 
most commonly mentioned transport issue. In addition, congestion was rated 
as the most important issue from a list of 23 transport related problems. 
Vehicle pollution affecting health and road safety were rated as the next most 
important issues after congestion. 
The majority of respondents stated 2 problems that they associated with 
current levels of road transport. Figure 4.2 shows the total amount of problems 
stated by each respondent. 
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Figure 4.2: Number of problems stated by each respondent 
A Spearman's rank correlation did not reveal any significant relationships 
between problem perception and the socioeconomic variables. Table 4.2 shows 
the average level of problem perception amongst the sample (number of 
problems mentioned) for each category of gender, age, income and education. 
Table 4.2: Average levels of problem perception split by gender, age, 
income and education 
Variable 
Gender 
Age 
Income 
Education 
Male 
Female 
18-35 
36 -53 
>54 
<£10,000 - £20,000 
>£20,000 - £40,000 
>; E40,000 
Basic 
Further 
Higher 
Problem perception 
4.05 
3.68 
3.97 
3.41 
4.50 
3.19 
3.87 
4.25 
2.25 
3.45 
4.05 
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On average, males mentioned a greater number of problems associated with 
current levels of road transport in comparison to females. The respondents in 
the highest age group had the highest level of problem perception across all 
variables and categories. The income data shows that problem perception 
increases as income also increases, which could possibly be related to car use 
as which also increases with income (DfT, 2006b). It is logical that more 
problems would be perceived and/or identified as levels of driving increased. 
The table also shows that problem perception increases as education levels 
also increase. This is also likely to be a result of income and car use. 
During the first section of the interview respondent were also asked 
(unprompted) whether they thought global warming was a serious threat. 93% 
of the sample considered global warming to be a serious threat, whilst only 7% 
were unconvinced: 
"I don't think so, most of what you hear is just media hype trying to scare 
people (24)" and "I'm not convinced about global warming, global 
temperatures go up and down naturally so I don't think it's something new 
that we're causing (16)" and "Definitely, I think everyone should be thinking 
about it. We need more evidence but we should do something about it anyway. 
The ice caps are already melting (49)". 
The Royal Society for Arts (RSA, 2006) found similar results from a public 
attitudes survey, where 84% of respondents agreed that 'climate change is a 
real problem and we all need to do something about it. Research conducted by 
Norton and Leaman (2004) revealed that most people had heard of global 
warming and it had become a commonly used and heard term amongst the 
public, with 67% of respondents feeling that they knew 'a great deal' about it. 
Professional and managerial groups were more likely to consider global 
warming as a serious threat compared with other social classes. This could 
explain the response from this sample, given that the majority of respondents 
had professional roles. 
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A number of respondents felt that human activity was either partly or wholly 
responsible for global warming: 
"I do think it's a threat and I think we're causing it (50)" and "I think we're 
definitely contributing to it but it's also part of a natural cycle (3)" 
A study conducted by MORI (2007) revealed that 42% of respondents 
considered human activity to be either partly or fully causing global warming. 
Only 11% of respondents thought that climate change was a result of natural 
causes alone. 
4.3 Knowledge of transport issues 
A list of 10 individual statements regarding the environmental and health 
impacts of transport were presented with the options 'true' 'false' and 'not 
sure'. Scores were then calculated for each respondent, with an average score 
of 3.8 from a maximum score of 10, thus indicating a fairly low level of 
knowledge amongst the sample. The majority of respondents had a score of 3, 
however, several respondents had a knowledge score of 0, thus reducing the 
overall group average. Figure 4.3 shows the scores for each respondent. 
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Figure 4.3: Knowledge score for each respondent 
A Spearman's rank correlation did not reveal any significant relationships 
between knowledge and the socioeconomic variables. Table 4.3 shows the 
average level of knowledge amongst the sample for each category of gender, 
age, income and education. 
Table 4.3: Average levels of knowledge split by gender, age, income 
and education 
Variable Knowledge score 
Male 2.77 
Gender 
Female 2.59 
18-35 2.52 
Age 36 -53 2.82 
>54 2.83 
<£10,000 - £20,000 2.69 
Income >£20,000 - £40,000 2.57 
>£40,000 2.75 
Basic 2.75 
Education Further 3.09 
Higher 2.55 
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Males had a slightly higher level of knowledge than females. The data shows 
that knowledge levels increase with age. The highest income earners had the 
highest levels of knowledge, which is possibly related to age particularly as age 
had a positive (but not significant) correlation with income. The education data 
shows that the respondents with further education qualifications had the 
highest levels of knowledge whilst those with the highest qualifications had the 
lowest levels of knowledge. However, these results could be a result of the 
sample characteristics given that higher education was very overly represented 
whilst basic and further education were underrepresented (see chapter 3- 
table 3.6). 
4.4 Conclusions 
The results revealed that males had a higher level of concern for the 
environment, problem perception and knowledge in comparison to females. 
Overall, respondents aged over 54 years had the highest levels of concern for 
the environment, problem perception and knowledge in comparison to all 
categories of the socioeconomic variables. The majority (83%) of respondents 
in this age group were male which could therefore largely explain the 
differences revealed between genders. 
The results have shown similarities with other research, particularly in terms of 
concern for the environment and problem perception. It is recognised that 
some of the findings, particularly in relation to the perception of global 
warming, could be sample specific in terms of the characteristics amongst 
respondents with the majority being highly educated and above average 
income earners. 
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Chapter 5 
Survey results: behavioural response to the Tradable Carbon 
Permit scheme and fuel price increases 
This chapter analyses the travel data collected by the low carbon software 
described in chapter 3. Section 5.1 shows the stimulus (fuel prices and free 
permit allocations) that people were responding to. Section 5.2 explores those 
who did not change their behaviour, followed by the types and level of 
behavioural response in section 5.3. The impact of response is examined in 
section 5.4, in terms of kilometres travelled and carbon consumption. Section 
5.5 then explores policy effectiveness in terms of achieving their carbon 
reduction targets. Following this, behavioural response is examined in terms of 
exploring relationships between those who changed and those who did not 
change. Section 5.7 gives an indication of behavioural response beyond 2030, 
with chapter conclusions provided in section 5.8. Quotations taken directly 
from the interview discussions are included to support the findings and 
demonstrate the variation in opinions. 
5.1 Price signals and free carbon permit allocation 
Table 5.1 displays the actual prices shown to respondents using the low carbon 
software for each scheme and time period. As explained in chapter 3, the price 
increases relating to the TCP scheme are purely a result of increasing permit 
prices over time (as explained in chapter 3- see sections 3.1.9 and 3.1.10), 
whereas elasticities of fuel demand were applied to derive the necessary price 
increases in the FPI policy (as detailed in chapter 3- see section 3.2). 
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Table 5.1: Fuel price (pence) and % increase from base8 in each time 
period for the TCP scheme and FPI 
Fuel price/litre Fuel price/litre % increase TCP % increase Year 
TCP scheme FPI scheme FPI 
2010 88.2 90.7 3.8 6.7 
2020 96.7 106.8 13.8 25.6 
2030 115.2 137.4 35.5 61.6 
The free permit allocation was displayed on screen to enable respondents to 
compare their own carbon consumption with the amount of carbon they would 
receive free of charge under the TCP scheme. In 2010, the free permit 
allocation equated to 4.4 kilograms of carbon per person per week, decreasing 
to 3.8 kilograms of carbon per person per week in 2020 and 3.1 kilograms of 
carbon per person per week in 2030. Displaying the free allocation allowed 
respondents to judge how many additional carbon permits they would require 
to meet their consumption and/or how many excess carbon permits they would 
have. Displaying the free carbon permit allocation also allowed respondents to 
see the impact of any changes to their travel behaviour in terms of the 
difference between their carbon consumption and their free permit allocation. 
Estimated spending on fuel and permits was also displayed in each time period 
(including base). 
For the FPI, the estimated price of carbon consumption (in terms of fuel) was 
shown on the screen. In each time period, respondents where shown the 
estimated price of their carbon consumption without any changes from their 
base consumption (the cost increased in each time period according to the 
prices shown in table 5.1). 
8 Base fuel price = 85p per litre for both the TCP scheme and FPI. 
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5.2 No behavioural change 
The majority of respondents (37) would not make any changes in response to 
either scheme in any time period, although 26 of these people were consuming 
within their free permit allocation during one or more time periods and hence 
did not need to change in response to the TCP scheme. This group would 
mainly opt to either keep their excess permits for leisure trips, give them away 
to friends and/or relatives, or sell them to the national permit market if the 
price was high enough. This suggests that a large amount of trading of unused 
permits could occur between friends and relatives rather than sales to the 
public market. Others that were willing to sell their permits to the national 
market were likely to wait until the market price increased to provide a 
substantial profit. This has implications for permit availability - if unused 
permits are being stored, demand would quickly increase resulting in 
increasing permit prices, at which point the stored permits are sold. It is likely 
that some permits would remain in storage until the permit price increased 
further, thus resulting in a fluctuating market with periods of low availability 
and high price followed by an influx of stored permits and lower permit prices. 
Several respondents that did not travel by car stated they would keep their 
free permits unused to avoid them being used by car users, for example: 
"I think I'd keep my permits, I wouldn't want someone who drives 50 miles to 
work and back everyday to buy them and it would save even more carbon if I 
didn't sell them (36)" and "I'd only sell them to someone who I knew genuinely 
needed to use their car, I wouldn't sell them to someone so they could drive 
their kids to school (50)": 
Hence there could be unused permits each year which would have an impact 
on demand, particularly prior to carbon reduction adjustments i. e. in the short 
term. The impact on permit demand could be reduced by releasing more 
permits each year than the amount corresponding to the carbon cap, assuming 
that a certain proportion would remain unused. However, there is a risk with 
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this method - the emissions target could be exceeded if the additional permits 
were actually sold rather than unused. 
It is likely that those consuming within their free carbon permit allocation did 
not respond to the FPI because their consumption was low, hence the price 
increases could be absorbed. In addition, many respondents felt that their car 
use was already minimal and could therefore not be reduced. The respondents 
that were consuming over their free permit allocation but did not respond to 
either policy (11 in total) largely felt that their car use was essential and could 
not be reduced, the journeys they made could not be made by other modes, 
using public transport would be inconvenient, expensive, increase journey 
times and reduce their choice of journey origin, destination and travel times. 
These respondents felt that the car provided them with options and 
convenience that they were unwilling to substitute and instead would prefer to 
pay the additional costs. Over half (7) of these respondents were above UK 
average carbon consumers. Steg (2005) suggests that high car usage results 
in a high attachment to car use and increased reluctance to change, which 
appeared apparent amongst the respondents that were unwilling to change 
despite a high potential to do so given their high consumption of carbon. 
However, a higher consumption does not necessarily make it easier to change. 
For example, a lack of alternative options could have prevented a response. 
Such responses suggest that utility or welfare maximisation does not always 
involve avoiding excessive monetary costs, although it is highly possible that 
other activities would be forgone in order to continue current spending on fuel 
without causing additional expenditure overall. For example, certain leisure 
activities could be substituted. Whilst this was not discussed as a behavioural 
response while the software was in use, later in the interview a number of 
respondents mentioned the possible need to sacrifice certain activities and/or 
journey types in order to avoid additional expenditure. This is discussed further 
in chapter 6 (see section 6.1). 
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A multidisciplinary approach to travel behaviour analysis would suggest that 
psychological motives including instrumental (convenience and comfort), 
affective (attachment to car and pleasure of driving) and symbolic reasons (car 
use represents wealth and social status) can be more important than monetary 
considerations when prices are increased (Steg, 2005; Anable, 2005). Thus, it 
is possible that those respondents unwilling to change and consuming above 
their free permit allocation possibly had psychological motives which were 
stronger than their monetary cost minimisation motives. However, without 
further investigation of attitudes it is not possible to identify which motives 
were most important, although from the interview discussion in some cases it 
is possible to identify certain motives: 
"I wouldn't change my vehicle until there was an economy range car that 
offered me the same comfort as my current car. You don't get leather seats 
and the room in an economy car. The hybrids look really ugly don't they, I like 
my car so I'd be very reluctant to change it. No, I'd just have to buy more 
permits somehow or do more car sharing with my wife and work at home more 
I suppose (55)': 
These comments demonstrate strong affective and symbolic motivations for 
car use. Anable (2005) identified such car users through a process of attitude 
measurement and suggests that different policies should be applied depending 
on motives for car use. Hence, as also suggested by Stradling et a/ (2000), a 
pricing policy is very unlikely to be effective where affective and symbolic 
motives are strong, which is possibly more of an issue for the effectiveness of 
the FPI than the TCP scheme given the cap on carbon availability. However, 
strong motives for car use could result in pressure to increase carbon 
availability which if implemented, could be disastrous for the credibility and 
effectiveness of the TCP scheme. 
Several respondents felt that the impact of reducing their own car use would 
be insignificant in global terms. Many were sceptical that others would reduce 
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their car use, particularly in relation to the FPI, and were thus unwilling to be 
disadvantaged if other people were not and no benefits would be gained from 
their actions: 
"Why should I waste my time getting the bus if no one else is? (23)''. 
Two respondents were sceptical about the impact of both policies in terms of 
global emissions: 
"Even if it worked and people gave up their cars it wouldn't make any 
difference to global emissions - what about America and China? They won't 
even sign up to the Kyoto. They need this more than us but we'd be losing out 
while they're still driving around as much as they like (51)': 
This clearly demonstrates a need for information regarding UK carbon 
emissions and the importance of reduction. For example, by revealing carbon 
emissions per person, the UK is much higher than China. It also suggests that 
people need to trust that others will also cooperate, which was also shown by 
Anable (2005). This is possibly more of an issue for the FPI, given the lack of a 
limit on fuel availability in comparison to the TCP scheme which has an 
absolute cap on carbon availability. Whilst the respondents' observations are 
valid, they should not constitute a reason not to act or provide a 'get out 
clause'. Such issues are also explored in the following chapter in relation to the 
perceived fairness of both policies (see chapter 6, section 6.3). 
5.2.1 Car dependency and lifestyle related barriers 
Many of the respondents that did not make any changes largely felt that their 
current lifestyles were dependant on car use which could therefore not be 
reduced or substituted for another mode: 
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"I just couldn't use the train, I've tried it before and I nearly quit my job 
because it was so stressful. My life's stressful enough already without having to 
use the train. By the time I dropped the kids off and got to work I'd be so 
stressed out and then knowing that I had to get back to pick them up, I just 
couldn't do it, no. The only thing I could do is car share with my husband who 
also works in Leeds, although that wouldn't always be possible as we work 
different hours so I'd have to drive most days anyway. I think there'd have to 
be a permit allocation for children, otherwise I might have to give up my job 
(42)" and "I'd like to not have to drive in everyday in all that traffic but it'd 
take me too long to get the train (3)" and "Public transport just isn't good 
enough (7)" : 
It is possible that some of the responses were excuses for continuing current 
car use rather than actual barriers to change - it is much easier to say that 
public transport is not an adequate alternative to car use than to actually 
transfer car trips to public transport. In addition, it is somewhat unrealistic to 
expect a public transport service to provide the comfort and convenience of 
private transport. It is also possible that respondents perceive public transport 
as worse than it actually is, with inaccurate perceptions of travel time for 
example, which could be resolved through the distribution of timetable 
information and trip planning advice (Shannon et a/., 2006). However, one 
respondent felt in order to increase use of public transport, it would be 
necessary to change public attitudes: 
"People think that only poor people use the buses and they don't want to sit 
next to wierdos. I think social norms would have to be changed so it was 
classed as normal to use the bus because everyone else was using it (43)': 
According to Anable (2005), even small changes to the numbers using public 
transport could aid a change in beliefs, attitudes and intentions. However, 
according to the Theory of Planned Behaviour, control beliefs greatly determine 
whether a certain behaviour would be performed. Factors that facilitate 
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behaviour, such as flexible working hours, or restrict behaviour, such as time 
constraints, form an individuals Perceived Behavioural Control (PCB) (Ajzen, 
1991). Thus, personal responsibilities such as collecting children from school 
could render the use of public transport to commute to work beyond an 
individuals PCB, regardless of the social norm regarding public transport use. 
Hence, the behaviour would not be performed. Anable (2005) identified 
differences between car owning segments of society and describes such car 
users as 'malcontented motorists', who feel increasingly unhappy and 
frustrated with their car use but perceive a large number of constraints to the 
use of public transport. It appears highly likely that those with high perceived 
car dependency would require persuasion with alternative information 
strategies that targeted such behaviour and offered practical carbon reduction 
measures. Given that time is a big issue for commuting, measures would be 
required to improve journey times of public transport in addition to trip 
planning information (Shannon et al., 2006). However, it is also possible that 
this group of car users would resort to telecommuting or buying either a more 
efficient vehicle or a clean fuelled vehicle in order to maintain current levels of 
car use. 
Several respondents were doubtful that public transport would actually 
improve as a result of the policies being introduced. There was a lack of trust 
regarding the use of revenue as intended with the removal of funding for the 
Leeds Supertram being used as an example of the governments' attitude 
towards improving public transport: 
"I'm not convinced that the revenue would actually be used to improve public 
transport, it'd probably get swallowed up by something else (44)" and "Look 
what happened with the Supertram, they even started building the tracks and 
spent quite a bit of money on it and then decided it was too expensive after all 
(55)': 
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Whilst the Supertram comments were specific to Leeds, such attitudes 
regarding the lack of trust in governments' use of revenues were also revealed 
in a study by Dresner et al (2006), where respondents were sceptical about 
the use of fuel tax revenue to improve public transport. It is perhaps not 
unreasonable for the public to question the proposed use of revenue in such a 
targeted way, given the historic use of taxation in the UK to raise revenue for 
general and often undisclosed purposes (Dresner et a/., 2006). However, such 
attitudes could be quickly changed when the improvements became visible. 
Conversely, one respondent did not want any revenue to be used for improving 
public transport services: 
"I wouldn't support the use of revenue to improve public transport, it's a 
private business. Why should our taxes be used to expand a profit making 
business? If it was given back to government ownership then fair enough, I'd 
have no problem with that (44)"". 
Many respondents felt that they would not need to make any changes to their 
travel behaviour and would instead absorb the increased costs: 
"I'd just pay that, I wouldn't really notice to be honest and I'd just cut down 
spending on other things if the prices went up anymore (23)" and "I'd just 
carry on as normal and hope that I'd get the permits I wanted (15)" and "I 
wouldn't care about the cost, I'd pay it if it meant I didn't have to change (11)" 
and "I wouldn't like it but yeh I'd just pay it (7)" and "I don't want to hear 
about climate change, I just want to get on with my life to be honest (16)": 
Such motorists were described by Anable (2005) as 'complacent car addicts' 
who do not feel moral imperative or other incentive to alter their car use with 
low potential to switch car journeys to public transport. The provision of 
education regarding the negative aspects of car use and the positive aspects of 
public transport use are proposed as the most effective policy options (Anable, 
2005) (it should be noted that the potential policy options proposed by Anable 
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did not consider personal carbon trading). However, the effectiveness of such 
policies should be considered. For example, Stradling et a/ (2000) discovered 
that information campaigns were considered as push measures, with motorists 
reacting negatively and feeling they were being labeled as polluters. It is 
possible that people do not relate general problems, such as climate change, to 
their own car use (Steg, 2005), hence, the delivery and content of such 
information would require careful consideration. 
5.3 Changes to travel behaviour 
In total, 12 respondents stated they would make changes to their travel 
behaviour only in response to the TCP scheme, 3 respondents stated they 
would make changes to their travel behaviour only in response to the FPI and 
8 respondents stated they would make changes to their travel behaviour in 
response to both policies. Table 5.2 lists the type and frequency of behavioural 
response recorded using the low carbon software with number of responses in 
each time period for both the TCP scheme and the FPI. The behaviours shown 
were suggested by respondents in reply to an open question (see chapter 3, 
section 3.5.2). 
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Table 5.2: Behavioural response with number of responses for the TCP 
scheme and FPI in 2010,2020 and 2030 
Response 
Train to work 5 days per week 
Train to work 3 days per week 
Train to work 2 days per week 
Train to work 1 day per week 
Work locally a nd walk to work 
Cycle to work 
Stop giving lifts to partner 
Bus to work 5 days/week 
Bus to work 3 days/week 
Bus to work 1 day/week 
Use bus/train on long distance leisure 
trips 
Buy fuel cell car 
Buy most fuel efficient car available 
Car share to work 2 days/week 
Work at home 1 day per week 
Walk for short leisure trips 
Number of responses 
2010 2020 2030 
TCP FPI TCP FPI TCP FPI 
11 
4 51 51 
2 
1 12 12 
1 1 1 
11 11 11 
1 
1 
2 21 
1 
111 
1 
111 
11 
11 
21212 
10 2 16 5 18 13 
As explained in chapter 3 (see section 3.5.2), when changes were suggested 
by respondents the journeys were adjusted accordingly in the low carbon 
software which then displayed the recalculated carbon consumption and 
estimated monetary cost. For the TCP scheme, respondents were also able to 
see the impact of any changes in relation to their free carbon permit allocation. 
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5.3.1 Journey to work 
The commute to work appeared to be the most flexible journey for most, in 
terms of making changes. Where changes were made, train was a much more 
popular mode than bus because of the perceived faster journey times and 
increased comfort. Leisure journeys were much less flexible than work trips, 
with many respondents feeling that car use was their only option for many of 
their leisure trips due to the level of trip combining involved and journey 
distance. These results are in contrast to other studies which report leisure 
trips to be more changeable than commute trips (Jakobsson et a/., 2002; 
Ubbels and Verhoef, 2006). For the TCP scheme, in the short term, train 
operators would be under more pressure to increase capacity than bus 
operators. There would be less pressure in response to the FPI policy, in terms 
of increasing capacity and reducing emissions given that the greatest demand 
occurred in the long term. 
It is evident from table 5.2 that respondents were much more willing to alter 
their commute to and from work rather than altering other trips. For example, 
in response to the TCP scheme in 2030,11 respondents would alter commute 
trips and only 3 people would alter their leisure trips. Similarly, 10 people 
would alter commute trips in response to the FPI in 2030, with only 2 people 
willing to alter leisure trips in the same period. This is logical given that 
commute trips are likely to be the most frequent trips made and generally 
have the most fixed route. 
Train was preferred to bus, being viewed as a faster, more direct and 
attractive mode, whereas bus was considered much less reliable given the 
possibility of being delayed in congested traffic: 
"I'd use the train because at least that won't get held up in traffic like the 
buses do (39)" and "Buses are always late and there's no way of knowing 
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when it's going to show up, whereas trains are generally much more reliable 
and you get told if it's late (47)'f. 
It is possible that such attitudes could be influenced by the improvement of 
journey time reliability (for example, by installing bus lanes) and the provision 
of accurate timetable information. For example in Leeds, Metro have recently 
implemented a wide scale availability of real time bus information which 
informs potential travellers waiting at the bus stop the number and arrival time 
of the next 4 buses. 
In addition to those respondents who made changes where feasible, several 
respondents stated they would like to change their journey to work but 
perceived difficulties: 
"I'd use the bus but I'd have to get one into town and then one up to the 
campus, which is ridiculous because I only live three miles away (19)" and "It's 
not possible for me to use the bus to work, there's only one an hour where I 
live (56) ". 
Such responses suggest that PBC was an important determinant of behaviour, 
given that restraints were perceived regarding the use of public transport to 
commute to work. Amongst a survey of employees at 2 UK companies, 
Kingham et al (2001) identified a strong willingness to reduce car use for the 
journey to work only where the conditions were right, for example, where 
public transport was available within a reasonable journey time. 
5.3.2 Leisure journeys 
Leisure journeys were considered by the majority of respondents to be much 
less flexible in terms of switching mode, being more time restrained, and not 
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very feasible to use public transport due to the high level of trip combining 
involved, for example: 
"I couldn't do most of my leisure trips by public transport, for example, if I did 
that one (pointed to a long-distance leisure trip displayed on the screen), it'd 
take about 3 times as long and I'd have to get about three different trains. It 
just wouldn't be worth doing (56)': 
These results are in contrast to other studies (for example: Ubbels and 
Verhoef, 2006; Loukopoulos et al., 2006) which have discovered a greater 
willingness to change leisure and shopping trips with commute trips being 
perceived as the most difficult to change given the route and time constraints. 
Whilst shopping trips are reportedly more elastic than commute trips (Ubbels 
and Verhoef, 2006) and thus easier to change (Jakobsson et al., 2002), many 
respondents were visiting decentralised shopping outlets (including the White 
Rose centre, and supermarkets on the outskirts of Leeds), which suggests a 
problem with accessibility. Many respondents were shopping during the 
evening and would not want to use public transport largely as a result of 
perceived lack of availability and personal safety concerns. Several 
respondents felt that such shopping and leisure areas were only accessible by 
car and could therefore not use public transport. Stradling et al (2000, p. 214) 
discovered similar findings amongst focus groups with the general public where 
it was largely agreed that many facilities can only be accessed via car: "the 
whole country is geared up for car use". Thus, many barriers to change or 
control beliefs could possibly be altered through the implementation of 
strategic planning laws which would encourage the recentralisation of 
amenities and prevent the imposition of shopping and/or leisure outlets 
without the provision of an adequate public transport service. 
The willingness to change varied amongst respondents, some were happy to 
make changes if the policies were necessary and they were helping to reduce 
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the impacts of climate change whereas others were more reluctant and made 
changes because they felt they would have to: 
"I'd use the bus so I knew that I had some permits left to do the shopping and 
for days out (1)" and "I suppose I could get the train to work 2 days a week if 
I had to, 3 days at a push. It'd take me longer but I'd just have to do it (2)" 
and "I'd have to cut down, fuel already costs too much and I cant afford to 
pay any more (17)" and "I could just walk for them short trips, I only used the 
car to save time but I'd just have to plan it a bit more. If it'll help the 
environment then it's worth it (8)". 
5.3.3 Increasing fuel efficiency 
By purchasing the most efficient vehicle in the same class as their current 
vehicle, respondents could reduce their fuel consumption by up to 30% (SMMT, 
2005), which could allow current behaviour to continue without making any 
changes. However, this option was only mentioned by a small number of 
respondents: 
If I bought a more efficient car I'd get more use from my permit allowance, so 
I'd do that straight away (20)': 
Efficient driving practices, such as changing gear between 2,000 and 2,500 
rpm, keeping windows closed, avoiding excessive braking and idling and 
maintaining optimum type pressure, could save as much as 25% of fuel 
consumption (Potter et al., 2001; Kroon, 2006; Anable and Bristow, 2007). 
However, this method of fuel reduction, which would not require a reduction in 
car use, was not mentioned during the interviews. However, people need to 
plan their travel (Jakobsson et a/., 2002), hence it is highly likely that, given 
more time to plan their response, many respondents would opt for such fuel 
saving measures that do not require a reduction in car use. In addition, the 
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awareness of efficient driving practices could possibly be influenced through an 
information campaign which would provide options for reducing carbon 
consumption, including driving style. For example, the UK Department for 
Transport currently have a series of adverts on billboards around the country 
which provide information on efficient driving practices, such as maintaining 
the correct tyre pressure and avoiding excessive acceleration and braking. 
Many respondents stated that, whilst the scheme would not prompt them to 
change their current vehicle, when they did need to change their vehicle fuel 
efficiency would be a very important determinant: 
"When I changed my car I'd look really carefully at the efficiency and buy one 
based on that (8)': 
Again, it is highly possible that given a supply of information and adequate 
time to plan, the uptake of more efficient cars (which could allow current car 
use to continue), could actually be much greater than suggested above. 
5.3.4 Walking and cycling 
Cycling was not a popular option in response to either policy. It was largely 
viewed as an unattractive mode due to the perceived safety implications, travel 
speed and the vulnerability to unpleasant weather conditions. In addition it 
was viewed as impractical for work trips given the lack of shower facilities 
available: 
"I'd like to cycle because I only live three miles away but because there's 
nowhere to get a shower, I'd have to ride in my suit and that's just not 
practical. And there's nowhere to leave my bike on campus (41)" and "I like 
cycling but not when it's wet and cold (44)" and "There's too much traffic on 
the roads, it's not safe for bikes (48) ". 
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It therefore appears that large scale cycling strategies would have to be 
deployed in conjunction with the introduction of the policies, including the 
provision of cycle facilities (safe lock up areas and shower facilities at places of 
employment) and extensive cycle lanes. However, the comments given by 
respondents could have been excuses not to cycle rather than genuine 
reasons. Thus, there is no guarantee that the provision of such facilities would 
significantly increase levels of cycling. For example, Shannon et al (2006) 
found amongst a survey of university employees and students that the travel 
time and distance from home to work were the main barriers for cycling to 
work. Jensen (1999) discovered amongst a survey of the general public that 
cyclists lived within a short distance of their workplace. In addition, amongst a 
survey of employees at two UK companies, Kingham et a/ (2001) found that 
cycling levels would increase as traffic levels declined, and that more than 25% 
of the sample from one company and 15% of the sample from the second 
company would cycle regularly all year if they lived within cycling distance of 
work. Hence, the distance from home to work could be a more important 
determinant of cycling than the provision of cycling facilities. For example, 
Shannon et a/ (2006) discovered that the introduction of cycle lanes, showers, 
secure lock ups and a cycle repair shop on campus were not likely to change 
behaviour amongst a sample of university students and employees. In 
addition, amongst a survey of employees at two UK companies, Kingham et al 
(2001) found that less than 10% of the sample would cycle to work if cycling 
infrastructure was improved. 
Other studies reported by Kingham et al (2001) found that cycling would 
improve by only 2% amongst a survey of university employees and 13% 
amongst a sample of employees at a large UK company if cycle lanes were 
improved. However, in contrast, another study reported by Kingham et al 
(2001) amongst staff from Boots Plc concluded that 23% of the sample would 
cycle to work if improvements to cycling infrastructure were made. The 
effectiveness of such measures would therefore require careful consideration 
prior to implementation given the level of investment and disruption required 
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to extend existing cycle paths and implement new cycle pathways in addition 
to the facilities at places of employment. It is also possible that changing 
existing social norms regarding cycling would play an important role in 
increasing cycling activity. 
5.4 Impact of behavioural response on kilometres travelled and carbon 
consumption 
The behavioural changes outlined in table 5.2 are reflected in table 5.3, which 
displays total kilometres travelled per mode for both the TCP scheme and the 
FPI. 
Table 5.3: Total distance (kilometres) traveled for the whole sample 
per mode per week (base) with % change in 2010,2020 and 2030 for 
the TCP scheme and FPI. 
Mode Base 2010 2020 2030 
TCP FPI TCP FPI TCP FPI 
Car 13921 -9.5 -0.6 -17.4 -4.4 -29.0 -11.0 
Bus 1719 0.0 0.0 +13.5 +5.0 +13.5 +12.. 0 
Train 4814 +17.4 0.0 +33.1 +8.2 +38.0 +23.5 
Taxi 59 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Motorcycle 694 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cycle 241 +28.6 +20.3 +33.6 +20.3 +51.0 +20.3 
Walk 332 +8.5 +1.6 +11.2 +2.2 +16.0 +4.0 
Total 21780 -1.8 -0.1 -2.4 -0.3 -8.4 -0.4 
A paired samples t-test was used to explore whether the differences in 
kilometres travelled between the base and 2030 for each policy were 
statistically significant, i. e. whether or not the difference occurred by chance. 
The t-test revealed significant differences for the TCP scheme (p<. 02) and for 
the FPI (p<. 025). In comparison to the UK national average, respondents were 
traveling more by car, bus, rail, motorcycle and cycle and less by taxi and 
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walking (see chapter 3, table 3.3). However, by 2030 in relation to the TCP 
scheme, car kilometres were below the UK national average with walking 
increased to above the national average. Conversely, for the FPI car kilometres 
remained above UK average and walking kilometres remained below the UK 
average. The ratio of car kilometres to cycle kilometres declined in relation to 
the TCP scheme, going from 57 car kilometres per cycle kilometre in the base 
to 27 car kilometres per cycle kilometre in 2030, therefore reducing the risk of 
accidents and possibly encouraging greater uptake of cycling. For example, as 
reported by Kingham et a/ (2001), willingness to cycle increased as traffic 
levels declined. 
Table 5.4 displays carbon consumed by mode in each policy and time period, 
reflecting the behavioural changes shown in table 5.2 and changes in 
kilometres travelled shown in table 5.3. 
Table 5.4: Total carbon consumption from the whole sample 
(kilograms) per mode per week (base) with % change in 2010,2020 
and 2030 for the TCP scheme and FPI. 
Mode Base 2010 2020 2030 
TCP FPI TCP FPI TCP FPI 
Car 512 -11.3 -0.4 -35.4 -5.9 -38.0 -21.3 
Bus 33 0.0 0.0 +32.0 +12.1 +33.0 +24.2 
Train 82 +10.0 0.0 +22.0 +4.9 +23.0 +20.7 
Taxi 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Motorcycle 17 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 647 -7.7 -0.3 -23.8 -3.4 -25.7 -13.1 
The total carbon consumed per person during the base and 2030 was 
significantly different for both the TCP scheme (p<. 02) and FPI (p<. 025). The 
total change in carbon consumption from all modes shows that the increase in 
public transport offset some of the reductions from car use, for example, in 
2030, the TCP achieved a 38% reduction in car carbon but the overall 
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reduction from all modes was 25.7%. This supports the case to reduce 
emissions from public transport in addition to personal transport modes, as 
suggested in chapter 3 (see section 3.1). 
The reduction in carbon consumed by car use is greater than the corresponding 
reduction in kilometres traveled by car (see table 5.3). This reflects the switch 
by one respondent to a smaller car that consumed less fuel, and by another to 
a fuel cell car in 2030 for the TCP scheme (see table 5.2). Hence, carbon 
consumption and demand for permits and fuel were reduced without having to 
reduce vehicle kilometres traveled. For the FPI, the greatest change in carbon 
consumption was achieved in 2030. Hence, the largest reduction in car carbon 
from base consumption and the greatest increase in carbon consumed by 
public transport were achieved in the long term. However, the elasticities 
applied assume a greater response in the long term (Graham and Glaister, 
2000), although it is possible that greater reductions would be achieved before 
2030 if supportive measures were made available, such as increased public 
transport quality and availability, cycle facilities, and local shops. In response 
to the TCP scheme, the greatest reductions in carbon occurred in 2020, with a 
further change in 2030 but at a much smaller level. Thus, the capacity and/or 
willingness to change was almost exhausted in 2020. However, long term 
supportive measures, such as clean-fuel vehicles at reduced costs and 
improved public transport, should have been implemented by this point 
therefore providing additional opportunities to reduce carbon consumption. In 
addition, the increasing permit price could play a crucial role, thus providing 2 
strong signals (cap and permit price increase) in the long term. 
5.5 Policy effectiveness 
Table 5.5 displays the carbon emissions targets implied by the scheme design 
values (see appendices 1 and 2) and the actual carbon emissions reductions 
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achieved amongst the sample for both policies in all time periods (derived from 
table 5.4). 
Table 5.5: Carbon emissions reduction targets (percentage change 
from current) and actual reduction for the TCP scheme and FPI in 
2010,2020 and 2030. 
Year TCP scheme carbon reduction % 
Aim Actual 
2010 8.0 11.3 
2020 21.4 35.4 
2030 34.8 38.3 
FPI carbon reduction % 
Aim Actual 
1.7 0.4 
10.6 5.9 
25.3 21.3 
The emissions targets to 2030 were a 34.8% reduction for the TCP scheme, 
reflecting the linear reduction in carbon each year, and for the fuel price 
increases 25.3% reflecting the assumed lower price elasticity in the early 
years. Despite smaller price increases in each time period (see table 5.1), the 
TCP scheme over achieved the emissions target in each period whilst, 
conversely, the FPI underachieved the emissions target in each period. Hence, 
the TCP scheme was more effective than the FPI at achieving change amongst 
a group of above average carbon consumers. To give an indication of the 
difference in effectiveness levels, the carbon reduction targets for the TCP 
scheme in 2010 and the FPI in 2020 were very similar yet the TCP scheme 
over achieved the target by 3.3% whilst the FPI underachieved the carbon 
reduction target by 4.7%. In addition, the change in carbon consumed by car 
use can be examined per 1% of carbon reduction aim. For example, up to 
2030 the TCP scheme aimed to reduce carbon consumed from car use by 
34.8% with an actual reduction of 38. 3%, hence for every 1% reduction aim a 
1.1% reduction was achieved. For the FPI this is quite different - for every 1% 
reduction aim for carbon used for car use resulted in a 0.8% reduction. Thus, 
the TCP scheme achieved an average effectiveness of 110% compared to the 
FPI which achieved an average effectiveness of 80%. However, the main 
response to pricing is to pay the increased charge and continue current 
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behaviour (Bonsall et al., 2007; Jakobsson et al., 2002), therefore this appears 
to be a positive outcome in comparison to other findings. 
The effectiveness of each policy can also be compared in terms of kilometers 
traveled in 2030 per mode for every 1% of the carbon reduction target9. Table 
5.6 shows the figures derived for the whole sample. 
Table 5.6: Change in kilometers traveled per mode per week per 1% of 
the carbon reduction target 
Car Bus Train Cycle Walk 
TCP scheme -116.0 6.0 53.0 3.5 1.5 
FPI -61.0 8.1 45.0 1.9 0.5 
The TCP scheme caused a threefold increase in walking and almost twice as 
much cycling as the FPI, therefore indicating larger health benefits as a result 
of the TCP scheme. As a result, social norms regarding active modes would be 
likely to change more rapidly and more significantly under a TCP scheme. Train 
use was also greater for the TCP scheme which also caused almost twice the 
reduction in car kilometres. Interestingly, the FPI caused a greater increase in 
bus kilometres than the TCP scheme, which is perhaps a result of those 
earning below average incomes who would typically use bus rather than train 
responding to the FPI and not to the TCP scheme. 
The difference between the actual and expected emissions reduction from the 
FPI was smaller in 2030 than any other period, however, the elasticities 
applied assume greater response in the long term (see chapter 3, section 3.2). 
The fuel price increase was greatest in this period (61.6% - as shown in table 
5.1). Thus, to achieve significant reductions from the FPI it appears that fuel 
price would have to increase by over 50%: 
9 Formula used: difference in kilometres travelled between base and 2030/carbon 
reduction target in 2030. 
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"I'd have to make changes if the price got that high, that's more than a 50% 
increase isn't it, I couldn't pay that much, no I'd definitely start to make 
changes then (21)': 
Conversely, Jakobsson et a/ (2002) investigated the effect of fuel price 
increases amongst car owning households and found that even substantial 
economic disincentives (100% fuel price increase) were unlikely to cause any 
large reductions in car use. In addition, Kingham et a/ (2001) found that only 
half of employees at two UK companies would change their car use if fuel 
prices reached £10 per litre. A substantial increase in fuel price would be 
required to have a significant effect on car use (Dargay, 2004), thus, in 
comparison to existing empirical data, it appears that the current sample were 
perhaps more willing to change their behaviour, hence it should be considered 
that amongst a different sample the effectiveness rates of both policies could 
be much lower. 
The limited availability of carbon permits provided respondents with a strong 
signal and drive for reducing their carbon consumption with many feeling that 
change would be inevitable for the majority of carbon consumers should the 
TCP scheme be introduced. Many respondents did not want to be in a situation 
where they could not make leisure trips or essential journeys by car due to a 
lack of available permits and instead would rather reduce their consumption 
from other trips where alternatives were more easily available, such as 
commuting to work using the train rather than car. The uncertainty of permit 
availability therefore appeared to be the main driver for behavioural change: 
"I'd want to make sure that I had enough permits for my leisure trips, there're 
some places were you can't use public transport, or it just takes too long. I'd 
cut back on the work trips and save the extra ones (14)" and "It's the not 
knowing whether you'd be able to buy what you wanted, and the price of 
them, so I might not even be able to afford it anyway. I'd have to stick to my 
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free allocation and get what my parents don't use, I wouldn't like to risk having 
to buy more in case there wasn't any there (19)': 
People are risk averse and would prefer an option with a known price to an 
option with an uncertain price (Bonsall et al., 2007). Hence, the TCP scheme 
could actually benefit, in terms of effectiveness, from risk aversion, i. e., people 
try to minimise the risk of permit shortages by reducing their permit use. 
5.5.1 Fuel demand elasticities: applied and derived from survey results 
The fuel price increases displayed in table 5.1 and the carbon reductions 
displayed in table 5.5 can together be used to derive fuel demand elasticities 
for the sample. Table 5.7 displays the elasticity applied in each time period for 
the FPI based on those derived by Graham and Glaister (2000) (as explained in 
chapter 3- see section 3.2.1) and the derived point elasticity for each period 
and policy based on the changes to behaviour recorded by the low carbon 
software during the survey. 
Table 5.7: Fuel demand elasticities - applied and derived from survey 
results'°. 
Survey results Survey results Year Elasticity applied FPI 
elasticity: FPI elasticity: TCP 
2010 -0.25 -0.06 -2.97 
2020 -0.40 -0.23 -2.57 
2030 -0.41 -0.35 -1.08 
For the FPI, in each period the elasticities derived from the survey results were 
much lower than those applied. Hence, the fuel price elasticities applied gave 
rather different results in comparison to those based on the response of a 
sample of above average carbon consumers with a higher than expected 
10 Formula: % reduction achieved/% price increase 
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willingness to pay. From the derived elasticities shown in table 5.7 it is possible 
to calculate the price increase that would be necessary to achieve the desired 
carbon reductions, as shown in table 5.5. For example, in 2010, in order to 
achieve a carbon reduction of 1.7%, fuel price would need to increase by 
28.5% which is much higher than the actual increase applied (6.7%). In 2020, 
a fuel price increase of 46% would be required whereas an actual increase of 
25.6% was applied. In order to achieve the desired reduction in 2030, a fuel 
price increase of 72% would be required, compared to the applied increase of 
61.6%. The smallest difference between the required price increase and the 
applied price increase occurred in 2030 which largely explains the smallest 
difference between expected and actual carbon reduction in this period, as 
shown in table 5.5. 
Given that the combined fuel and permit prices were lower in each time period 
then those used in the FPI, the elasticities derived from the survey results in 
relation to the TCP scheme are clearly dominated by the quantity effect i. e. the 
reduction in carbon availability over time. As discussed in section 5.5, a 
number of respondents felt that they would have to reduce their carbon 
consumption and would prefer to reduce their non-essential trips to avoid a 
permit shortage. Hence, the derived elasticity represents risk averse behaviour 
in response to a declining availability of carbon permits, rather than purely a 
price effect. 
5.6 Exploring the changes to travel behaviour 
Given the complexity of travel behaviour and the potential influence of 
attitudes (Steg, 2005; Anable, 2005), this section aims to further explore the 
motivators for behavioural change amongst participants. In order to identify 
differences between respondents who changed their behaviour compared to 
those who did not change their behaviour, a dummy variable was coded as 0 
for non changers and 1 for changers. Table 5.8 shows the average scores for 
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the attitude variables reported in chapter 4 and the average base carbon 
consumption derived from the low carbon software. 
Table 5.8: Changers versus non-changers 
Behavioural change No behavioural change Variable 
TCP FPI TCP FPI 
Environmental concern 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.8 
Problem perception 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.6 
Knowledge 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.8 
Carbon kg/person/week 17.5 14.9 4.7 7.4 
In terms of concern for the environment, for the TCP scheme the no changers 
had on average a slightly lower score whereas for the FPI, the changers had a 
lower score than those who did not change their behaviour. Problem perception 
was higher amongst changers in both policies. Knowledge was higher amongst 
changers for the TCP scheme and higher amongst non changers for the FPI. 
Hence, based on the lack of clear and consistent relationships, it appears that 
concern for the environment, problem perception and knowledge were not 
strong causative factors of behavioural change. 
For both policies, carbon consumption was vastly different between 
respondents who changed compared to those who did not change. Those who 
changed for the TCP scheme were consuming more than 3 times as much 
carbon as the non changers and similarly for the FPI changers were consuming 
over twice as much carbon as the non changers. The data in table 5.8 supports 
the results in section 5.2, where it was revealed that for both policies the 
majority of non changers were below UK average carbon consumers and in 
relation to the TCP scheme were consuming within or very close to the free 
carbon permit allocation. Conversely, those who changed were consuming 
significantly above the free permit allocation. Hence, carbon consumption 
expectedly has a strong influence on propensity to change. 
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To further explore relationships with behavioural response, a correlation 
analysis was conducted using a Spearman's rank correlation (explained in 
chapter 4). For the FPI, statistically significant relationships were revealed 
between behavioural response and carbon consumption (p<. 01), with a 
positive but not very strong correlation coefficient of 0.368 (a value of 1 
indicates a perfect correlation). For the TCP scheme, income (p<. 05), impacts 
on lifestyle" (p<. 01) and carbon consumption (p<. 01) had a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with behavioural response, with carbon 
consumption having the strongest correlation coefficient of 0.631. Hence, for 
the TCP scheme, behavioural response increases as income, impacts on 
lifestyle and carbon consumption also increase. There is likely to be a level of 
interdependency between the variables in that carbon consumption increases 
with income which in turn provides more scope and incentive to reduce 
consumption as income and thus carbon consumption increase. The level of 
impacts on lifestyle would also depend on the type and level of behavioural 
response which increases as carbon consumption and income increase. 
Interestingly, income was not significant in response to the FPI despite a 
positive and significant (p<. 01) relationship between income and base carbon 
consumption. This is possibly a result of the larger number of respondents 
making changes in response to the TCP scheme than the FPI (20 people 
compared to 12 people). 
Carbon consumption was clearly an important factor in behavioural response. A 
Spearman's rank correlation revealed significant and positive relationships 
between base carbon consumption and age (p<. 05), and income (p<. 01), with 
income having the strongest relationship with carbon consumption (coefficient 
of . 534). Gender had a significant 
(p<. 05) but negative relationship with 
carbon consumption which reveals a higher consumption amongst males 
compared to females (males were coded as 0 and females were coded as 1 in 
the dummy variable for gender). Hence, the likelihood of behavioural change 
"'Impacts on lifestyle' variable measured the scale of impacts on lifestyle resulting 
from the TCP scheme and FPI - chapter 3 (section 3.5.2) and chapter 6 (section 6.1). 
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increases as carbon consumption, income, age and distance travelled increase. 
In addition, males are more likely to change their behaviour although this is 
expected given that men tend to travel greater distances than women (DfT, 
2006b), which was also revealed in the correlation analysis as a negative 
relationship between gender and distance travelled. 
The following section further explores the relationship with behavioural 
response (presented as carbon consumption in each time period) and income, 
which was significantly and positively correlated with distance travelled 
(p<. 05) and carbon consumption (p<. 01). 
5.6.1 Income 
The demand for fuel is heavily dependant on income (Graham and Glaister, 
2000). It is therefore logical to assume that behavioural response to a policy 
that imposes monetary penalties would be largely influenced by the ability to 
absorb such penalties, and thus that income might be a key indicator of 
propensity to change. The elasticities used to derive the fuel price increases 
assume that an individual will maximize their utility when faced with increased 
expenditure (Dresner and Ekins, 2004). The extent to which monetary aspects 
are important in the consideration of utility are likely to be influenced by 
income, with other factors such as instrumental (convenience), affective 
(enjoyment of driving) or symbolic (status) motives becoming more important 
as income increases and resultantly make pricing policies less effective (Steg, 
2005). Amongst the sample, 27% earned below the UK average gross 
household income, 38% had an average gross household income and 35% 
earned above the UK average gross household income (see chapter 3, table 
3.3). Table 4.9 provides carbon consumption by mode split by gross annual 
household income across the whole sample for both policies in each time 
period. It should be noted that the table is designed to explore the relationship 
between income and carbon consumption in each time period and policy, 
139 
rather than provide comparisons between the policies given that the carbon 
reduction targets differed in each time period (see table 5.5). 
Table 5.9: Carbon consumption (kilograms) per person per week 
(base) with % change from base in 2010,2020 and 2030 split by 
travel mode12 and income group for the TCP scheme and FPI 
Year Mode 
Below average 
income 
Average income 
Above average 
income 
TCP FPI TCP FPI TCP FPI 
Car 1.8 1.8 9.5 9.5 13.2 13.2 
Base Bus 1 1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Train 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.9 
Car 0 0 -20 0 -5 -0.4 
2010 Bus 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Train 0 0 +20 0 0 0 
Car 0 -11 -35 -6 -40 -6 
2020 Bus 0 +10 +50 0 +133 +33 
Train 0 0 +47 +9 +11 0 
Car 0 -11 -38 -23 -43 -21 
2030 Bus 0 +10 +75 +25 +133 +100 
Train 0 0 +47 +33 +11 +22 
The data shows a highly positive relationship between carbon consumed by car 
use and income and a reduction in carbon consumed by bus and train as 
income increases. However, this is expected given the proportionate increase 
in car travel and reduction in travel by other modes in relation to income (DfT, 
2006b). Despite the TCP scheme having higher carbon reduction targets, the 
FPI was the only policy to cause changes amongst the below average income 
group. This group had the least potential to reduce their carbon consumption, 
given they were substantially below the average carbon consumption (from car 
12 Motorcycle and taxi were excluded from the analysis as no changes to these modes 
occurred in any time period or policy. 
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use) in the UK. The majority of this group had excess carbon permits, 
therefore removing the necessity to respond to the TCP scheme. This suggests 
that the TCP scheme could have fewer equity impacts amongst low income 
groups in comparison to the FPI which in turn could greatly influence the public 
acceptability of the policy (Jakobsson et al., 2002; Veigas, 2001). 
Given their above average consumption of carbon from car use, the average 
income group had much more potential to change in comparison to the below 
average group, although the greatest potential to change was amongst the 
above average income earners who had the highest carbon consumption from 
car use. Changes were made by this group in response to each period and 
policy, with the greatest response to the TCP scheme occurring in the medium 
term (2020) and the greatest response to the FPI occurring in the long term 
(2030). As expected, for the FPI the average income earners made greater 
reductions than the above average income earners who were better equipped 
to absorb the increased fuel costs to a larger extent. The impact of price would 
be expected to be low amongst above average income earners (Brand et a/., 
2006), and although the reduction in car use increased significantly in 2030 it 
was below the carbon reduction target of 25.3% (see table 5.6). This 
demonstrates that in order to achieve the desired levels of carbon reduction 
amongst this group, fuel price would need to be increased by over 50%. This 
also applies to the average income group who also made much greater 
changes in response to the FPI in 2030 compared to the other periods. 
Conversely for the TCP scheme, the carbon reduction target was overachieved 
in nearly all time periods by the average and above average income groups, 
being underachieved only in 2010 by the above average income group. 
However, whilst this group resisted change in the short term (2010), they 
achieved greater reductions in the medium and long term than the average 
income earners. Thus, amongst the highest consumers, it appears that a TCP 
scheme could be more effective at reducing emissions than fuel price 
increases. This again demonstrates the impact of the limit placed on permit 
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availability, with many respondents feeling like they would have to change 
their consumption whilst being allowed to largely continue current consumption 
under the FPI but at a higher price. However, the response may be quite 
different amongst a nationally representative sample, given the generic nature 
of the fuel price elasticity applied. 
5.7 Long term behavioural response 
In order to explore behavioural response beyond 2030, respondents were 
shown a list of 11 activities and asked how likely they were to do each activity 
in the long-term in response to both policies. Each activity was rated on a scale 
ranging from -3 (very unlikely) to +3 (very likely). Table 5.10 shows the 
number of responses in each category. 
Table 5.10: Likelihood (number of responses) of activity uptake in the 
long term (up to 2050) for the TCP scheme and FPI 
TCP scheme FPI Activity 
Unlikely Unsure Likely Unlikely Unsure Likely 
Car share 16 14 30 19 13 28 
Move house closer to 41 7 12 38 8 14 
Change job closer to 36 8 16 31 9 20 
Telecommute 19 9 32 18 11 31 
Shop online/home 20 7 33 22 10 28 
Buy alternative fuel 8 8 44 10 11 39 
Increase vehicle fuel 6 6 48 9 7 44 
efficiency 
Use public transport 15 10 35 12 14 34 
Cycle to replace short car 24 11 25 26 12 22 
trips 
Walk to replace short car 5 14 41 9 12 39 
trips 
Trip combine -3 57 -5 55 
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Cycling received a similar number of responses in the likely and unlikely 
categories which indicates a split response. Conversely, other activities such as 
walking to replace short car trips, using public transport, increasing vehicle 
efficiency, buying an alternatively fuelled vehicle, telecommuting and car 
sharing received many more 'likely' ratings then 'unlikely' ratings therefore 
suggesting that the majority of respondents would do such activities. Moving 
house to live closer to work and moving job to work closer to home were 
largely at the 'unlikely' end of the scale therefore suggesting that the majority 
of respondents would not do such activities. 
Where the majority of respondents rated an activity as likely for both policies, 
there were more responses in relation to the TCP scheme than the FPI. The 
difference is particularly noticeable in regard to shopping online, buying an 
alternatively fuelled vehicle and buying a more fuel efficient vehicle. It appears 
that the TCP scheme would encourage a greater uptake of these activities than 
the FPI, which was possibly a result of the TCP scheme being largely viewed as 
a more restrictive policy that would force change, whereas the FPI allowed 
respondents to continue their current behaviour if they were willing to pay the 
increased cost. Hence, respondents felt it more necessary to implement carbon 
saving measures in response to the TCP scheme. 
Many respondents recognised the benefit of reducing their fuel consumption 
whilst maintaining vehicle kilometres through the purchase of a more efficient 
vehicle. However, several respondents stated they would only purchase a more 
efficient vehicle when it became necessary to replace their old one, which was 
envisaged to be in the long term. In addition, many respondents felt that a 
more efficient vehicle would be smaller in size and would not therefore 
sufficiently accommodate their needs in terms of transporting family members 
and luggage. Others thought vehicles such as the hybrid models were too 
expensive and would only consider purchase should the price be reduced, 
which was envisaged to occur over time as demand increased as a result of the 
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constraints on carbon emissions. This suggests a much greater demand for 
increased fuel efficiency in the long term, therefore providing regulators and 
manufacturer's ample time to achieve and supply such vehicles. Respondents 
generally had more doubts about purchasing an alternatively fuelled vehicle, 
such as a fuel cell car, with more respondents being likely to purchase an 
increased fuel efficiency car. Many respondents answered this question with a 
caveat. For example: 
"I'd get a hydrogen car if the prices came down and if I didn't have to drive too 
far to refuel (27)" and "I'd get an electric car if you could go further than 30 
miles without having to recharge the battery (8)'". 
Telecommuting was answered in a similar way, with more than half of the 
sample stating they were likely to work from home. Many respondents stated 
that they would like to work from home now under the current situation but 
felt that their employer would not allow it: 
"I'd definitely work from home if I could, I'd do it now if my employer would let 
me. There's no reason why I can't work at home and it'd save me a lot of 
traveling (39)" and "It needs to be an option offered by employers, as well as 
flexible hours so we're not all driving in during the rush hour (47)': 
This suggests a large potential to reduce carbon emissions resulting from 
commute trips, which after leisure trips, are the largest generator of passenger 
miles in the UK (DfT, 2006a). This is a measure that would be attractive to 
many people as it would reduce the time spent traveling, hence more time 
spent on leisure activities, and is probably much more favourable than using 
alternative modes, such as using the bus instead of driving to work. However, 
there is a possibility that increased leisure time would result in increased travel 
by car for leisure purposes, therefore offsetting any carbon savings gained 
from teleworking. Whilst in theory the potential to telecommute amongst this 
sample was large given the nature of their employment (predominantly office 
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based with very infrequent off-site visits), it would differ amongst employment 
types which could be taken into account when targeting employers with 
telecommute options/facilities. 
For both policies, the majority of respondents were unlikely to move house to 
live closer to work and change their job to live closer to home. Many 
respondents were happy with their current circumstances and would not be 
willing to change, for example: 
"I live in a nice village, I don't want to move closer to work, it's not a nice 
area (5)" and "I couldn't get a job close to where I live and I like the job I've 
got (7)': 
In response to both policies, over half of the sample stated they were likely to 
use public transport. Interestingly, more respondents were unlikely to use 
public transport beyond 2030 in response to the TCP scheme than the FPI 
despite a higher increase in public transport kilometers in response to the TCP 
scheme than the FPI (see table 5.3). It is possible that respondents were 
taking into account the changes they had already made up to 2030 in response 
to the TCP scheme and thus considered the long term changes as additional, 
hence further changes were unlikely given that car trips had already been 
changed to public transport where possible. In relation to the FPI, it is possible 
that respondents were taking into account further fuel price increases which 
could have encouraged the switch to public transport in the long term. 
In response to the TCP scheme, cycling to replace short car trips was 
considered unlikely and likely by an almost equal number of respondents, 
whereas the majority rated cycling as an unlikely activity in response to the 
FPI. Again, this could be a result of respondents feeling that the FPI was not as 
forceful in terms of changing mode, given the option of paying the increased 
costs and continuing car use. However, the comments provided during the 
interviews indicated safety concerns as the most important reason for avoiding 
cycling: 
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"I couldn't cycle, it's too dangerous. People drive too fast and they don't see 
bikes (1)" and "The weather's not good enough to cycle in this country and we 
don't have any cycle lanes. When I lived in Germany they had cycle lanes 
everywhere, I used to cycle to work everyday along the river, it was lovely, 
much better than what I'm doing now (3)': 
It is highly possible that perceptions regarding safety whilst cycling could be 
altered through the use of targeted information campaigns, thus increasing the 
propensity to cycle without the need for traffic reduction measures. 
Half of the sample would be likely to car share in response to the TCP scheme 
and just below half would car share in response to the FPI. Many respondents 
stated they would not like to share their car with a stranger or a colleague: 
"I don't like the idea of sharing my car plus it'd be awkward because I 
sometimes do the shopping on my way home but I wouldn't be able to if I had 
to drop someone off. I know people that do it and it works for them, and 
there're these clubs now aren't there but it wouldn't be right for me, I wouldn't 
like to do it (33)". 
Car sharing might appear to be a practical method of reducing carbon 
emissions that allows car use to continue and thus all of the convenience and 
comfort associated with car use, however there are also inconveniences 
associated with this activity such as having to compromise driving conditions 
(for example, radio on or off, windows open or closed), route choice, journey 
origin time and sharing a confined space with a stranger for example. 
Loukopoulos et al (2006) revealed that car sharing was the most unpopular car 
use reduction method for commute and shopping trips, being much more 
favourable for leisure journeys. However, such trips are likely to be made with 
family members and/or friends rather than colleagues or strangers as for the 
commute to work. As mentioned by several respondents there are also issues 
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with reliability and some had negative experiences that could deter them from 
retrying car sharing: 
"It can be a nightmare, I did it once and I got let down so many times and had 
to drive my own car anyway that it wasn't worth doing. I don't mind sharing 
my car and I would do it if it worked (11)': 
Where people have had negative experiences it could be difficult to encourage 
car sharing. Kingham et al (2001) found amongst a sample of British car 
owners a potential to car share, with 51% of respondents prepared to 
participate. However, car sharing was considered to be unreliable, with many 
respondents feeling more inclined to participate if they were guaranteed a free 
taxi home should their car sharing partner be unavailable. Hence, car sharing 
could increase significantly but is clearly a measure that would require 
government investment and employer support, for example through offering 
incentives such as parking priority. 
To indicate the overall likelihood for each activity across the whole sample, 
table 5.11 shows the averaged scores. 
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Table 5.11: Average rating for likelihood of behavioural change in the 
long term for the TCP scheme and FPI (standard deviation in 
brackets). 
Activity TCP scheme FPI 
Car share 0.43 (2.11) 0.34 (2.16) 
Move house closer to work -1.48 (2.04) -1.34 (2.11) 
Change job closer to home -1.05 (2.06) -0.86 (2.23) 
Telecommute 0.48 (2.23) 0.36 (2.35) 
Shop online/home delivery 0.34 (2.20) 0.12 (2.17) 
Buy alternative fuelled vehicle 1.28 (1.78) 1.03 (1.86) 
Increase fuel efficiency of vehicle 1.79 (1.59) 1.50 (1.88) 
Use public transport 1.00 (2.10) 0.80 (2.20) 
Cycle -0.16 (2.07) -0.47 (-1.98) 
Walk 1.53 (1.72) 1.10 (1.94) 
Trip combine 2.34 (0.89) 1.86 (0.98) 
The most favourable activity for both policies in the long term would be trip 
combining. However, many respondents were already combining trips, for 
example, shopping on the way home from work was popular amongst the 
sample. There would be potential to combine leisure trips to a larger extent, 
given they were more fragmented. Loukopoulos et al (2006) found that in 
response to car use reduction goals, trip combining was the most popular 
adaptation behaviour for shopping trips, the second most popular option for 
commute trips and the third most popular option for leisure trips. It therefore 
appears that people prefer to make smaller changes where possible. Due to 
the large standard variations, trip combining is the only activity where the sign 
of the average score is certain for both policies in relation to the same activity. 
However, table 5.10 shows which category of likelihood had the most 
responses. For example, in table 5.11, the standard deviation on the average 
likelihood for moving house closer to work indicates this activity could be likely 
or unlikely, whereas table 5.10 shows that the majority of respondents (68% 
for the TCP scheme and 63% for the FPI) considered this activity to be unlikely 
for both policies. 
148 
Respondents were asked if they would find it difficult to adapt and whether 
they would require help to adapt to the introduction of the FPI or TCP scheme. 
Table 5.12 displays the number of response to each question. 
Table 5.12: Number of respondents that would have difficulty 
adapting/needing help to adapt to the TCP scheme and FPI 
TCP scheme FPI 
Difficult to adapt 32 (55%) 24 (41%) 
Help to adapt 47 (81%) 34 (59%) 
More respondents would find it difficult to adapt and need help adapting to the 
TCP scheme than the FPI. This was largely a result of the concept of fuel price 
increases being familiar to respondents, whereas the TCP scheme was a new 
more complicated scheme that involved greater levels of adaptation and 
learning. The main difficulties related to the TCP scheme were perceived to be 
the inconvenience of having to use the permit card and monitor the permit 
account and the time implications of using public transport: 
"I don't think it'd be difficult as such, just more inconvenient really with having 
to swipe your card every time you bought fuel and then worrying if they'll be 
any left when you want more petrol (9)" and "You'd have to learn about the 
permits and carbon and what they're worth but I'm sure it wouldn't take that 
long to get used to it (23)" and "If I had to get the train to work that'd be 
difficult for me because I'd have to arrange for someone to pick my kids up 
from school (2)" and "I wouldn't be able to work late if I had to use public 
transport, there isn't a bus back at that time and I wouldn't feel very safe 
using it (27)': 
The majority of the sample stated that they would need help to adapt to the 
TCP scheme. The main measures were improvements to public transport in 
terms of availability, frequency, comfort, reliability and connecting services 
such as train and bus; essential car user allowance (increased permit allocation 
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for people that have no other transport option), flexible working hours; and 
incentives to buy smaller cars and cycles. Many respondents also felt that a 
national information campaign would be essential in order to make everyone 
aware of the permit scheme and how it works: 
"Everyone would need a lot of information about it, how it works and what you 
can do with your permits. I can imagine some people getting really confused 
(16)" and "If I've got to use public transport then it'd need a lot of 
improvement, night services, cleaner buses, routes that connect up so you're 
not waiting half an hour in between. All the things they already do in other 
European countries really (51)" and "The government need to make employers 
let people work at home, it's ridiculous really, we need flexible working hours 
so we don't have to do 9 'til 5 everyday (49)" and "The working week's too 
long, if I didn't have to work 8 hours a day I could use public transport and still 
have time to spend with my family (44)" and "The government should provide 
incentives to use cleaner cars, like taking the purchase tax off and reducing the 
road tax (12)"". 
It appears that many of the perceived difficulties largely result from 
respondents building their lives around car use, which for example allows them 
to work in a different city to where they live whilst also having children. The 
reliance on car use to maintain current lifestyles represents a major problem in 
society (Jensen, 1999; Lyons et al., 2002) and a particular obstacle in terms of 
response to the introduction of the FPI and more so in relation to the TCP 
scheme given the limit placed on carbon availability. It would be very difficult 
to encourage or enforce lifestyle changes. Kingham et a/ (2001) suggest the 
introduction of a scheme whereby employers provide incentives for employees 
to live closer to work i. e. within walking or cycling distance or on a public 
transport route. However, the incentives would in most cases need to be large 
and outweigh, for example, the attractiveness of living in a remote village 
compared to a city. This method also relies on people's willingness to take up 
such incentives, hence the success rate could be highly unpredictable. 
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Many respondents felt that the FPI would not require adaptation as they were 
familiar with fuel price increases and would not alter their behaviour: 
"Well it's no different to what happens now, I wouldn't need to adapt (22)" and 
"We expect fuel price to go up and carry on going up and we just put up with it 
(55)': 
This again demonstrates the inadequacy of the FPI as a carbon reduction 
measure in terms of allowing current behavior and attitudes to continue. The 
measures to aid adaptation to the FPI were very similar to those listed for the 
TCP scheme, such as information regarding fuel efficiency, reduced tax for 
vehicles that are more efficient, essential car user allowance, public transport 
improvements, cycle lanes, and flexible working hours with telecommute 
options. Several respondents felt that it would be helpful to have a form of 
revenue redistribution in order to help them adapt to the FPI: 
"They'd have to reduce tax on something else wouldn't they, that'd help. Like if 
they reduced income tax at the same time it wouldn't be as bad then (58)" and 
"Some of the revenue could be used to reduce other taxes, like VAT or income 
tax (29)'. 
The TCP scheme provides a free permit allocation, during the use of which no 
additional fuel costs would result. The same effect could possibly be replicated 
in the FPI policy through the redistribution of revenue, or a double dividend 
approach where the revenue would be used to reduce another tax, such as 
income tax (Dresner et al., 2006). 
5.8 Conclusions and policy implications 
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More than a third (23 people) of the sample said they would alter their travel 
behaviour in response to either the TCP scheme or FPI in at least 1 time 
period. This is similar to other findings (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2003; Stradling et 
al., 2000). For the TCP scheme, most of the changes occurred in 2010 and 
2020 whilst the majority of response to the FPI occurred in 2030. This 
demonstrates the different levels of response - the introduction of the TCP 
scheme would result in more urgent change being achieved in the short and 
medium term, with the potential to change decreasing in the long term whilst 
the response to the FPI was largely in the long term with reluctance to change 
in the short term. 
The majority of respondents (37) would not make any changes in response to 
either scheme, however the majority of these were consuming within their free 
carbon permit allocation during one or more time periods and therefore did not 
have to change their behaviour in response to the TCP scheme. Many 
respondents felt unable to reduce their car use in response to either policy, 
mainly because of family commitments and time issues related to using public 
transport. Many other respondents did not want to reduce their car use in 
response to either policy and would instead try to buy the amount of permits 
they needed and pay the increased fuel costs. Thus, even within a small 
sample, different groups of car users were identified. Anable (2005) also 
recognised distinct groups of motorists and suggested that each group be 
targeted based on the characteristics displayed amongst that group. It 
therefore appears that it would be necessary to implement targeted 
information campaigns with specific motivations for change and practical 
carbon reducing solutions. 
Whilst it is possible that some respondents were making excuses rather than 
valid reasons for non response, in many cases it was evident that low levels of 
Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) inhibited a response. In addition, lifestyle 
choices were restrictive in terms of limiting the options available, for example 
9 respondents who made no changes were living in a different city to where 
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they worked. In addition, family responsibilities restricted journey times. Whilst 
the car is considered by many to provide freedom, for example providing the 
option of commuting between cities whilst also maintaining family 
commitments, this in turn leads to car dependency in order to sustain such 
lifestyle choices, thus creating a 'freedom paradox' (Jensen, 1999). Providing 
the option of teleworking could provide a practical solution for many, however 
this would require employee cooperation or government legislation and could 
in turn result in an increase in leisure journeys, which is perhaps more of a 
problem in relation to the FPI where there are no limits on carbon availability. 
Hence, there are many potential problems to consider in relation to 
encouraging car use reduction amongst those with low PBC. 
Perhaps the most intriguing result in terms of policy implications is related to 
the ability to reduce carbon emissions to the desired level. Whilst the TCP 
scheme overachieved the carbon reduction target in each time period, 
conversely the FPI failed to achieve any of the carbon reduction targets. 
Comparatively, the TCP scheme attained an average effectiveness rate of 
110%, whilst the FPI was only 80% effective. Hence, amongst a sample of 
above average carbon consumers with high potential to reduce their carbon 
consumption, there was a much greater response to a limit placed on carbon 
availability than increasing fuel prices. It appeared that the TCP scheme 
benefited from risk averse behaviour in that many respondents would reduce 
their carbon consumption in order to avoid uncertainty regarding permit 
availability. 
The response to the fuel price was more inelastic then expected. However, it is 
possible that amongst a representative sample the elasticity applied would be 
more effective, as indicated during the analysis on carbon consumption split by 
income where those consuming substantially below the UK average and with 
below average incomes were the only group to achieve any of the carbon 
reduction targets related to the FPI. Although this itself indicates problems 
regarding inequities, which could in turn seriously hinder the policy in terms of 
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low acceptability levels. Thus, in addition to effectiveness issues, there are 
potential problems regarding equity impacts, which leads to the question: how 
can the FPI be made effective and equitable? The obvious solution to equity 
concerns is a form of revenue redistribution to minimise the inequities, for 
example by reducing income tax levels. However, without a limit on 
availability, willingness to pay would still determine effectiveness despite 
further price increases. Hence, the FPI could be more suited to raising revenue 
that could be used to aid the provision of renewable energy, efficient 
technology and other carbon reduction measures. Hence, instead of 
investigating which policy would be more effective at directly reducing carbon 
emissions, the options would become either a TCP scheme that effectively 
reduces carbon emissions directly from the source in addition to raising 
sufficient revenues for supportive measures, or a FPI used to raise revenue in 
order to indirectly reduce carbon emissions. 
However, there are limitations regarding the 'technical fix' solutions in terms of 
availability and supply issues (Potter et aL, 2001), which implies that 
ultimately it might be necessary to reduce the demand for carbon rather than 
replacing carbon with clean fuels, which then makes the TCP scheme more 
appropriate. However, it would be useful to conduct a full cost benefit analysis 
of both options which would include any such limitations. 
The survey results strongly indicate issues regarding the effectiveness of the 
FPI. In their draft Climate Change Bill, the UK government have set out legally 
binding carbon reduction targets amounting to a reduction of 60% by 2050 
(DEFRA, 2007). Given the imperative nature of reducing the impacts of climate 
change and thus securing the carbon reduction targets, the TCP scheme would, 
based on the survey results, be a much more effective policy than the FPI. 
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Chapter 6 
Impacts on lifestyle, fairness and perceived effectiveness of the 
Tradable Carbon Permit scheme and fuel price increases 
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This chapter analyses the quantitative and qualitative data collected after 
respondents had considered their behavioural response to each policy 
(reported in chapter 5). Section 6.1 reports the level and strength of impacts 
on lifestyle followed by the costs and benefits in section 6.2. Fairness is 
explored in section 6.3 with perceived effectiveness reported in section 6.4. 
The affect of each policy on a range of measures is also explored. Section 6.5 
details the range of alternative measures that respondents considered to be 
more effective than the TCP scheme and the FPI. Section 6.6 contains the 
chapter conclusions. Respondents were asked to provide responses in 
consideration of the whole timescale of both policies. The average ratings 
reported are from the full sample unless otherwise stated. To show the 
statistical dispersion of ratings around the average, standard deviation is 
provided (in brackets) which is measured in the same units as the average. 
Quotations taken directly from the interview discussion are included to 
exemplify varying attitudes across the sample. 
6.1 Impacts on lifestyle 
Respondents were asked if there would be any impacts on their lifestyles if the 
policies were introduced, and if the impacts would be considered to be positive 
or negative. Responses to the first question were given on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 0 (no impacts) to 6 (very many impacts), and to the second 
question on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (very negative) to 3 (very 
positive). The average ratings from the whole sample for both questions are 
displayed in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Impacts on lifestyle 
TCP scheme FPI 
Level of impacts 2.48 (1.55) 2.29 (1.61) 
Strength of impact 0.42 (1.61) - 0.21 (1.50) 
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Given the greater level of behavioural response generated by the TCP scheme 
(see chapter 5), it might be expected that a greater level of impacts would 
result in comparison to the FPI, however, the results suggest that the extent of 
the perceived impacts on lifestyle were similar for both policies. Whilst, on 
average, the impacts resulting from the TCP scheme were perceived to be 
slightly positive, slightly negative impacts were perceived to result from the 
FPI. 
The difference between the impacts ratings of the two policies were tested for 
significance using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test, which is a non-parametric 
alternative to a paired samples t-test used in the previous chapter where the 
data was normally distributed. Like the paired samples t-test, the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test can be used to measure differences amongst the same 
sample. A significant difference indicates that the difference did not occur by 
chance, hence other factors are responsible for the difference. The test 
requires data to be measured at an interval level and does not make 
assumptions about the distribution. The test has been used here to measure 
differences between ratings given for the TCP scheme and the FPI. The 
Wilcoxon test revealed no significant difference between the level of impacts 
ratings, whilst the difference between the strength of impacts ratings was 
significant (p<. 005). 
The standard deviation values indicate a wide dispersion of ratings away from 
the average, however, this is most likely to be a limitation of the sample size. 
Therefore, to provide more detail the frequencies of response are presented in 
figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
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Figure 6.1 displays the similarity in responses with the majority of respondents 
identifying a small amount of impacts on their lifestyles as a result of both 
policies. 
158 
16 
14 
12 
-a o 10 
a U) L8 
6 
as 
4 
2 
0 
Figure 6.2: Strength of impacts on lifestyle 
  TCP 
  FPI . 
Figure 6.2 displays the variation in responses across the sample. Whilst the 
majority of respondents rated the impacts on their lifestyles arising from the 
TCP scheme as positive, the majority of respondents regarded the impacts 
arising from the FPI as slightly negative. 
Table 6.2 shows the frequency of the types of impacts stated in response to 
open questions following the categorical rating of impacts on lifestyle (see 
appendix 4 for interview questionnaire). 
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Table 6.2: Type of impacts on lifestyle (with number of respondents) 
as a result of the TCP scheme and FPI 
Impact 
Buying new car 
Having to think about 'being green' 
Holiday in the UK 
Thinking about necessity of car use 
Using public transport more 
Spending less in other areas 
More money spent on fuel/car use 
Less leisure trips 
More exercise 
Try to work closer to home 
Use other modes (cycle, walk) 
TCP scheme 
6 
6 
1 
23 
13 
3 
4 
6 
5 
3 
7 
FPI 
5 
2 
0 
18 
9 
5 
22 
9 
1 
1 
3 
A number of respondents felt that neither policy would have an impact on their 
lifestyle as they had very low levels of carbon consumption and/or car use at 
the time of interview. 
The most commonly reported impact resulting from the TCP scheme was 
thinking about the necessity of car use, the use of alternative modes and 
reducing fuel consumption through efficient driving and trip combining. In 
addition, this included monitoring permit use and calculating the permit cost of 
car journeys. Thinking about car use was also frequently noted in relation to 
the FPI: 
"I suppose it's having to think about what's currently taken for granted (48)": 
These impacts were largely considered to be positive as they would make 
respondents feel like they were contributing to reducing environmental 
pollution whilst also using modes that they would not have been inclined to use 
otherwise. In addition, benefits were perceived, such as an improvement in 
health and fitness levels from an increased use of cycling and walking: 
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"I'd have to talk to my husband about our permit allocation and ways to 
reduce our car use so I suppose they'd be communication benefits as well 
(13)" and "I'd feel good about it, knowing that I was doing my bit and staying 
in my allowance (29)" and "This'd make me think more about the environment 
than the money aspect (05)': 
Using public transport was an impact reported by a number of respondents. 
However, for some respondents this was regarded as a positive impact that 
would possibly reduce their journey time to work and reduce stress levels by 
not driving and having time to read a book. Other respondents noted the 
negative aspects including having to follow a timetable rather than having the 
choice of journey time as when using a car. Fewer respondents stated the use 
of public transport as an impact of the FPI in comparison to the TCP scheme, 
however this is likely to be explained by the greater amount of public transport 
kilometres stimulated by the TCP scheme (see chapter 5). 
Reducing the frequency and/or length of leisure journeys and spending time to 
plan trips using public transport was one of the main negative impacts on 
lifestyle arising from the TCP scheme. However, more respondents noted this 
impact in relation to the FPI: 
"I wouldn't be able to do as many leisure trips, like going to see my friends. I 
wouldn't like that (52)" and "I'd have to do less social trips, and they wouldn't 
be able to visit me as often (24)': 
Other negative impacts included having holidays in the UK due to an increased 
expenditure on fuel and purchasing a new vehicle: 
"We'd have to have our holidays in this country if we were spending more 
money on fuel and the coupon things. If we changed our car we'd definitely be 
having our holiday here (19)" 
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Whilst the impacts ratings shown in table 6.1 appear similar for both policies, 
from the interview discussions it was clear that respondents' perceptions of the 
policies were very different. In general, it was considered that both policies 
would result in increased costs and having to think about the necessity of car 
use, however the TCP scheme provided options to avoid excessive costs 
(through the free permit allocation) whilst for the FPI respondents felt that 
they would have to either spend more money on fuel or reduce their 
consumption without the purpose of the policy being obvious on a day to day 
basis, whereas the purpose of the TCP scheme appeared to be more 
memorable whilst also providing increased flexibility and options: 
"I think because you've got to use the carbon permits all the time it'd really 
make you think about what you were doing and the impact on the 
environment, whereas with the fuel prices you'd be told what the purpose was 
at the beginning but it'd be less obvious in an every day way and people might 
easily forget and just get mad about paying more for their fuel (31) 
The permit allocation and limit on carbon availability thus provided a strong 
motivation for change (as also discussed in chapter 5), and in turn was 
thought to stimulate 'green thinking' with many people adapting other aspects 
of their lifestyles and energy use as a result of increased concern for the 
environment and particularly climate change. Conversely, the FPI did not 
stimulate the same positive thought process and actions as the TCP scheme: 
"The environmental reasons aren't as strong for this one (FPI) so it makes it 
seem less important and more of a tax than a way to reduce pollution (41)". 
However, it is possible that labeling the FPI as a carbon tax or levy could help 
to make the purpose more obvious and memorable. 
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Many respondents believed that the majority of people would not make any 
changes in response to the FPI and that they were thus amongst a minority 
that had to make changes, which they viewed to be negative: 
"This just feels like a tax increase that most people can ignore (28)" and "I'd 
have to change and the impacts would be pretty much the same as the other 
one (TCP scheme) but it'd annoy me to know that the rich people could still 
drive their cars as much as they liked. I don't feel like I'd really benefit from 
changing for this one (FPI) (44) ". 
Thus, the difference between the impacts ratings appeared to largely revolve 
around fairness issues with respondents feeling that the impacts would be 
positive if other people were also having to make changes. In relation to the 
TCP scheme: 
"I'd still have to change but it seems like it'd be worth it because other people 
were making changes as well (07)" and "I'd know that everyone else had to 
change so it wouldn't just be me having to get the bus to work (15)'f. 
Given that the majority of impacts were expectedly related to changes to 
travel behaviour, the average rating of impacts and strength of impacts were 
derived for those respondents who changed their travel behaviour and those 
respondents who made no changes to their travel behaviour. Table 6.3 shows 
the results. 
Table 6.3: Impacts on lifestyle - changers versus non changers 
Attitude 
Level of impacts 
Strength of impacts 
Behavioural change 
TCP FPI 
3.39 (1.34) 
0.28 (1.74) 
No behavioural change 
TCP FPI 
2.08 (1.47) 2.11 (1.65) 
0.49 (1.57) -0.26 (1.47) 
3.09 (1.22) 
0.00 (1.67) 
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For both policies, the level of impacts on lifestyle were higher amongst those 
who changed their behaviour compared to those who did not change. This is a 
logical outcome, as also revealed by a Spearman's rank correlation (explained 
in chapter 4) where the level of impacts were positively and significantly 
correlated with base carbon consumption for both policies (p<. 01). In addition, 
for the TCP scheme behavioural response was also positively and significantly 
(p<. 01) correlated with level of impacts on lifestyle. In terms of strength of 
impacts, for the TCP scheme the changers envisaged slightly less positive 
impacts than the non changers. This is largely explained by the view that non 
changers could benefit from improved public transport and/or from selling 
excess carbon permits (the majority of non changers were consuming within 
the free carbon permit allocation). In relation to the FPI, the non changers 
rated the impacts as being slightly negative whereas the changers had a 
neutral rating. This is largely a result of envisaged price increases of non-fuel 
products as a result of the FPI. It is interesting that many more respondents 
noted this impact in relation to the FPI than the TCP scheme and again 
demonstrates the different approach to thinking about/analysing the policy 
impacts. 
6.2 Costs and benefits 
Respondents were asked if there would be any costs and/or benefits to 
themselves and/or society as a result of the implementation of each policy. 
Responses were provided on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (very many costs) 
to 3 (very many benefits). Table 6.4 contains the average ratings for each 
policy. 
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Table 6.4 Personal and social costs and benefits resulting from the TCP 
scheme and FPI. 
Personal rating 
Social rating 
On average, respondents thought the TCP scheme would provide personal 
benefits, whereas the FPI would result in costs. However, the FPI would 
provide social benefits, but to a lesser extent than those provided by the TCP 
scheme. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test revealed a significant difference between 
the personal ratings (p<. 005) given for each policy and also the social ratings 
(p<. 005) given for each policy. However, the limitations of the sample size 
again appear apparent in the large standard deviation figures which prevent 
the direction of the average ratings from being ascertained. Hence, for further 
detail, the frequency of response is provided in figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3: Costs and benefits 
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Figure 6.3 shows agreement with the average ratings in table 6.4 -a large 
variation in ratings with the majority of respondents envisaging personal and 
social benefits from the TCP scheme; and personal costs and social benefits 
from the FPI. Using an open question to investigate the reasons for these 
ratings, respondents were asked to explain their response which was recorded 
into categories during the interviews (as explained in chapter 3). Table 6.5 
shows frequency of response in each category. 
Table 6.5: Costs and benefits (number of responses) resulting from the 
TCP scheme and FPI 
TCP scheme FPI 
Issue 
Personal Social Personal Social 
Benefit 
Health benefits 11 11 3 9 
Reduced levels of pollution 19 31 9 22 
Social cohesion/integration 3 5 1 5 
Time savings 3 3 2 1 
Increase environmental awareness 9 12 2 1 
Reduction in traffic congestion 8 24 5 11 
Provision of clean fuel/vehicles 3 
Monetary benefit 9 1 2 
Improved public transport system 3 8 5 
Increased fitness levels 11 7 4 3 
Reduction in road accidents 1 4 2 
Investment in local businesses 1 3 1 
Cost 
Monetary costs 17 8 35 25 
Inconvenience 12 4 5 1 
Negative impact on certain groups 3 2 6 
Crime generation 4 
Reduced choice/freedom 3 2 5 4 
Lifestyle changes 2 5 1 1 
Increase social divisions 1 3 
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Complexity of policy 1 2 
Time costs 7 24 1 
Non-investment of revenue on PT 1 2 
Total number of benefits 75 107 37 59 
Total number of costs 43 30 53 43 
Table 6.5 shows for both policies that more social benefits than personal 
benefits were perceived. This is largely a result of reduced levels of 
environmental pollution and traffic congestion being considered as more of a 
social gain rather than a personal benefit. In terms of costs, more personal 
rather than social costs were perceived to result from both policies. This is 
largely explained by monetary costs and inconvenience being viewed as 
personal costs rather than costs to society. This clearly demonstrates a logical 
thought process - monetary costs might not apply to the whole of society 
whereas a reduction in pollution levels would benefit everyone. 
The total number of costs and benefits reported in table 6.5 reflects the 
average ratings displayed in table 6.4 - for the TCP scheme there are net 
personal and social benefits whereas for the FPI there are net personal costs 
and net social benefits: 
"People only lose out from the fuel price increase but people actually benefit 
from the permit scheme (35) ". 
The most commonly stated personal benefits of the TCP scheme were a 
reduction in levels of environmental pollution (including local air pollutants, 
noise and greenhouse gases), health benefits as a result of reduced levels of 
air pollution (such as less incidents of asthma), and an increase in fitness 
levels as a result of an increased use of active modes (walking and cycling). A 
reduction in environmental pollution levels was also the most commonly 
reported personal benefit related to the FPI. An improvement in public 
transport services was the second most commonly reported personal benefit, 
which was not mentioned as a personal benefit in the TCP scheme despite a 
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greater perceived increase in public transport use reported in chapter 5. This 
suggests that respondents were thinking of more important personal benefits 
arising from the TCP scheme, such as reduced levels of pollution, which were 
less prominent in relation to the FPI where more generic and widespread gains, 
such as improved public transport services were perceived. In addition, this 
also demonstrates the common opinion amongst the sample that the FPI would 
not generate a large reduction in car use, hence the benefits relating to this 
(such as health benefits due to reduced pollution levels) would be less 
apparent: 
"Fuel prices are going up anyway so I can't see it having any impact (07)" and 
"Not enough people will stop using their cars so there'd be little benefit, people 
would rather starve than stop using their cars (32)" and "We're all sat on the 
bus while the rich people are driving past and getting the benefit of getting to 
work quicker because there's less traffic on the roads (24)" and "It'd make it 
so that driving was something rich people do (54)" and "Well I'd have to spend 
more on fuel so that'd be a cost (03)': 
This again demonstrates the difference between the policies - the TCP scheme 
stimulated respondents to reduce their carbon consumption sometimes at large 
costs (such as changing vehicles) whereas the majority of respondents were 
willing to absorb the increased fuel costs related to the FPI, rendering it as an 
almost invisible policy in terms of benefits provided. 
The most commonly reported social benefits resulting from both policies were 
a reduction in environmental pollution and levels of traffic congestion, more so 
for the TCP scheme. A much larger number of respondents reported monetary 
costs arising from the FPI in comparison to the TCP scheme. This is largely a 
result of the perceived reduction in car and hence fuel use in relation to the 
TCP scheme in comparison to the general response of continuing current 
behaviour and absorbing the increased fuel costs in relation to the FPI 
(supported by behavioural response results provided in chapter 5). The 
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majority of respondents felt that without any behavioural change the TCP 
scheme would impose greater monetary costs than the FPI as a result of the 
uncertain permit price, however this was perceived to be offset by a reduction 
in the consumption of fuel and thus permits (through a reduction in car use). 
Hence, the FPI was perceived to result in higher monetary costs due to a 
greater tendency to absorb the costs rather than change behaviour. This is 
also applicable to the social cost ratings where monetary costs were again 
more commonly reported in relation to the FPI than the TCP scheme. 
Inconvenience was stated by a number of respondents in relation to both 
polices but to a larger extent for the TCP scheme. Respondents largely referred 
to the purchase of permits, monitoring of permit accounts and using permit 
swipe cards when purchasing fuel as an inconvenience, whereas for the FPI 
this was mainly thinking about car use reduction measures. As a result of the 
perceived amount of behavioural change in response to the TCP scheme, 
lifestyle changes were viewed by a number of respondents as a social cost. The 
generation of illegal permit markets was also stated as a social cost, given the 
possibility of jeopardising the carbon reduction target and hence the social 
benefits such as reduced levels of environmental pollution. Conversely, crime 
generation was not perceived as a cost resulting from the FPI: 
"There'd be no incentive for a black market as fuel is available (03)"". 
The FPI was thought to have a negative impact on certain groups within 
society, such as rural dwellers and those on low incomes. It was considered 
that such groups were dependant on their cars possibly to an equal or greater 
extent than people on higher incomes or with greater access to public 
transport services yet would be subject to the same levels of fuel price 
increase. Conversely, this was thought to be less of a problem in relation to 
the TCP scheme as the free permit allocation was perceived to offset some of 
the negative impacts and inequities by allowing a certain amount of fuel to be 
purchased without any incurred additional costs. This again suggests the need 
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for a form of revenue redistribution to be included in the FPI, which in turn 
stimulates the issues previously discussed in chapter 5 regarding the difficulty 
of making the redistribution fair and effective (i. e. without compromising the 
carbon emissions reduction target). 
Several respondents noted the possibility of the TCP scheme instigating a 
cultural change away from car use: 
"It'd be good because people couldn't build their lives around car use, they'd 
have to change and realise that you don't need a car to do everything. After a 
while they'd probably prefer it because they wouldn't be having the stress of 
driving everywhere (36)" 
Many respondents felt that the increased use of public transport and local 
amenities such as shops would aid the cohesion of communities: 
"If you're all at the bus stop together you'd get chatting to more people (28)" 
and "I can imagine that people will see each other on the bus and sit and talk 
to each other (25)" and "When you go shopping now you don't really see 
people you know but if you were just popping down the street to do your 
shopping and everyone else was doing the same you'd see a lot more people 
(30)': 
It was also thought that the TCP scheme would provide a discussion point 
amongst communities that might as a result come together to discuss their 
intended course of action and share ways to reduce their permit use which 
might involve, for example, setting up local car pools: 
"People would be more interested in what other people were doing because 
they'd know that if their neighbour was driving everywhere in their 4 by 4 
there'd be less permits left for everyone else and they'd be more expensive. It 
could end up starting a community watch type of thing where frivolous use of 
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carbon is shunned upon. There might be things like community car clubs where 
they get together to decide who's the best person to car share with (52)': 
Several of the costs and benefits listed in table 6.5 were related to behavioural 
change, thus table 6.6 shows the average ratings for perceived costs and 
benefits of both policies amongst those who changed their travel behaviour 
and those who did not make any changes. 
Table 6.6: Costs and benefits - changers versus non changers 
Behavioural change 
TCP FPI 
Personal 
Social 
0.06 (1.59) 
1.28 (1.67) 
-0.73 (1.10) 
0.55 (1.86) 
No behavioural change 
TCP FPI 
0.48 (1.45) 
1.32 (1.64) 
-0.36 (1.54) 
0.13 (1.81) 
For the TCP scheme, slightly more benefits than costs were perceived amongst 
changers and non changers, with more benefits perceived by the latter. This is 
likely to be a result of an improvement in public transport services and the 
ability to sell excess carbon permits. The non changers also perceived slightly 
more social benefits compared to the changers. For the FPI, personal costs 
were perceived by both the changers and non changers, with more costs 
perceived by the former. This again demonstrates the different perceptions of 
the policies - the TCP scheme was thought to provide benefits to those who did 
not change their behaviour whereas the FPI was perceived to result in costs. 
However, both the changers and non changers considered the FPI to provide 
social benefits although to a smaller extent than the TCP scheme. 
Interestingly, in comparison to the non changers, those who changed their 
behaviour considered more social benefits to result from the FPI. This is 
possibly because the changers had fully considered the impacts in terms of 
reducing car use which in turn reduces congestion and air pollution - all of 
which would benefit society. 
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6.3 Fairness 
Fairness appeared to be a key issue throughout the interview, as demonstrated 
in section 6.1 above where the rating of impacts to be positive or negative was 
largely affected by the number of people that were perceived to incur the same 
level of impacts. After considering the costs and benefits, respondents were 
asked how personally fair they considered each policy to be, and how society 
might rate the policies. Responses were given on a 7-point scale, ranging from 
-3 (completely unfair) to 3 (completely fair). The average ratings (with 
standard deviation) for both measures are shown in table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 Personal and social fairness ratings 
TCP scheme FPI 
Personal 1.31 (1.42) 0.46 (1.87) 
Social - 0.61 (1.68) - 1.38 (1.48) 
The TCP scheme was considered more personally fair, and less unfair to society 
than the FPI. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test revealed a significant difference 
between the personal (p<. 005) ratings for the TCP scheme and FPI and also 
between the social (p<. 005) ratings for both policies. The standard deviation 
figures indicate a large variation in responses. Thus, the frequency of 
responses is displayed in figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4: Perceived fairness 
In agreement with the average ratings displayed in table 6.7, figure 6.4 shows 
the majority of responses regarding personal ratings of the TCP scheme and 
FPI were fair, whereas the majority of perceived social ratings were unfair for 
both policies. In order to investigate these ratings, table 6.8 provides the 
categories of responses interpreted from responses to open questions at this 
point of the interview. 
17 3 
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Table 6.8: Fairness issues with number of responses relating to the 
TCP scheme and FPI 
TCP scheme FPI 
Issue 
Personal Social Personal Social 
Fair because.... 
Policy is necessary 9 1 7 3 
Allows current car use to continue 1 1 
Everyone will be affected 3 2 1 
Increase environmental awareness 7 3 3 
Benefits13 8 5 1 1 
Permit allocation 16 8 
Fuel should be more expensive 4 7 
Policy effective at achieving reductions 2 1 
Greater impact on high carbon consumers 7 1 2 
Can easily adapt current situation 4 1 
Unfair because.... 
Uneven impacts across society 4 5 12 8 
Increase social divide 2 2 3 
Lack of trust in revenue use/policy aim 2 2 3 
Fuel too expensive/monetary costs 3 14 4 27 
Permit allocation 1 
Restriction on personal freedom 1 15 6 
Black market/corruption 4 1 
Inconvenience of monitoring car use 3 2 
Lack of alternative travel mode 2 1 2 
Policy ineffective at achieving reductions 5 5 
Total number of fair issues 60 21 23 5 
Total number of unfair issues 17 43 1 27 62 
The necessity to have a policy in place to effectively reduce carbon emissions 
from personal transport was a commonly stated reason for considering both 
policies to be personally fair. Jones (2003) also found during a survey amongst 
13 Includes health and fitness benefits from using active modes; reduced levels of 
traffic congestion and noise and air pollution. 
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the general public a common belief that "something needs to be done', which 
was provided as a reason for accepting road pricing. 
Respondents considered the allocation of carbon permits on an equal per 
capita basis to be a key factor in the fairness ratings of the TCP scheme, with 
those using more than their free allocation having to buy additional permits 
and therefore incurring extra costs. It was also felt that this would be the most 
common reason from a society viewpoint: 
"If everyone gets the same then there're no arguments are there (54)" and "If 
its been divided up equally then I think that's fair, I'd accept that that was my 
allocation and be happy to know that everyone else had the same amount 
(01)" and "It's like the polluter pays because if you use more than your free 
allowance you've got to start paying (12)" and "It gets people thinking about 
what they take for granted (48)" and "I'd be happy to stick to my allowance, it 
brings up the whole issue of social responsibility and I think it would feel good, 
: like you were doing something to benefit society (51)" 
Many respondents also felt that the equal permit allocation provided a strong 
message that the problem is due to collective actions, affects everyone and 
requires collective action to mitigate: 
"It's saying we're all causing it and now we're all doing our bit to try and put it 
right (39)" and "It says that we're all in it together and we all need to make an 
effort (06) 
It is possible that some respondents had not fully understood the TCP scheme, 
in terms of realising that the free permit allocation provided a certain amount 
of travel without increasing costs: 
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"At the end of the day it's like a fuel tax so it's still unfair (07)" and "It could 
be seen as another tax so the benefits would have to be really emphasized 
(25) 
The necessity of the TCP scheme was also an important fairness issue, with 
many respondents feeling that emissions from personal transport should be 
reduced with the TCP scheme providing an effective option: 
"It addresses the problem without just pricing people off the road with a 
financial disincentive (23)" and "We need to do something and this seems like 
the most fair way. It should've been done earlier than this though because 
people are too used to their cars now (45)': 
The necessity to reduce emissions was also a major issue regarding personal 
and social fairness of the FPI: 
"I think its unfair on me but I affect others so it has to be fair (12)" and "I 
think the general public know that something needs to be done so they'd think 
it was fair overall (39)" and "If it's a government policy and we need it then I'll 
take part and shift my behaviour (51)': 
Several respondents felt that the TCP scheme would be considered unfair to 
society due to a perceived reduction of their personal freedom, with a limit on 
car use and thus their personal choices: 
"It'd mean that they couldn't go and see their family when they wanted so no I 
don't think it's fair. There must be a better way to do it (58)" and "I'd feel like 
I couldn't have the holidays I wanted because of this and that impinges on my 
personal choice. Other people would feel exactly the same (16)" and "People 
could see this as the government dictating that they can only do so many miles 
each year (58)" and "Society isn't as fully aware and switched onto 
environmental problems as it should be so the rating would be based on 
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personal costs. People think climate problems are somebody else's, they don't 
want something that impinges on their personal choices (12)" and "People see 
their car and freedom as a right. There'd be a lot of resistance and upset, the 
car gives people flexibility, freedom and safety. People need to be encouraged 
that it's a good idea rather than being told (48)" and "People don't like to 
change (19)". 
Civil liberties issues were also raised, in regard to the monitoring of the 
scheme, the national database containing permit accounts and the use of 
swipe cards when purchasing fuel: 
"It all seems a bit big brotherish to me, I'm not sure about it. It might be 
another way for the government to keep tabs on us, they'd know exactly what 
we were doing (58)". 
The purpose of data collection and use of the data collected through the central 
database would need to be transparent to the public in order to avoid any 
perception of conspiracy. The fact that the only data needed would be the 
time, date and location and quantity of permit use in addition to permit 
account balance and transaction records could possibly be made clear to the 
public in order to alleviate concerns that the government were 'keeping tabs' 
on people. As detailed in chapter 3 (see section 3.1), such accounts would be 
made confidential with monitoring only to detect any unusual activity. 
In contrast, several respondents felt that, rather than restricting freedom, the 
TCP scheme actually provided choices: 
"This scheme puts people in control of their actions and has a big influence on 
personal decisions. It gives people choices and people would prefer to change 
on a voluntary basis (50)" 
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It was also noted that the FPI could be viewed as providing choices and to a 
greater extent than the TCP scheme: 
"There's a personal choice benefit with the fuel prices because if you want to 
carry on what you're doing you can if you pay more whereas the other scheme 
forces the change more so I think the fuel prices are more fair (07) ". 
However, as revealed in chapter 5, the option to continue current carbon 
consumption at increased costs could greatly jeopardise the achievement of 
the emissions target which increases the chance of the FPI policy being largely 
regarded as an unfair policy given the lack of effectiveness and thus becoming 
an "unfair tax'. 
A number of respondents noted the uneven distribution of impacts resulting 
from both policies. In relation to the TCP scheme: 
"People with more money can buy more permits, it's as simple as that really 
(27)" and "I'm sure that people would be able to buy as many permits as they 
wanted if they could afford it which isn't fair on everyone else (08)': 
In relation to the FPI: 
"There'd definitely be an uneven distribution of benefits depending on income. 
People living in rural areas would be hit badly by this (FPI) (15)" and "Low 
income people wouldn't be happy (53)" and "We'd have a situation where only 
rich people can afford to drive, it'd become really elitist, more than it is now 
(36)": 
It could be possible to redistribute revenue in order to reduce the worst 
inequities (see chapters 2 and 5 for further discussion). 
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Conversely, several respondents felt that the TCP scheme would result in 
equitable impacts: 
"This is a much more equitable scheme across the whole socio-economic strata 
(12)" and "It's more fair on lower incomes and it doesn't advantage the rich 
people (36)'f. 
The FPI was considered unfair by a number of respondents as it was perceived 
to be ineffective at achieving the emissions target: 
"It won't work so how can it be fair? I'm willing to support things if they 
actually achieve what they set out to achieve (49)" and "Fuel price has been 
going up anyway so I can't see it having any impacts (41)': 
Both policies were perceived to result in increased motoring costs, which were 
largely considered to be unfair as fuel was considered to be an already heavily 
taxed commodity: 
"I think its really unfair actually because we already pay a lot for fuel, a lot 
more than other countries (57)" and "I don't see how they could justify putting 
fuel prices up because they're already extortionate, they cant go any higher 
(05)" 
Many respondents felt that most people would largely view both policies as an 
additional tax rather than a measure to reduce CO2 emissions, given the low 
levels of concern for the environment and climate change that were thought to 
prevail across society: 
"People aren't concerned about the environment so they'd see this policy (FPI) 
as an unfair tax increase (41)" and "People hate being hit in the pocket and 
they don't think it's the way to do it, it should be industry. They think car users 
shouldn't be punished because people can't change. They make excuses why 
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it's unfair (36)" and "People don't think they should pay more to use their cars 
because they can't see why it's wrong (46)". 
Conversely, a number of respondents felt that fuel should be more expensive 
in recognition of the detrimental impacts: 
"People should pay for what they use (54)" and "Fuel should cost more, I think 
it's too easy for people to drive judging by the amount of traffic on the road 
(21) 
Several respondents noted the likelihood of varying public opinions related to 
the impacts of both policies, depending on personal circumstances: 
"It would be fair to people that don't drive and unfair to people that do drive 
(55)" and "I think there'd be a mix of opinions depending on how much extra it 
would cost and levels of car use (56)" and "Some people care about global 
warming, some don't care about global warming so I think the opinion would 
be mixed (41)". 
It was thought that fairness ratings might improve over time as people became 
accustomed to the TCP scheme and the benefits became visible. Several 
respondents thought that the public reaction was largely dependant on how the 
scheme would be portrayed by the media: 
"If its all over the papers as a new policy to take away our cars and our civil 
liberties then people would definitely think it was unfair (04)" and "It'd need to 
be backed by the media otherwise it might not even get off the ground. The 
papers could be used to tell people why it's fair and that it's not an excuse to 
watch everyone and take away our freedom (13) ". 
Given the importance of fairness issues in terms of public acceptance of 
transport policies, as highlighted in chapter 2 (Jacobsson et al., 2000; Fujji et 
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al., 2004; Viegas, 2001; Jones, 2005), an ordered Logit model was employed 
to further explore the relationships between fairness and other attitudes and 
socio economic variables. The discrete nature of the dependant variable 
(acceptability) violates the assumptions of linear regression, thus a log-linear 
approach was adopted. As the dependant variable is ordered rather than 
binary, an ordered regression analysis was considered most suitable. All 
variables collected during the study period were entered as ordered 
independent variables (impacts on lifestyle, costs/benefits, effectiveness, social 
fairness, personal and social acceptability, environmental concern, knowledge, 
problem perception, education, gender, income, age, carbon consumption, 
behavioural response), with the gradual removal of insignificant variables (at 
p<. 05). Given the sample size and the clustering of responses away from the 
extreme ends of the scales, the variables measured on a7 point scale were 
collapsed into 5 values where 1 represents the most negative ends (ratings of - 
3 and -2) and 5 represents the most positive ends (ratings of 2 and 3). 3 
represents the neutral category. This process was carried out on all 
independent variables that were measures on a bipolar 7-point scale (impacts 
on lifestyle, costs/benefits, effectiveness, social fairness, personal and social 
acceptability). The variables were also reduced into 3 values in order to 
determine which method yielded the best model. However, the model fit data 
deteriorated when the variables were collapsed into 3 values. 
By using the categories of each variable it allows the Logit model to provide a 
coefficient for each category of the independent variable, which shows the 
relationship with the dependant variable in comparison to the dummy 
independent variable, which in this model was the most positive end of the 
scale. For example, in terms of acceptability, the coefficients shown for 
categories 1 to 4 show the relationship with the dependant variable in 
comparison to the reference category. Hence, the coefficients in this model are 
expected to be negative as, for example in comparison to the most positive 
acceptability rating (category 5- the reference category), fairness would be 
expected to decrease as acceptability decreases. The coefficients therefore 
would also be expected to display monotonicity (value increases/decreases 
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consistently between categories), however in terms of the TCP scheme the 
coefficients of the significant independent variables are not monotonic. This 
could be explained by the low response for the value in the middle of the 
scales which represented the 'unsure' or 'neutral' responses. This could 
possibly be resolved by having a6 point scale which excludes the `neutral' 
option. However, this could result in respondents that are neutral or unsure 
selecting an inaccurate category. It is also possible that a larger sample size 
would reduce the problem. Table 6.9 provides the final models for both 
policies. 
Table 6.9: Logit analysis of the determinants of personal fairness 
relating to the TCP scheme and FPI. 
Independent variable 
TCP scheme FPI 
Coefficient P value Coefficient P value 
Acceptability 1 -4.56 p<. 005 -5.96 p<. 001 
Acceptability 2 -5.10 p<. 001 -5.46 p<. 001 
Acceptability 3 -3.93 p<. 025 -4.10 p<. 001 
Acceptability 4 -2.99 p<. 001 -1.40 p<. 001 
Social fairness 1 -16.36 p<. 001 
Social fairness 2 -17.50 p<. 001 
Social fairness 3 -17.04 p<. 001 
Social fairness 4 -16.47 p<. 001 
Strength of impacts 1 -21.75 p<. 001 
Strength of impacts 2 -18.41 p<. 001 
Strength of impacts 3 -16.21 p<. 025 
Strength of impacts 4 -17.08 p<. 025 
TCP scheme 
Pearson Chi-squared 47.5 -2 log likelihood 85.879 Pseudo R2 . 490 
FPI 
Pearson Chi-squared 131.4 -2 log likelihood 125.382 Pseudo R2 . 696 
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The degree to which a person considered the policies to be personally 
acceptable changed significantly from the reference dummy (which in this case 
was all ratings of maximum acceptability) to all other ratings of acceptability. 
Thus indicating that the degree to which a person finds the policy fair could be 
greatly related to the acceptability rating and vice versa. This is a logical 
relationship and has been investigated previously in relation to other transport 
policies (Jacobsson et a/., 2000; Fujji et al., 2004). From the coefficient value 
it can be interpreted that the policies become less fair, or more unfair as the 
acceptability rating declines (going from acceptable (5) to unacceptable (1)). 
From the coefficients related to the perceived social fairness ratings of the TCP 
scheme, it can be interpreted that personal fairness increases as social fairness 
increases. Whilst this is also a logical relationship, it was not identifiable from 
the average ratings displayed in table 6.7 where both policies were considered 
personally fair whilst being perceived by society to be unfair. This 
demonstrates the importance of using a variety of analytical tools when 
exploring responses. 
The Logit model revealed for the FPI in terms of the strength of impacts on 
lifestyle, the difference in fairness was greatest between the reference dummy 
and the most negative impacts, hence fairness was lowest amongst those 
perceiving the most negative impacts. 
The level of behavioural response appeared to influence responses throughout 
the interviews. Whilst behavioural response was not a significant factor in the 
Logit model of fairness, table 6.10 shows the average fairness ratings of both 
policies amongst those who changed their travel behaviour and those who did 
not make any changes. 
183 
Table 6.10: Fairness ratings - changers versus non changers 
Behavioural change 
TCP FPI 
Personal 0.94 (1.43) 0.82 (1.72) 
Social -0.22 (1.67) -1.09 (1.70) 
No behavioural change 
TCP FPI 
1.43 (1.41) 0.43 (1.91) 
-0.73 (1.68) -1.45 (1.44) 
The TCP scheme was considered more personally fair amongst those who did 
not change their travel behaviour, whereas the FPI was more personally fair 
amongst the changers. In terms of social acceptability, the changers thought 
that both policies would be less unfair than the non changers. 
6.4 Effectiveness 
Following the fairness ratings, the perceived effectiveness (ability to meet 
carbon reduction target) was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all 
effective) to 6 (completely effective). The average ratings, with standard 
deviations in brackets, are displayed in table 6.11. 
Table 6.11: Perceived effectiveness ratings 
TCP scheme FPI 
3.9 (1.4) 2.2 (1.4) 
The TCP scheme was considered effective at achieving the emissions target 
whilst the FPI was considered less effective. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
indicated a significant difference between the effectiveness ratings of the 
policies (p<. 005). However, the large standard deviation values again prevent 
a reliable interpretation of the average ratings, hence the frequency of 
responses are displayed in figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5 clearly shows that the majority of respondents rated the TCP 
scheme to be highly effective at achieving the emissions target whilst 
conversely the majority of respondents rated the FPI as being slightly effective. 
The perceived effectiveness of each policy emerged as a key aspect, 
underpinning the responses to several other questions, such as personal 
fairness as discussed in section 6.4. In order to investigate the perceived 
effectiveness ratings, table 6.12 displays the categories of responses derived 
from an open question with number of respondents. 
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Table 6.12: Issues relating to the perceived effectiveness of the TCP 
scheme and FPI 
Issue TCP scheme FPI 
Effective because.... 
Policy increases environmental awareness 12 3 
Places responsibility on individual 6 
Carbon budget ensures success 27 
Would be effective in long term 4 
Non essential trips removed 31 
Effective if people fully aware of policy purpose 1 
Effective if reliable public transport provided 22 
Ineffective because.... 
Politically unfeasible 1 
Higher costs absorbed by majority 7 40 
Difficult to monitor 2 
Lobbying/lack of faith in government 4 2 
Counterfeit permits/fraud jeopardise target 9 
Price adjustments would be required 1 6 
People not aware/interested in environment 1 
Political instability 1 
Miss use of revenue 1 
Total effective issues 52 11 
Total ineffective issues 25 50 
The majority of respondents felt that the TCP scheme would be effective at 
achieving the carbon reduction target due to the limit placed on carbon 
availability: 
"If you can't go over the limit than it has to be successful (19)". 
Several respondents were less sure that the TCP would be effective: 
"I think the effectiveness remains to be seen. We'd just have to trust the 
government that it would work (28)". 
186 
A number of respondents felt that the TCP scheme would increase awareness 
of the environmental impacts associated with car use and would therefore 
reduce carbon emissions without needing to rely on the carbon limit: 
"The permit allocation would encourage people to stay within the limit (05)" 
and "It'd make people think about what they were doing because you've got 
your own allowance with a figure on it (27)" and "I think 80% of people would 
change. It'd make people think about their car use (25)" and "The trading 
scheme's got a more positive spin, people would adapt gradually and for 
environmental reasons (25)" and "People would be more aware of the purpose 
of the permit scheme because they'd be constantly reminded by having to use 
the permits. I think this'd make it more effective really. The purpose of the fuel 
price increase could get lost on people and it'd be seen as another unfair tax 
increase (04)" and "There'd be no extra costs if you stay within your limit 
(47) 
Due to the limit placed on carbon availability, the TCP scheme could, 
theoretically, be 100% effective. However, several respondents were doubtful 
that the TCP scheme would be fully effective, perceiving complications such as 
the potential of fraudulent carbon permits jeopardising the carbon reduction 
target and a lack of faith in the government to carry out the policy: 
"I can see some potential problems though like more carbon being released if 
there's a permit shortage which would breach the target but the government 
wouldn't want things to come to a halt (26)" and "There's so much potential 
for abuse with this scheme, there'd be black markets all over the place. 
Another major issue is the fact that car use is engrained in society - the whole 
freedom of choice thing with people being able to go anywhere at will in a car 
which could possible make the policy politically unfeasible. It needs a climate 
that makes the scheme a non political party issue, like in response to a 
disaster (51)" and "There's a lot of issues to iron out that could potentially 
reduce effectiveness (17)" and "The government would increase the permit 
187 
allocation because of increased pressure from the public (46)" and "The 
scheme's too complicated, it's a hair brain idea for use on the general public, 
it'd be better for industry. It's a totally unworkable policy (16)" and "There's a 
possible problem of people selling their permits prematurely then needing to 
travel (04)". 
However, one of the main benefits of personal trading schemes is the placing 
of responsibility onto the individual (Starkey and Anderson, 2005; Fleming, 
2007). Hence, each person would be responsible for managing their own 
carbon allocation and carbon permit use. In terms of budgeting issues, 
similarities can be drawn from managing a monetary budget which is 
applicable to the majority of adult individuals in the UK. This involves a degree 
of planning and self control which are transferable skills that could be applied 
to adapting to the TCP scheme. Several respondents recognised the benefits of 
placing responsibility on the individual: 
"I think placing responsibility on the individual is very effective (10)" and "The 
best way to make people aware of what they're doing is to give them some 
responsibility (40)" and "It's about time people were made to think about the 
consequences of their actions. This would make them realise how much 
emissions they were causing and to find ways of changing their behaviour. I 
think it could start a whole green thought process (36)". 
However, it should be considered that there is currently a record level of 
personal debt in the UK. Hence, it would be very important to fully consider the 
impact of loaning carbon permits and the consequences of allowing people to 
use their next years allocation in advance. 
Whilst the TCP scheme was a new concept in terms of regulating personal 
transport emissions, respondents generally had more reservations regarding 
the effectiveness of the FPI highlighted by the greater number of 'ineffective' 
issues compared to the 'effective' issues listed in table 6.12. The majority of 
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respondents felt that the public response to the FPI would largely be a 
continuation of current behaviour regardless of the price increase: 
"People'd complain but they'd still pay the extra (45)" and "Putting the price up 
doesn't work. People don't stop smoking because the price goes up, they stop 
smoking for other reasons (11)" and "It'd just be easier for most people to pay 
the extra cost and carry on rather than moving house or changing job (52)" 
and "I don't know because it's only a theory that it'll work. If people are well 
off they'll buy it (49)" and "People would just reduce their spending on other 
things so they could carry on buying fuel (42)" and "From my observations fuel 
price increases don't make any difference to consumption (41)". 
Several respondents felt that the FPI would be ineffective because the price 
increase was not high enough to stimulate a behavioural change: 
"You could get it to work by adjusting the price. If it's a government target 
then it would have to be met but the price would need increasing because it's 
too low (33)" and "A small price increase won't shock people into reducing 
their car use (27)" and "It's only a marginal change, it's not radical enough to 
achieve a savage reduction in energy use. People would just spend less in 
other areas (51)". 
Conversely, a number of respondents considered the price increase to be high 
enough but envisaged other problems related the policy that were thought to 
hinder the achievement of the carbon reduction targets: 
"The price is high enough to put people off but there's no limit on availability 
and there's no market influence to determine price therefore it can't be as 
effective as the trading scheme (23)" and "It wouldn't make people think about 
their consumption and address it. There wouldn't be a cultural change like 
there would with the permit scheme (50)" and "It doesn't provide a measure or 
make people think (30) ". 
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However, a number of respondents believed that the FPI would be effective at 
reducing carbon emissions: 
"I think it'd be very effective. I think people would car share, walk for shorter 
trips and walk their kids to school (53)" and "It'll make people think about car 
use because of the expense. Money's very important to people so it'd have a 
big impact on travel (28)" and "It'd work in the long term as long as incomes 
don't increase to counter balance it (36)". 
It is possible that respondents said the policies would be ineffective because 
they did not want to change their behaviour identified as strategic response by 
Rienstra et a/ (1999). Thus, to explore the affect of perceived effectiveness on 
behavioural response, ratings were averaged amongst those who changed 
their behaviour and those who did not make any changes. Table 6.13 shows 
the results. 
Table 6.13: Perceived effectiveness - changers versus non changers 
Behavioural change No behavioural change 
TCP FPI TCP FPI 
4.17 (1.34) 2.27 (0.91) 3.80 (1.40) 2.15 (1.52) 
For the TCP scheme, respondents who changed their travel behaviour rated the 
policy as more effective than those who did not make any changes to their 
behaviour. There are 2 possible explanations. Firstly, those who changed might 
have considered the policy more effective as they had changed their behaviour 
and thus thought that other people would do the same. Alternatively, those 
who did not change might have considered the policy less effective because it 
had not stimulated them to change and thus thought that other people might 
also not change. For the FPI, the average effectiveness ratings amongst 
changers and non changers are very similar - it therefore appears that 
behavioural response had little impact on perceived effectiveness. 
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After respondents had considered the effectiveness of each policy, they were 
asked to rate the impact on a list of factors. Responses were based on the 
perceived change (at a Great Britain level) in comparison with current 
circumstances using categories ranging from 'very much worse' to 'very much 
improved'. The responses were later given a numerical rating ranging from -3 
(very much worse) to 3 (very much improved), with 0 as the `no change' 
category. Table 6.14 displays the average numerical rating (with standard 
deviation) for each factor and policy, with the final column showing the 
difference between the TCP scheme and FPI average ratings. 
Table 6.14: Affect of TCP scheme and FPI on various factors 
Factor TCP scheme FPI TCP - FPI 
GHG emissions14 1.43 (0.89) 0.82 (1.02) v 0.61 
Local air pollution5 1.52 (0.82) 0.82 (1.12) 0.70 
Local noise pollution 5 1.22 (0.89) 0.63 (1.04) 0.59 
Provisions of amenities 0.77 (0.89) 0.45 (0.96) 0.32 
Public health 1.27 (0.87) 0.72 (1.02) 0.55 
Traffic congestion 5 1.42 (0.88) 0.71 (1.21) 0.71 
Public transport 1.21 (1.00) 1.01 (1.10) 0.20 
Access to amenities 0.54 (1.03) 0.27 (0.91) 0.27 
Cost of private transpo rt5 -0.58 (1.10) -1.07 (1.24) 0.48 
Social exclusion 5 -0.07 (1.13) -0.45 (1.11) 0.38 
Frequency of accidents15 0.79 (0.89) 0.51 (1.03) 0.28 
As shown by the difference between ratings, in all cases the TCP scheme was 
considered to have a more positive or less negative impact than the FPI 
particularly in relation to reducing local air pollution and traffic congestion. 
However, given the large variation in responses (indicated by the standard 
deviation values), tables 6.15 and 6.16 display the frequencies of response. 
14 An 'improvement' was interpreted by respondents as a reduction. 
15 An improvement in the frequency of road accidents meant a reduction in the 
frequency of road accidents. 
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Table 6.15: Effect of TCP scheme - individual ratings 
Very Very 
Much No Much 
Factor much Worse Improved much 
worse change improved 
worse improved 
GHG 3 35 15 7 
Air 2 35 13 10 
pollution 
Noise 11 32 10 7 
Local 
2 22 28 4 4 
shops 
Health 8 36 8 8 
Congestion 4 38 7 11 
Public 
13 27 12 8 
transport 
Access to 
10 17 25 5 3 
amenities 
Monetary 
1 6 36 6 7 3 1 
costs 
Social 
1 4 15 22 16 2 
exclusion 
Accidents 2 20 29 5 4 
Table 6.15 clearly shows that the majority of respondents considered the TCP 
scheme to worsen the monetary costs of private transport. Conversely, all 
other factors were thought by the majority of respondents to be improved as a 
result of the TCP scheme, particularly levels of greenhouse gas emissions, local 
air pollution levels and traffic congestion, except social exclusion which was 
considered to remain the same as now. 
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Table 6.16: Effect of FPI - individual ratings 
Very 
Much No Much 
Very 
Factor much Worse Improved much worse change improved 
worse improved 
GHG 1 2 20 27 5 5 
Air 
1 5 17 24 8 5 
pollution 
Noise 1 4 25 21 5 4 
Local 
1 3 34 15 4 3 
shops 
Health 1 1 27 21 5 5 
Congestion 1 1 4 20 23 5 6 
Public 
1 3 15 25 10 6 
transport 
Access to 8 35 11 4 2 
amenities 
Monetary 
9 11 25 6 8 1 
CoSts4 
Social 
4 2 24 19 9 2 
exclusion 
Accidents5 1 3 30 20 2 4 
Table 6.16 shows a majority of responses in the 'no change' category in 
relation to access to amenities, provision of local shops and road accidents. 
Conversely, public transport, greenhouse gas emissions, local air pollution 
levels, traffic congestion, health status, and noise pollution were considered to 
improve by the majority of respondents, whilst monetary costs and social 
exclusion would become worse as a result of the FPI. 
It is clear from tables 6.15 and 6.16 that a greater number of respondents 
considered the FPI to result in higher monetary costs in comparison to the TCP 
scheme. Table 6.12 indicated that the majority of respondents felt that the 
public response to the FPI would be to absorb the increased fuel costs and 
continue current behaviour, hence the monetary costs would increase. The 
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results shown in tables 6.15 and 6.16 therefore indicates that many 
respondents had possibly not taken into account unknown and possibly very 
high carbon permit prices which could increase beyond the relative FPI, despite 
being informed of this during the explanation of the TCP scheme. A greater 
number of respondents perceived social exclusion to worsen in relation to the 
FPI in comparison to the TCP scheme. This was largely a result of the 
perception that many low income motorists would be unable to continue their 
current behaviour and would thus be excluded from activities where car use is 
essential for access. In addition, the majority of respondents felt that the 
provision of local shops and services would remain the same as now rather 
than increasing to accommodate demand from those unable to continue 
current travel behaviour as a result of the FPI. 
6.5 Alternative measures 
Before the interview ended, an open question was used to ask respondents if 
there were any measures that they considered would more effectively achieve 
a 60% reduction in carbon emissions from personal road transport by 2050 
than the TCP scheme or FPI. The measures suggested were categorised into 
policy type, as shown in table 6.17. 
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Table 6.17: Alternative measures to the TCP scheme and FPI 
Measure Number of responses 
Pricing 
Road pricing 2 
Increased Vehicle Excise Duty 1 
Motorway tolls for freight 1 
Infrastructure/technology 
More cycle lanes and facilities 
Increased availability of clean personal vehicles 
Work at home schemes/telecommute 
Information /other 
Information on environmental impacts of car use 
Advertisement of alternative vehicles/fuels 
Car sharing 
Improving public transport 
Non tradable fuel ration 
TCP on international scale 
Policy combinations 
TCP scheme and public transport improvements 
TCP scheme with subsidies on H2 
FPI and major public transport improvements 
FPI with provision of alternative vehicles/fuels 
FPI with improved fuel efficiency of vehicles 
FPI with car use on certain days for each person 
Congestion charging and PT improvements 
Total 
1 
4 
1 
2 
1 
2 
6 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
32 
Overall, 40% of the sample considered another policy more effective than the 
TCP scheme and FPI. Improving public transport was the most frequently 
stated option. Reliability, frequency and route choice were the most commonly 
stated areas for improvement. Although public transport improvements were 
included in the policy descriptions of the TCP scheme and FPI, a number of 
respondents felt that improving public transport alone would achieve the 
emissions target, without the need for fiscal regulation provided by either the 
TCP scheme or FPI: 
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"People would use public transport if it was available (20)" 
Whilst improving public transport alone would persuade a certain amount of 
people to reduce their car use, there would be no disincentive to influence the 
proportion of people who would inevitably switch back to car use as a result of 
reduced traffic congestion. In addition, improving public transport alone does 
not incentivise change amongst those most reluctant to switch mode, such as 
the 'malcontented motorists' and the 'complacent car addicts' (Anable, 2005). 
Whilst the suggestions in table 6.17 would undoubtedly have some effect on 
travel behaviour, many of them lack a driver for change. For example, 
increasing the availability of cycle lanes and clean fuelled cars. One respondent 
felt that the latter option would allow people to continue their current levels of 
car use and would thus be more preferable to the TCP scheme and FPI: 
"We just need to use alternative fuels then people don't have to give up their 
car which is much more acceptable (48)'". 
However, within this option there are issues related to influencing purchasing 
behaviour and the sustainability of alternative fuels, particularly bio fuels and 
hydrogen produced from non renewable sources. It is doubtful that, without a 
driver to influence behaviour, a large enough change would be achieved from 
the use of alternative fuels alone. 
Several respondents felt that the provision of information alone would 
influence behaviour enough to achieve the emissions target. One respondent 
felt that it was particularly important to change the way that people currently 
view public transport and car use: 
"It's more about changing attitudes and norms towards car use and public 
transport (48)': 
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Several respondents felt that other forms of pricing would be more effective 
than the TCP scheme or FPI, although one respondent considered the TCP 
scheme to be more effective: 
"Road pricing is most simple and easier to introduce on the basis of current 
technology but rationing is the way to go, plus it's the fairest policy (51)': 
A combination of policy measures was suggested by a number of respondents. 
Interestingly, the majority of the combinations included the FPI despite this 
being rated as less effective than the TCP scheme according to the results 
shown in tables 6.11 and 6.14. 
6.6 Conclusions and policy implications 
The TCP scheme was more favourable than the FPI in terms of the strength of 
impacts on lifestyle, costs and benefits, fairness and perceived effectiveness, 
which is perhaps the most prominent research finding. The results presented in 
this chapter have demonstrated a diverse and varied range of opinions 
amongst the sample in terms of the issues raised regarding the impacts on 
lifestyle, costs and benefits, fairness and perceived effectiveness of both 
policies. The variation in response indicates that it would be very important to 
fully advertise all benefits of the policy at the implementation stage. 
Whilst the level of impacts on lifestyle were perceived to be similar for both 
policies, the major outcome was the fact that the majority of respondents 
viewed the impacts resulting from the FPI to be negative overall whilst those 
resulting from the TCP scheme were positive. This difference was largely 
related to policy effectiveness and resultant fairness issues - many 
respondents felt that they would have to change their behaviour for both 
policies but the FPI provided an option for individuals to continue their 
behaviour at increased costs, thus resulting in fewer visible benefits due to 
failure to achieve the emissions target. Conversely, behavioural response to 
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the TCP scheme was considered to be largely unavoidable due to the limit on 
carbon availability, hence respondents felt assured that most people 
consuming above their free permit allocation would have to make some 
changes, hence they would not be the only ones disadvantaged and in addition 
would gain benefits such as reduced levels of air pollution. 
In terms of fairness ratings relating to the TCP scheme, the equal per capita 
basis of the permit allocation was the most prominent issue. A large number of 
respondents considered that everyone receiving the same amount of free 
permits was a fair approach. However, without a time allowance for discussing 
in detail the type and preference of various permit allocation methods during 
the interviews (such as increasing the allocation based on the number of 
dependants or instead providing children with an allocation), it could possibly 
be an insightful area for future exploration. 
Collectively the results highlight perceived effectiveness as a major 
consideration in terms of responses given throughout the interview. For 
example, a popular opinion amongst the sample was that the public response 
to the FPI would be to largely continue current behaviour regardless of the 
price increase, which is supported by the behavioural response results reported 
in chapter 5. This belief was most apparent in relation to the effectiveness 
ratings where the majority of respondents considered such a response to result 
in a poor achievement of the carbon reduction targets. This factor was the 
main cause of the negative attitudes prevalent amongst the sample towards 
the FPI. For example, the FPI was thought to result in personal costs whereas 
the TCP scheme would provide net benefits. Hence, many respondents were 
unconvinced that the FPI would cause any significant changes whilst being 
convinced that the TCP scheme could deliver the reductions with a greater 
degree of certainty, which is a major finding from this chapter. Therefore, 
should the FPI be pursued as a policy option, it appears imperative to convince 
the public prior to implementation that the FPI would be effective. However, 
how to do this raises a range of questions, with particular regard to the lack of 
198 
guarantee that the FPI would be effective without any restriction on carbon 
availability, as also noted by one respondent. This again raises questions 
regarding the suitability of the FPI as a carbon reduction measure, as also 
discussed in chapter 5. 
The carbon budget was considered to make the purpose of the TCP scheme 
obvious on a daily basis and thus provide positive encouragement by 
increasing awareness of environmental issues and methods of carbon 
reduction. It is therefore possible that the purpose of the FPI could also be 
made more obvious and memorable on a day to day basis by introducing it as 
a carbon tax or levy rather than a fuel price increase, which is perhaps too 
emotive in that it is strongly associated with raising revenue for purposes 
which are not necessarily related to environmental improvements. 
Whilst a large number of respondents had a positive attitude towards the TCP 
scheme in terms of achieving the carbon reduction targets, several 
respondents had strong reservations about the policy related to the possible 
availability of illegal carbon permits in addition to the complexities involved in 
monitoring and administration and political instability. Whilst such issues are 
addressed in chapters 2 and 3, they are valid concerns which require detailed 
investigation at the policy planning stage. 
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Chapter 7 
Acceptability of the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme and fuel 
price increase 
200 
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After respondents had considered their behavioural response and attitudes in 
terms of perceived fairness and effectiveness of both policies, the questions 
were focused on acceptability. Section 7.1 contains the acceptability ratings, 
which are explored in section 7.2. Although the majority of the explanatory 
work is achieved through the use of qualitative findings, an ordered Logit 
model is included in section 7.3. A comparison of the policies is then presented 
through an open question regarding preference between the policies in section 
7.4. The support for including air transport in both policies is then presented in 
section 7.5. Suggestions from respondents regarding increasing the 
acceptability of the TCP scheme are then presented in section 7.6 followed by 
the chapter conclusions and policy implications in section 7.7. 
7.1 Acceptability ratings 
Respondents were asked to rate how acceptable they personally considered the 
policies to be and also to rate the polices from a wider social perspective. 
Responses were given on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (completely 
unacceptable) to 3 (completely acceptable). Table 7.1 displays the average 
ratings of acceptability for both policies. 
Table 7.1 Personal and social acceptability 
TCP scheme FPI 
Personal 1.14 (1.59) 0.32 (1.82) 
Social - 0.31 (1.45) - 1.19 (1.61) 
The results show that respondents considered both policies to be personally 
acceptable (more so for the TCP scheme), whilst both being unacceptable from 
a social perspective (the FPI to a larger extent than the TCP scheme). The 
ratings were tested for statistical significance using a Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test (used for ordinal data - see chapter 5 for more information). The personal 
acceptability ratings for the TCP scheme and the FPI were significantly different 
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(p<. 01), as were the social acceptability ratings (p<. 005), thus implying that 
the difference between the ratings did not occur by chance. 
The large standard deviation figures indicate that the average ratings could be 
positive or negative, thus to further examine the ratings, the frequency of 
responses are shown in figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1 Acceptability ratings 
In terms of personal acceptability, 78% of respondents considered the TCP 
scheme to be acceptable whereas 50% rated the FPI as acceptable. In terms of 
the FPI, this is greater than the average level of support (37%) expected for 
road pricing in the UK (Jaensirisak et al., 2005). The TCP scheme is less 
comparable with road pricing than the FPI and is instead more comparable with 
findings from the RSA (2006) who found that 53% of respondents would 
accept limits imposed on their energy use if they helped to solve the problem 
of climate change. In which case, the acceptability of both the TCP scheme and 
FPI could be lower amongst a more representative sample. In terms of social 
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acceptability, the majority of respondents thought society would consider the 
TCP scheme to be unacceptable, the FPI even more so. 
7.2 Exploring acceptability: qualitative findings 
Using an open question, respondents were asked to explain the reasons for 
their personal acceptability rating. Table 7.2 shows the responses. 
Table 7.2 Acceptability issues (with number of respondents) related to 
the TCP scheme and FPI 
Issue TCP scheme FPI 
Personal Social Personal Social 
Acceptable because.... 
Policy is necessary 
Allows current car use to continue 
Everyone would be affected 
Increase environmental awareness 
Benefits16 
Permit allocation 
Fuel should be more expensive 
Policy effective at achieving reductions 
Can adapt current situation 
Improved public transport system 
Fairness 
Policy would change peoples behaviour 
Fuel price increase is expected 
Would not affect me 
Straightforward policy 
13 4 
1 
7 
20 10 
3 
3 
41 
- -- 5 
8 1 
3 1 
2 
7 4 
7 
i 
ii 
1 
ý- 
2 2 
2 
2 
16 The benefits included a reduction in air and noise pollution levels, health benefits 
resulting from such reductions, an improvement in physical fitness through the use of 
active transport modes, a reduction in traffic congestion and profiting from the sale of 
the free permit allocation. 
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Unacceptable because.... 
Uneven impacts across society 11 4 3 1 
Increase social divide 1 1 i2 
Lack of trust in revenue use/policy aim 1 
Monetary costs 2 14 10 32 
Permit allocation/carbon budget 1 
Unfair 3 12 10 16 
Lifestyle change 5 
Inconvenience of monitoring car use 1 3 1 
Lack of alternative travel mode alternative 2 2 1 2 
Policy ineffective at achieving reductions 3 4 
Complexity of policy 4 4 
Uncertainty of carbon availability 2 
Restriction of personal freedom/choice 3 7 2 
Total number of acceptable issues ' 74 23 36 9 
t 
Total number of unacceptable issues 19 55 27 t 59 
The total number of acceptability issues reported in table 7.2 reflect the 
average ratings provided in table 7.1. For the TCP scheme, there are more 
reasons given regarding personal acceptance of the policy in comparison to the 
FPI, whilst there are less reasons provided regarding social acceptability in 
comparison to personal acceptability for both policies. In terms of personal 
unacceptability, there are more reasons provided for the FPI in comparison to 
the TCP scheme whilst the number of reasons regarding social unacceptability 
is greater than personal unacceptability for both policies. 
Table 7.2 shows that the perceived benefits were the main reason for personal 
acceptance of the TCP scheme. Whilst such benefits could also occur from the 
FPI, a much smaller number of respondents mentioned them. Conversely, the 
most commonly stated reason for accepting the FPI was the necessity to 
reduce carbon emissions: 
"We don't have a choice, we'd have to accept it because it'd be law and it's 
necessary (28)". 
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Benefits were also one of the most commonly stated reasons, in addition to the 
feeling that fuel should be more expensive in recognition of the detrimental 
impacts. This again demonstrates the different ways of thinking about the 
policies as the feeling that fuel should cost more could also apply to the TCP 
scheme, however this was one of the least commonly stated reasons for 
accepting the policy. 
Fairness and the necessity to reduce carbon emissions were two of the most 
commonly stated reasons for accepting the TCP scheme: 
"It's a fair way to reduce emissions, it improves public transport and 
encourages people to use it. I think the scheme would work well and has a 
target and aim to achieve and it's a big scheme for people to take on which 
would help to make people realise the scale of the problem and what needs to 
be done (46) ". 
Many of the fairness issues discussed in chapter 6 (see section 6.3) were again 
highlighted during the responses to the acceptability questions. The majority of 
comments were regarding the impact of the TCP scheme in terms of everyone 
being affected, the limit on carbon availability and the equal per capita permit 
allocation. In addition, several respondents noted the possibility of a general 
movement towards smaller vehicles in order to reduce carbon permit 
consumption. 
In terms of social acceptability, benefits were again the most commonly stated 
reason regarding public acceptance of the TCP scheme. Perceived benefits 
were also the most commonly stated reason for social acceptance of the FPI 
but to a much lesser extent: 
"It's a small price increase so I don't think people would object considering the 
benefits received (55)". 
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Amongst the respondents rating the TCP scheme as unacceptable, the most 
commonly stated reason was the perceived complexity of the policy in terms of 
managing a permit account and allocation, buying permits and calculating 
permit consumption of car journeys. Several respondents also felt that the TCP 
scheme would be unfair due to a perceived reduction in leisure journeys. In 
addition, several respondents had concerns over the effectiveness of the policy 
and were unconvinced that the carbon reduction targets would be achieved. A 
restriction on personal freedom was also an issue for several respondents who 
felt that their choices would be constrained by the TCP scheme. However, one 
respondent had the opposite opinion: 
"It's about reducing your footprint, not about reducing your choices (12)". 
In terms of the FPI, unfairness together with monetary costs were the most 
commonly stated reasons for rating the policy as unacceptable. A number of 
respondents felt that the FPI would be unfair largely because they were 
doubtful that the carbon reduction targets would be achieved: 
"There'd be no benefit or change therefore it wouldn't achieve anything which 
makes it unfair (06)" and "It's a risky way to do it because it might not work 
whereas the trading scheme has set targets but may be less socially 
acceptable (49)" and "It's another way of increasing taxes without necessarily 
providing benefits. Fuel price has gone up due to oil price increases and there's 
been no impact on behaviour (47)" and "There's a high risk that it won't work 
and could be for nothing. There'd be no benefit and people paid more for 
nothing (43)" and "It's just a stop gap approach, the government trying not to 
do too much and cause too much upset. People can ignore the prices, they're 
too low (35)" and "I think it's unfair because I don't believe that the 
government would use the revenue to improve public transport. It'd be 
acceptable if they did (15)". 
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Unfairness and monetary costs were also the most commonly stated reasons in 
terms of the perceived social unacceptability of both policies. In relation to the 
TCP scheme: 
"People don't want to cycle or walk or be dictated to. They'd find it intrusive 
(35)" and "People love their cars too much and aren't concerned about global 
warming so they'd think it was unfair (30)" and "People are too selfish to 
accept it, they think they've got a right to drive everywhere (16)" and "I think 
whether or not people can make their essential trips within their permit 
allowance would decide how acceptable it is (11)" and "People would think it's 
the worst thing that could happen to them (10)". 
In relation to the FPI: 
"People don't want to pay more for fuel, they don't want to pay more tax for 
the NHS and schools so they won't want to pay more for fuel (30)" and "If you 
can afford it great, no problem if you can't then tough you have to reduce your 
use (48)" and "It'd just be seen as another tax (8)" and "People can't see 
pollution, they're not concerned" and "People realise something needs to be 
done but not by having to pay more (16)" and "People wouldn't like it. They'd 
say that fuel is already too expensive and we pay more than other countries 
and why should we change when America won't reduce their emissions (33)" 
and "It'd become more unacceptable over time as the price increased and 
people were unable to absorb the costs (25)" and "It's more of an impact 
because people feel more coerced to changing their lifestyle and they don't like 
that (36)" and "They think their journey won't make a difference, it's everyone 
else (54)". 
Several respondents felt that such feelings of unfairness from society would be 
unjustified, in relation to the TCP: 
"To limit personal freedom is to help the planet which I think is necessary (5)". 
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In relation to the FPI: 
"People need to be encouraged to stop using their cars which requires some 
form of coercion (16)". 
Several respondents felt that the TCP scheme would become more acceptable 
over time: 
"People wouldn't like it at first but they'd get used to it. It's like the seatbelt 
law. It becomes more acceptable over time (05)" and "I don't think people 
would like it at first but after a while they'd notice the benefits so I think it 
would be acceptable over time (45)" and "I think initially it would be 
unacceptable probably because there's a limit but as people adjust and they 
see changes in the midterm acceptability would increase (49)" and "People 
think they're dependant on their cars but over time they'd find it acceptable 
and reduce their use. People don't think they can adapt but over time they'd 
realise they can change. It's like smoking, no one thought that'd ever be 
banned but now it is (36)". 
It is highly possible that the acceptability of the TCP scheme would change 
following implementation when the benefits become visible. For example, 
support for the London congestion charging scheme increased from 39% prior 
to implementation to 59% following implementation (TfL, 2004). It is also 
possible that the FPI would become more acceptable over time, however this 
was not mentioned by any respondent. During the interviews a number of 
respondents found it difficult to rate their responses using the 7-point scales as 
they thought their opinion would change in the long term, for example, 
benefits would increase in the long term as pollution levels declined but initially 
the policy might result in costs, for example having to reduce car use and/or 
buy carbon permits. Hence, based on the discussions during the interviews it is 
likely that the acceptability of the TCP scheme would increase rather than 
decrease over time. 
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Following the explanation of their personal acceptability ratings, respondents 
were asked which factor was of most importance when making their decision. 
Table 7.3 displays the responses with number of respondents. 
Table 7.3 Issues of most importance relating to personal acceptability 
of the TCP scheme and FPI (with number of respondents). 
Issue 
Policy is necessary 
Allows current car use to continue 
Increase environmental awareness 
Benefits 
Permit allocation 
Fuel should be more expensive 
Policy effective at achieving reductions 
Can adapt current situation 
Uneven impacts across society 
Policy is fair 
Monetary costs 
Restriction on personal freedom/choic( 
Policy is unfair 
Inconvenience of monitoring car use 
Lack of flexibility 
Policy ineffective at achieving reductio 
12 
2 
15 
1 
1 
8 
2 
1 
9 
3 
1 
i 
_-r__ 
i 
1 
2 
1 
FPI 
4 
3 
3 
7 
3 
4 
8 
4 
1 
11 
Table 7.3 shows that the most important reason for rating the TCP scheme and 
FPI as acceptable was the perceived benefits, which includes a reduction in air 
pollution and traffic congestion. Following this, the necessity to reduce carbon 
emissions and the consideration that the TCP scheme was fair and effective at 
reducing carbon emissions were the most commonly stated reasons regarding 
acceptance of the TCP scheme. In relation to the FPI, the perceived benefits, 
the necessity to reduce emissions and the ability to adapt travel behaviour with 
little inconvenience were the most important reasons regarding acceptance. In 
terms of rating the policies as unacceptable, monetary cost was the most 
TCP scheme 
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important factor relating to the TCP scheme whilst the inability to achieve the 
carbon reduction targets was the most important reason regarding the FPI. 
The frequency of responses displayed in table 7.3 again demonstrates the 
difference in attitudes related to the policies - the most commonly stated issue 
related to the acceptability of the TCP scheme was the perceived benefits 
which are positive and related to acceptance. Conversely, the most commonly 
stated issue regarding the acceptability ratings for the FPI was the inability to 
achieve the emissions target, which is negative and related to non acceptance 
of the policy. 
7.3 Exploring the determinants of acceptability: quantitative findings 
Given the importance of acceptability in transport policy (Jones, 1995; 2003; 
Whittles, 2003; Schade and Schlag, 2003; Button and Verhoef, 2000; 
Jaensirisak et a/., 2005), an ordered Logit model was used to further 
investigate the influential factors (see section 6.3 for an explanation of the 
model). All variables collected in the interview questionnaire were included as 
discrete independent variables (level of impacts on lifestyle, costs/benefits, 
effectiveness, personal and social fairness, social acceptability, environmental 
concern, knowledge, problem perception, education, gender, income, age, 
base carbon consumption, behavioural response (entered as a binary variable 
with 1 representing a response during one or more time periods and 0 
representing no change during any time period)), which were gradually 
removed from the model based on significance ratings (p<. 05). Thus, each 
time the model was re run, the least significant variable was removed until all 
of the variables in the model were significant. The same method of categorical 
data analysis was used by Rienstra et al (1999), Jakobsson et al (2000) and 
Fujii et a/ (2004) for exploring the determinants of the acceptability of road 
pricing. In addition, to investigate the impact of this method of variable 
removal, several models were run based on logical combinations of 
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independent variables such as carbon consumption, concern for the 
environment and income. Each combination investigated yielded insignificant 
variables and very low r2 values. Table 7.4 shows the model derived from the 
gradual removal of variables based on significance ratings. 
Table 7.4: Ordered Logit model of the determinants of personal 
acceptability relating to the TCP scheme and FPI 
T_ TCP scheme FPI Independent variable 
Coefficient P value Coefficient P value 
Personal fairness 1 -7.974 p<. 001 
Personal fairness 2 -4.418 p<. 005 -4.681 p<. 001 
Personal fairness 3 -6.028 p<. 001 -3.271 p<. 001 
Personal fairness 4 -4.060 p<. 005 -1.666 p<. 050 
Personal cost/benefit 1 -7.692 p<. 001 
Personal cost/benefit 2 -5.862 p<. 001 
Personal cost/benefit 3 -3.131 p<. 050 
Personal cost/benefit 4 -4.373 p<. 010 
TCP scheme 
Pearson Chi-squared 58.179 -2 log likelihood 105.24 Pseudo R2 . 60 
FPI 
Pearson Chi-squared 96.044 -2 log likelihood 82.487 Pseudo R2 . 54 
In terms of the TCP scheme the coefficients of the significant independent 
variables are not monotonic as would be expected (see section 6.3). This could 
be explained by the low response for the value in the middle of the scales 
which represented the "unsure" or 'neutral' responses. It is possible that a 
larger sample size would reduce the problem. 
The Logit model shows that acceptability of the TCP scheme is greatest where 
benefits and personal fairness also have the highest ratings (categories 1 to 4 
have a negative coefficient in comparison to the reference category 5) (there 
were no responses for personal fairness 1). These results are supported by 
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table 7.2 which showed that perceived benefits were the most commonly 
stated reason for rating the TCP scheme as acceptable and were also predicted 
in the research hypotheses (see chapter 3- section 3.4). In addition, table 7.3 
revealed that benefits were the most important factor in terms of acceptance 
ratings. Fairness was the third most commonly stated reason for accepting the 
policy in tables 7.2 and 7.3 (necessity of the policy was the second most 
commonly stated however there is no variable in the model to account for 
necessity). Schade and Schlag (2003) found using a stepwise multiple 
regression analysis that personal outcome expectations (benefits) were 
positively related to the acceptability of transport pricing strategies. 
Personal fairness was revealed as the only significant independent variable in 
terms of acceptability of the FPI. In this case the coefficients show a monotonic 
relationship (consistently become more negative between categories), thus 
indicating that the FPI becomes more acceptable, or less unacceptable, as 
personal fairness ratings increase. This correlates with the results in table 7.2 
where unfairness was one of the most commonly stated reasons for rating the 
FPI as unacceptable. In addition, the Logit model results are in line with 
findings by Jakobsson et al (2000) who discovered that the acceptance of road 
pricing was negatively affected by perceived infringement on personal freedom 
and unfairness. These results were further confirmed by Fujii et al (2004), 
where fairness was discovered to be the main predictor of acceptability of road 
pricing. Further to this, Eriksson et a/ (2006) revealed that moral 
considerations and perceived fairness were the most important factors in terms 
of the acceptability of fuel tax increases. 
It is possible that there is a multi causal relationship in terms of perceived 
fairness and acceptability - chapter 6 revealed that the strength of impacts on 
lifestyle (positive/negative) was one of the main predictors of fairness for the 
FPI (see table 6.9). Hence, the fairness ratings included in the acceptability 
Logit model were likely to have already accounted for costs and/or benefits. 
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7.3.1 Acceptability and behavioural response 
The acceptability ratings were explored in terms of behavioural response. Table 
7.5 shows the average ratings of personal acceptability amongst the 
respondents who changed their behaviour during one or more time periods and 
those who made no changes to their travel behaviour. 
Table 7.5: Acceptability - changers versus non changers 
Personal 
Social 
Behavioural change 
TCP FPI 
1.44(1.19) 0.64 (1.50) 
0.22 (1.31) -0.27 (1.56) 
No behavioural change 
TCP FPI 
1.00 (1.74) 0.30 (1.89) 
-0.55 (1.47) -1.19 (1.58) 
For both policies, the changers had slightly higher ratings of personal 
acceptability than the non changers. This suggests that behavioural response 
would increase amongst those rating the policy as acceptable or vice versa. 
This is plausible as it is perhaps likely that acceptability would increase 
amongst those who are able and/or willing to change their behaviour and 
decrease amongst those less willing and/or able to change. In terms of 
perceived social acceptability, those who changed for the TCP scheme thought 
that the general public would rate the scheme as slightly acceptable whereas 
the non changers thought the general public would consider the scheme to be 
slightly unacceptable. For the FPI, both the changers and the non changers 
thought that society would rate the policy as unacceptable, more so amongst 
the non changers. 
7.4 Direct comparison of the TCP scheme and FPI 
Following the questions relating to each policy separately, respondents were 
asked which policy they considered to be most personally acceptable. The 
majority of respondents (40) would consider the TCP scheme to be more 
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acceptable than the FPI, 1 respondent thought the policies were equally as 
acceptable, 1 respondent thought neither were acceptable and 18 respondents 
considered the FPI to be more acceptable than the TCP scheme. Table 7.6 
displays the categories of responses derived from an open question at this 
point of the interview. 
Table 7.6 Comparing acceptability of the TCP scheme and FPI 
Issue TCP scheme FPI 
Fairness 
Allows current car use to continue 
Everyone would be affected 
Increase environmental awareness 
Benefits'' 
Permit allocation 
Less financial costs 
Policy more effective at achieving reductions 
Greater impact on high carbon consumers 
Carbon budget 
Revenue raising potential 
Would not have either scheme 
Focus on individual 
Personal choice element 
Simplicity of policy 
Would make people change 
16 2 
28 
2 
10 
5 
1 
3 
24 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 -- -- -6 
4 
31 
Table 7.6 shows that the main reason for considering the TCP scheme to be 
more acceptable than the FPI is the ability to achieve the carbon reduction 
targets: 
"People can't ignore the trading scheme but they can ignore the fuel prices 
(23)" and "The trading scheme has a bigger impact even though it's more 
17 Includes health and fitness benefits from using active modes; reduced levels of 
traffic congestion and noise and air pollution. 
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difficult than the fuel price increase. The trading scheme is the way we should 
go (27)" and "People would consider it in the same way as a personal bank 
account which has a limit and each time they're buying fuel they'd think about 
their bank balance going down (49)" 
Fairness was also commonly stated: 
"It provides incentives to change instead of penalising people for doing the 
wrong thing (44)" and "It gives rewards to people that are already doing 
something positive like using public transport (30)" and "It gives people fair 
access to resources to use and is not based on ability to pay. Fuel price 
increases are regressive (51) ". 
Increasing public awareness of environmental issues was also a commonly 
stated reason for considering the TCP scheme more acceptable then the FPI: 
"It's a softer approach and makes people conscious of what they're doing. The 
permit scheme has a good approach because it works with people and treats 
them as adults (36)" and "It'll change public attitudes, it'll be frowned upon to 
over use your car the same as not recycling glass bottles (14)" and "It makes 
people think about car use and increases personal responsibility in managing 
the allocation (28)". 
In terms of the FPI, the most commonly stated reason for preference over the 
TCP scheme was the ability to continue current behaviour, albeit at increased 
monetary costs. This was considered to provide an element of personal choice: 
"There's no limit on consumption so there're more options. I can still do the 
journeys I want and can afford to pay the extra. It's more fair then the trading 
scheme (33)" and "There's no element of compulsion and it'd work if nice cars 
with lower fuel consumption were available (52)". 
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The simplicity of the FPI and the revenue raising potential were also commonly 
stated reasons: 
"It provides immediate investment into public transport. The trading scheme's 
too complicated for the general public and people might think it's a waste of 
time and money if it's not understood (53)" and "Fuel price increases anyway 
but at this level it would make people think about their journeys and car use 
(40)" and "I think the public would see the permit scheme as a waste of money 
that could be spent on something else like the Supertram. The fuel price 
increase is a simple policy, there's no more bureaucracy involved than there is 
now and all the revenue could be spent on improving public transport (16)". 
7.5 Air transport 
In recognition of the importance of air transport in terms of carbon emissions 
(Bows and Anderson, 2007) (see chapter 1), respondents were asked whether 
they thought air transport should be included in the TCP scheme and FPI, and 
whether they would alter their current use of air transport if it was included. In 
relation to the TCP scheme, 83% of respondents stated that air transport 
should be included: 
"It'd make operators increase their fuel efficiency so it'd be more of an 
investment than a cost (13)" and "It should be included. Air transport is a 
major problem (28) ". 
A number of respondents did not think that air transport should be included in 
the TCP scheme: 
"International issues make the scheme too complicated (06)" and "I'm not sure 
about alternative fuels for aircraft, it's a long and slow process. I think 
including it would cause problems, air transport needs different solutions. It'd 
be unfair if I could only fly once a year (55). 
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In relation to the FPI, 77% stated that air transport should be included: 
"I think its more effective for air transport than road transport because it's less 
essential (45)" and "I think it should be included because air travel is more of a 
luxury that you can do without whereas car fuel is more essential. I wouldn't 
like it though but I'd just save up more money for my holiday (11)". 
A number of respondents felt that air transport should not be included in the 
FPI mainly because it was considered to be ineffective at reducing carbon 
emissions and/or unfair to increase air fares: 
"It wouldn't be effective, people would just get into more debt going on holiday 
(35)" and "The price increase would have to be much higher (44)" and "It'd 
have to be a landing fee instead because they'd just fill up aircraft with fuel in 
another country (16)" and "Holiday makers only use air about twice a year 
anyway so I don't think it'd be fair to include it (56)" and "It depends on the 
price increase. It might make holidays for the elite again (08)". 
Respondents were then asked if they would alter their use of air transport if it 
was to be included in the policies. The responses to this open question were 
categorised and are shown in table 7.7. 
Table 7.7 Response to the inclusion of air transport in the TCP scheme 
and FPI 
TCP scheme FPI 
Fly less often 19 21 
Have holidays in the UK 2 3 
No change 39 37 
Use alternative transport mode 33 
Think about journey length 51 
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In response to both policies, the majority of respondents would not change 
their use of air transport which can be largely explained by a number of 
respondents who either did not use air transport or were very infrequent users. 
However, in relation to the TCP scheme, several respondents recognised the 
possibility of using permits for air transport that they had saved from changing 
their use of land based transport: 
"I'd buy a clean fuel car so I could use my permits for flying (08)" and "I'd use 
my road transport permits that I'd saved by cycling (35)". 
For those that would change, the most commonly stated response was to 
reduce the number of flights taken. This was mainly in reference to leisure 
trips taken to other European countries over the weekend. A small number of 
respondents would consider having their annual holidays in the UK rather than 
flying to another country: 
"I think I'd have my holidays in this country and travel by train (45)" and "It'd 
definitely make me think about it more (16) ". 
The majority of respondents were unwilling to alter their main annual holiday: 
"Flights are too cheap and it'd be better for the environment if they were less 
available and more expensive but I wouldn't sacrifice my holiday every year 
(33)" and "I'd feel really reluctant, air travel is very personally important so 
I'm not keen on limiting my personal air travel. I'd feel imprisoned. We should 
just get clean fuel planes (48)". 
7.6 Increasing acceptability of the TCP scheme 
Following the acceptability ratings of the TCP scheme, respondents were given 
the opportunity to state whether they would alter any aspect of the policy. The 
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responses to this open question were categorised and are displayed in table 
7.8. 
Table 7.8 Making the TCP scheme more acceptable 
Issue 
Technological/design related 
Varied permit allocation 
Include permit banking 
Disallow sale of excess permits 
Permit price premium over set consumption 
Include all domestic energy 
Permit trade between individuals 
National emergency permit fund 
Reduce timescale of policy 
Not provide free allocation 
Supportive measures/incentives 
Reward for using PT 
Subsidies for clean fuel vehicles 
Subsidise provision of clean fuel and vehicles 
Extensive information provision 
Reward for not using full allocation 
Limit vehicle engine size to reduce consumption 
Reduce price of fuel 
Number of responses 
Cap on fuel price 
Other 
Would not implement TCP scheme IITTI 
18 
2 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
The most commonly stated amendment to the TCP scheme was to alter the 
permit allocation: 
"Public transport users get less. Car dependant people get more but only if it's 
used wisely (28)" and "I think the allowance should be linked to your job type, 
where you live, who you live with, and your income (45)" and "It should be a 
varied allocation on a needs basis looking at car dependency and children. 
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Adults get more than children but the child allocation would increase with age 
(29)" and "It's not fair to give everyone the same allocation (26)" and "You'd 
need exceptions for different groups with more for people with children. It'd 
get the parents on board. There'd be smaller allocations for pensioners 
because they don't need as much (25)" and "It should be means tested like the 
car parking permits at university. It'd be based on how long the car journey is 
by public transport and whether there're any children to drop off or collect 
(33)" and "The allocation should be based on vehicle type (03)" and "Means 
test the allocation so that people that don't use carbon wouldn't get an 
allowance and people with children get more (14)" and "Give more free 
permits at first then reduce the amount and make it a more harsh reduction 
after 10 years (48)". 
Whilst the equal per capita permit allocation was the most commonly stated 
reason for considering the TCP scheme fair (see chapter 6- table 6.8), there 
was clearly a wide variation in suggestions regarding the allocation of permits. 
Research conducted by the RSA (2006) found that the majority of respondents 
(46%) thought that people in 'special needs' groups, such as the elderly, 
should have the right to consume more energy rather than consumption being 
limited equally across society. It is highly possible that reaching a consensus 
agreement on one type of permit allocation would be unachievable - for 
example, the suggestion that pensioners require fewer permits could possibly 
be a contentious topic. Similarly, whether or not to give children allocations is 
likely to differ amongst people who themselves have children and those who do 
not. Therefore, types of permit allocation and preference could be an important 
area for future research. 
One respondent felt that the timescale should be reduced: 
"I'd reduce the timescale to see the benefits sooner and therefore make it 
more acceptable. People would like to see changes sooner (49)". 
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Several respondents felt that the TCP scheme should include all domestic 
energy: 
"People could use their permits for heating then if they used the bus (11) if. 
Inevitably there would be trade offs regarding permit use for different 
purposes (for example, using the car versus switching the central heating 
down), which could be an important area for future research particularly given 
the political interest regarding personal domestic tradable quotas in the UK 
(Roberts and Thumin, 2006). 
Following the open question, respondents were asked to re-rate their 
acceptability of the TCP scheme using the same 7 point bipolar scale as used 
previously (see section 7.1 and appendix 4), based on the assumption that 
their suggested changes were implemented. The results are shown in table 
7.9. 
Table 7.9 Acceptability ratings for the TCP scheme: pre and post 
amendment 
Personal 
Social 
Original 
1.14 (1.59) 
- 0.31 (1.45) 
Revised 
1.60 (1.52) 
- 0.28 (1.83) 
The revised personal ratings have improved slightly in comparison to the 
original ratings as displayed in table 7.1, with very little change in the social 
ratings. This suggests that the issues displayed in table 7.7 were largely what 
people thought could make the TCP scheme work better from a personal 
perspective rather than making it much more acceptable across society. 
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7.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
The majority of respondents rated both the TCP scheme and FPI as acceptable. 
In terms of the TCP scheme, the benefits received the necessity to reduce 
carbon emissions and fairness were the most important reasons for accepting 
the policy. In relation to the FPI, the main reasons given were the necessity of 
the scheme with respondents feeling that 'something needs to be done'. This 
was also found by Jones (2005) and Stradling et al (2001). For those rating 
the policies as unacceptable, complexity of the TCP scheme and unfairness 
were the most commonly stated reasons. For the FPI, costs and unfairness 
were the most commonly stated reasons. The Logit analysis further highlighted 
these results, where personal costs and benefits and fairness were the main 
predictors of acceptability of the TCP scheme and fairness was the main 
predictor of acceptability of the FPI. These outcomes are in common with other 
research findings (Jakobsson et al., 2000; Fujii et al., 2004; Eriksson et al., 
2006; Bonsall et al., 2007). 
The results collectively reveal fairness and benefits to be very important in 
terms of acceptability ratings. A key benefit of the TCP scheme is that fairness 
can be designed into the policy through the permit allocation and possibly 
placing limits on accounts to avoid stock piling and increasing permit prices 
unnecessarily. In addition, as recognised by many respondents, there is a limit 
on carbon availability regardless of willingness to pay. The FPI however is more 
problematic in terms of increasing fairness - there is no free allocation and no 
limit on consumption therefore willingness to pay is a more prominent issue in 
terms of inequities and distribution of impacts. It could be possible to 
redistribute revenue in order to reduce some of the inequities. This is possibly 
an important area for future research in terms of comparing the TCP scheme 
with a FPI that includes a set amount of revenue redistribution. Chapter 6 
revealed that the uneven impacts of the FPI across society was one of main 
reasons for rating the policy as unfair, thus the results could be very different 
if the FPI was made to be more fair, for example the acceptability of the FPI 
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could increase given that fairness was revealed as the most important 
predictor of acceptability. 
The majority of respondents considered the TCP scheme to be more acceptable 
than the FPI because it was considered more effective at achieving the carbon 
reduction targets. Hence, the results indicate that respondents were more 
willing to accept a policy with a greater level of certainty in terms of 
effectiveness. Increasing the effectiveness of the FPI implies further price 
increases which could subsequently require a large amount of revenue 
redistribution to even out inequities. In turn this could reduce acceptability 
levels given that monetary costs were the most commonly stated reason for 
rating the FPI as unacceptable. It therefore appears necessary to convince the 
public firstly that the fuel price increase is necessary and secondly that it would 
deliver substantial benefits. Recognisably, the TCP scheme has potential issues 
in terms of feasibility, complexity and financial costs, however such issues are 
arguably more resolvable than those related to the FPI. 
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Chapter 8 
Research conclusions, policy implications and future directions 
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This research set out to explore the feasibility of significantly reducing carbon 
emissions from personal land based transport through the use of a personal 
carbon trading scheme. This chapter lists the research objectives and details 
the crucial aspects of their achievement, followed by the key findings from 
each chapter. The policy implications of the findings are then discussed 
followed by suggested areas for future research. 
8.1 Research aims and objectives 
The policy design, ability to achieve the emissions targets and public response 
were identified as key research areas in terms of exploring the feasibility of 
significantly reducing carbon emissions from personal land based transport 
through the use of a personal carbon trading scheme. Hence, the research 
objectives were to: 
1. Fully design a working personal carbon trading scheme for land based 
transport including estimated financial costs. 
2. Explore behavioural response to a personal carbon trading scheme. 
3. Explore public attitudes to a personal carbon trading scheme. 
All of the research aims and objectives were satisfied. In order to satisfy the 
first objective, an extensive review of the literature regarding the design and 
workings of a TP scheme was undertaken. The literature review revealed a lack 
of detail in the policy outlines contained within the literature. Hence, in order 
to explore response to a TP scheme, it was imperative to fully design a working 
policy. This was a considerable element of the research. The UK governments 
aim to achieve a 60% reduction of carbon emissions by 2050 was adopted as 
the emissions target for the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme. A substantial part 
of the design involved setting out the pathway to achieving a 60% reduction. A 
linear approach was adopted where the same percentage reduction was 
applied each year. However, it could be possible to set lower reductions initially 
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and gradually increase as more options for reducing carbon consumption 
become available. This is possibly an area of debate in terms of which method 
is most appropriate as it could have strong implications on attaining the target. 
The permit allocation method is also a changeable aspect of the scheme as 
there are several options available. For the purpose of this research, an equal 
per capita permit allocation was selected in recognition of being the most 
equitable approach, as also identified by the literature review. 
From the literature review, fuel price increases were identified as having the 
potential to achieve the same emissions target as the TCP scheme. Hence, a 
fuel price increase (FPI) was also designed using the same emissions target as 
used for the TCP scheme. Conventional elasticities of fuel demand were used in 
order to derive fuel prices and subsequent carbon reductions. Including the FPI 
served to identify key differences between the policies in terms of behavioural 
response, attitudes and effectiveness in relation to how successful each policy 
was in delivering their respective carbon reduction targets. 
Bespoke software was used to record behavioural response. Given the need for 
interaction with respondents, face to face interviews with individuals were 
conducted to explore in detail key issues relating to behavioural response, 
impacts on lifestyle, costs and benefits, fairness, perceived effectiveness and 
acceptability. In order to obtain comparative responses, the same set of 
questions was asked in relation to each policy. The low carbon software was 
designed to include a separate screen for each policy. For both policies, current 
carbon consumption was shown on the screen. For the TCP scheme, the weekly 
free allocation of carbon permits was shown. The software served to explain 
the TCP scheme in terms of how it would work and to illustrate the free permit 
allocation in relation to current carbon consumption. Following the pre-pilot 
study, it was decided that estimated permit and fuel prices should be included 
in the low carbon software and displayed to respondents on-screen next to the 
corresponding carbon consumption. It was therefore necessary to fully 
estimate financial costs of the TCP scheme, which was designed to be fully 
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funded through permit revenue. Whilst this process was not originally 
perceived and hence did not have a time allocation, it was considered very 
important to provide respondents with an indication of monetary costs 
particularly as this could form the basis of response and subsequent impacts. A 
consequence of including estimated permit prices in the TCP scheme and 
refining the survey implementation was a smaller sample than planned - 
reducing from 90 interviews to 60. 
8.2 Key findings 
8.2.1 Design of the TCP scheme 
Currently, the TCP scheme developed in this research is the most detailed 
available in terms of estimated financial costs and revenue generation, 
estimated permit price, scheme implementation including technology used, the 
amount of carbon available each year (the annual carbon budget), quantifying 
the emissions target and relative annual percentage reductions in the carbon 
budget, and the amount of free carbon permits each person would receive in 
terms of, for example, carbon per week. Moreover, it is the first personal 
carbon trading scheme that has been designed in enough detail to allow a 
comprehensive measurement of public response. Designing the TCP scheme 
was a crucial part of the research and constitutes one of the main aspects of 
originality. 
8.2.2 Survey design and methodology 
The survey was the first to measure behavioural response to a personal carbon 
trading scheme and to interactively show respondents their free allocation of 
carbon permits in relation to their current consumption of carbon. In particular, 
it is the first piece of work to record comparative responses to a personal 
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carbon trading scheme and a fuel price increase, with both policies including 
estimated spending on fuel and permits. As a result of recording behavioural 
response through the low carbon software, this is the first study to indicate the 
impact of behavioural response in relation to the carbon reduction target for 
the TCP scheme. Hence, in terms of survey design and implementation, the 
use of the low carbon software to interactively illustrate travel data and 
resultant carbon emissions clearly demonstrates innovation and originality. 
The permit prices used in the low carbon software were fixed prices based on 
the revenue required from permit sales in order to fully fund the TCP scheme. 
The low carbon software did not provide an indication of permit availability or 
estimate permit prices sold on an open market. This could be an important 
area of development in terms of providing respondents with a more realistic 
idea of how the scheme could work on a day to day basis and hence making 
the responses more realistic. 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative data collected during the 
interviews provided a unique insight into public attitudes towards a personal 
carbon trading scheme which could provide a useful reference point for future 
research. In addition, the data provided a first set of comparative empirical 
findings, which undoubtedly contribute to what is emerging as a key political 
debate and topic of investigation in terms of taxing versus trading. 
For the main survey, 60 people were interviewed. The majority of respondents 
were earning above UK average incomes and consuming an above UK average 
amount of carbon for personal transport use. A measurement of environmental 
concern revealed that on average respondents were highly concerned for the 
environment. Hence, whilst the results are illuminating, the sample size and 
characteristics should be considered. In addition, it is recognised that the 
sample size could have constrained the potential of the quantitative modelling 
work conducted on fairness and acceptability. However, whilst the sample is 
not representative, a wide and varied range of responses were collected as 
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illustrated in the results chapters which are summarised in the following 
sections. 
8.2.3 Behavioural response 
The response to the TCP scheme resulted in an overachievement of the carbon 
reduction targets. Conversely, the response to the FPI resulted in a failure to 
achieve the carbon reduction target in any time period despite higher fuel 
prices relative to the TCP scheme. The FPI was closest to achieving its carbon 
reduction target in 2030 in response to a 61% price increase. 
In total, just over a third of the sample altered their behaviour. A large number 
of the respondents who did not make any changes were consuming within their 
free permit allocation and could thus continue current behaviour without any 
additional monetary costs in relation to the TCP scheme. A number of 
respondents believed that their current circumstances prevented a reduction in 
car use and were thus unwilling to change their behaviour and instead would 
rather pay the increased fuel price and buy additional permits despite the risk 
regarding availability. A correlation analysis revealed that for the FPI, 
behavioural response and carbon consumption were significantly and positively 
related. For the TCP scheme, income, level of impacts on lifestyle and carbon 
consumption were significantly and positively related to behavioural response. 
Further exploration revealed that, for the TCP scheme, the above average 
income earners achieved the greatest reduction in carbon consumption, 
whereas the average income earners achieved the greatest reduction in 
response to the FPI. 
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8.2.4 Impacts on lifestyle, costs and benefits, fairness and perceived 
effectiveness 
The perceived level of impacts on lifestyle were very similar for both policies 
despite a larger behavioural response in relation to the TCP scheme. Whilst the 
majority of respondents considered the impacts arising from the TCP scheme 
to be positive, conversely the majority of respondents considered the impacts 
arising from the FPI to be negative. This was largely due to the perceived 
response of others - it was believed that people would have to change in 
response to the TCP scheme and hence also be disadvantaged, whereas the 
FPI provided an option to continue current behaviour which was considered to 
be the most likely public response. Such perceptions largely underpinned the 
perceived level of costs and/or benefits received. For the TCP scheme, a larger 
number of respondents perceived benefits, such as reduced levels of air 
pollution and traffic congestion rather than costs, such as inconvenience and 
monetary penalties, whereas conversely a larger number of respondents 
perceived costs rather than benefits resulting from the FPI. 
Both policies were considered to be fair by the majority of respondents, 
however the TCP scheme received higher average ratings than the FPI, which 
was predicted in the research hypotheses. The equal per capita basis of the 
free permit allocation was the most commonly stated reason for rating the TCP 
scheme as fair. In relation to the FPI, the most commonly stated reasons were 
regarding the necessity of the policy in terms of climate change and the belief 
that fuel should be more expensive in recognition of the negative 
environmental impacts. The most commonly stated reasons for considering the 
TCP scheme to be unfair were the uneven distribution of impacts across society 
and potential illegal activities in terms of fraudulent permit markets. In relation 
to the FPI, the uneven distribution of impacts was by far the most commonly 
stated reason for rating the policy as unfair. 
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In recognition of the limit on carbon availability, the majority of respondents 
rated the TCP scheme to be highly effective at achieving the carbon reduction 
targets, thus providing multiple benefits and making avoidance behaviour 
largely improbable. In addition, a number of respondents felt that the policy 
could not be ignored and the purpose was made obvious through the limit on 
carbon availability and free permit allocation, which was thought to encourage 
further carbon reductions by increasing awareness of environmental issues. 
Conversely, the FPI was rated as much less effective by the majority of 
respondents, with the common belief that people would mostly absorb the 
increased costs and continue current behaviour. 
8.2.5 Acceptability 
The majority of respondents rated both policies as acceptable, more so for the 
TCP scheme. In addition, a much larger number of respondents considered the 
TCP scheme to be acceptable. However, both policies received higher than 
expected acceptability ratings which could be largely explained by the sample 
characteristics as other research has shown higher acceptance of transport 
pricing policies amongst highly educated respondents (Rienstra et a/., 1999). 
In terms of the TCP scheme, the perceived benefits, the necessity to reduce 
carbon emissions and fairness were the most important reasons for accepting 
the policy. In relation to the FPI, the necessity to reduce carbon emissions was 
the main reason given with respondents feeling that 'something needs to be 
done', which was also found in other surveys (Jones, 2005; Stradling et a/., 
2001). Within the research hypotheses, it was predicted that the TCP scheme 
would be accepted by the majority of respondents due to the feeling that 
'something needs to be done'. In addition, the perceived benefits and the 
feeling that fuel should be more expensive in order to more accurately reflect 
the associated environmental costs were amongst the most commonly stated 
reasons. For those rating the policies as unacceptable, complexity of the TCP 
231 
scheme and unfairness were the most commonly stated reasons. For the FPI, 
costs and unfairness were the most commonly stated reasons. An ordered 
Logit model further highlighted these results, where personal costs and 
benefits and fairness were the main predictors of acceptability of the TCP 
scheme and fairness was the main predictor of acceptability of the FPI. These 
outcomes are in common with other research findings (Jakobsson et al., 2000; 
Fujii et al., 2004; Eriksson et al., 2006; Bonsall et al., 2007) and are also 
logical in terms of issues discussed above in relation to the costs and benefits, 
fairness and perceived effectiveness. 
In terms of making the TCP scheme more acceptable, varying the permit 
allocation to reflect individuals' carbon needs was the most commonly stated 
response. The majority of suggestions were related to the design of the 
scheme, for example, regarding the trade of permits between individuals, 
permit banking, the use of a price premium and the inclusion of all domestic 
energy. 
The majority of the sample supported the inclusion of air transport for both 
policies, more so for the TCP scheme. Interestingly, the number of people 
supporting the inclusion of air transport in the TCP scheme was slightly higher 
than the number of people considering the inclusion of road transport in the 
TCP scheme as acceptable. The difference was even more apparent for the FPI. 
8.3 Policy implications 
There was a clear difference in attitudes towards the policies - respondents 
were much more positive about the TCP scheme than the FPI. In addition, the 
average ratings revealed the TCP scheme to be more favourable in every 
aspect. Hence, whilst fuel price increases and tradable permit schemes are 
very similar in theory, the public response revealed stark differences in terms 
of how the policies were perceived. The difference in attitudes appeared to be 
232 
largely a result of perceived effectiveness of the policies - many respondents 
were unconvinced that the FPI would deliver substantial benefits, with the 
belief that the majority of individuals would continue their current car use. In 
contrast, the TCP scheme was viewed as largely unavoidable and hence would 
deliver benefits. Thus, respondents would rather support a policy where the 
ability to achieve the carbon reductions was more certain. The difference in 
perceptions between the policies could have major impacts on response - it 
appeared that people were more willing to change their behaviour in response 
to the TCP scheme as they thought that other people would also be changing 
their behaviour given the limit on carbon availability. The TCP scheme 
therefore offered people a level of reassurance that their efforts to reduce 
carbon emissions would not be in vain. The FPI did not have this effect, with 
the majority of respondents feeling that the lack of a limit on availability could 
result in a much lower response. Hence, the perceived response of others 
appeared to be very important in influencing the decision to change behaviour 
and particularly whether attitudes towards the policy would be positive or 
negative. 
The limit on carbon availability and subsequent uncertainty were crucial in 
prompting the behavioural response to the TCP scheme. Hence, the TCP 
scheme would benefit from risk averse behaviour in that people try to avoid a 
situation where they are unable to obtain permits by reducing their 
consumption. The mechanism for stimulating behavioural change for the FPI is 
very different in that it relies solely on willingness to pay. Increasing the 
effectiveness of the FPI implies further price increases. However, this could 
reduce public acceptability in addition to inevitably raising issues regarding 
inequities and employing an appropriate revenue redistribution in terms of 
achieving a fair method without jeopardising the attainment of the carbon 
reduction targets but whilst also maintaining significant revenues to improve 
public transport. Whilst the TCP scheme would inherently cause inequities, the 
provision of a free permit allocation implies fewer inequities in comparison to 
the FPI and is therefore arguably less of an issue. Interestingly, several 
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respondents suggested that the FPI should be accompanied by tax cuts 
elsewhere, whereas this was not mentioned in relation to the TCP scheme. 
During the survey it was suggested that the TCP scheme could make people 
aware of their environmental impacts resulting from all aspects of their lifestyle 
and ways to reduce them, therefore further increasing policy effectiveness and 
subsidiary benefits through the uptake of environmentally astute behaviour 
(Starkey and Anderson, 2005). This impact was not suggested for the FPI, 
which could possibly be a result of negative preconceptions in regard to past 
uses of fuel taxation to raise revenue rather than to improve the environment. 
Hence it is possible that perceptions of the FPI could be changed by introducing 
it as a carbon tax, which would perhaps help to remind people of the policy 
aim and also stimulate environmentally astute behaviour. It should be noted 
that the difference in perceptions between the policies could result from 
familiarity in that the fuel tax concept is well known whereas the concept of 
the TCP scheme is relatively new and unknown. Hence, with increased 
familiarity it is possible that attitudes and response towards the TCP scheme 
would change and could become more similar to those relating to the FPI. 
However, the possibility of attitudes changing over time could be hinged to a 
greater extent on the ability of the TCP scheme to achieve its carbon reduction 
target given that effectiveness was identified as the basis for differing attitudes 
between the policies. Thus, regardless to familiarity with the concept, providing 
that the TCP scheme is effective, attitudes would not be expected to vary 
greatly over time. Hence, it is highly possible that attitudes relating to the TCP 
scheme are related more to the core design in terms of the limit on carbon 
availability rather than familiarity with the concept. 
It is possible that a full exploration of attitudes including Perceived Behavioural 
Control, personal norms and intentions would be very useful in addition to 
identifying actual barriers to change. Behaviours could then be targeted 
through both information campaigns and practical solutions. In addition, it 
could be possible to vary permit allocations to account for actual barriers to 
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change. Whilst the equal per capita allocation is perceived to be most equitable 
in the literature (Starkey and Anderson, 2005; Hillman and Fawcett, 2004; 
Fleming, 2007) and was the most commonly stated reason for considering the 
TCP scheme to be fair, a number of respondents suggested that the permit 
allocations should be varied to take account of varying demands, for example 
those with children. Whilst there is a danger that varying allocations could be 
viewed as unfair, it would be a similar principle to current allocations such as 
child benefit payments which could also be considered as inequitable to those 
individuals without children. However, there is very little public debate about 
this subject. 
It appears that a substantial amount of effort would be required in terms of 
providing options for people to enable behavioural change. For example, many 
respondents stated that they would work at home but were constrained by 
their employers. Hence, the issues raised suggest that supportive measures to 
enable such behaviours should be included with the introduction of the TCP 
scheme. Many respondents that did not change their behaviour considered 
public transport as an inadequate alternative to car, particularly for leisure 
trips. Whilst it would be imperative to improve services, it is unrealistic to 
expect a public transport service to offer the same level of speed, reliability 
and comfort as private transport. It is possible that attitudes and social norms 
regarding public transport could be influenced by information campaigns and 
would become much more positive as the scheme progressed. 
Recent work by the IPCC (2007) indicates that urgent action is required 
regarding climate change and urges political leaders to rapidly implement 
means of attaining significant carbon reductions. Whilst both policies were 
considered to be acceptable by the majority of respondents, in terms of the 
urgency of climate change it is arguably more important to select the policy 
which is most capable and certain of achieving significant carbon reductions. 
Hence, whilst important, acceptability should not be the focal point in terms of 
decision making and policy implementation. One of the key findings and 
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perhaps the most important policy implication is the differing ability to achieve 
the carbon reduction targets - the TCP scheme was 110% effective whilst the 
FPI was only 80% effective. However, it should be noted that the behavioural 
response was not measured past 2030. Whilst the results show that the FPI 
became more effective in the long term, in order to achieve the overall carbon 
reduction target by 2050 the FPI would need to substantially overachieve 
intermediate targets leading up to 2050 which is somewhat unrealistic. In 
terms of attaining legally binding carbon reduction targets, the results suggest 
that the TCP scheme would provide more certainty than the FPI. Moreover, the 
results raise questions regarding the suitability of the FPI as a sole measure to 
achieve significant and imperative carbon reductions. As noted by respondents, 
'something needs to be done', and it is highly possible that a TP scheme could 
play a crucial role. 
8.4 Recommendations for further research 
This research has highlighted several key areas for future research that would 
need to be addressed before the TCP scheme can be seriously considered as a 
climate change policy. 
This research suggested that permit revenue raised through selling 50% of the 
annual carbon budget could be used to fully fund the scheme, including the 
replacement of lost fuel tax revenue. The resultant permit prices were not 
excessive, as mentioned by a number of respondents. However, it is possible 
that the scheme would be less acceptable if initial (fixed) permit prices were 
higher than those estimated in the survey. Hence, it is imperative to improve 
the accuracy of the estimated costs by conducting a full cost-benefit analysis. 
In addition, an indication of the variation in permit price under open market 
conditions would be useful in making the survey more realistic and for 
measuring the impact on public response. 
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A number of respondents suggested that the TCP scheme would be more 
personally acceptable with the use of varied permit allocations rather than 
using an equal per capita approach. In addition, it could be possible to better 
manage the demand for carbon by varying permit allocations based on 
socioeconomic characteristics and/or actual barriers to change. In recognition 
that it would not be possible to please everyone, the allocation should perhaps 
reflect demand to an extent. Inevitably there are implications of giving 
different permit allocations in terms of efficiency (having unused permits in the 
system), behavioural response, social impacts and public acceptability. Hence, 
the method of permit allocation could be a key aspect of the TCP scheme and 
should therefore be fully investigated. This could possibly be achieved through 
a stated preference experiment where participants are presented with the 
relative attributes of each allocation and subsequently select which permit 
allocation they prefer, which could later be investigated in relation to their 
personal socioeconomic characteristics, carbon consumption and attitudes. This 
method could provide an indication of which type of permit allocation would be 
most preferred by which 'type' of person. This data could then be grossed up 
to a national level and subsequently form the basis of allocation. 
One of the potential problems identified in the SP experiment conducted as 
part of this research was the ability to include the free permit allocation as an 
independent variable in a way that respondents could fully understand. Hence 
it would be useful to identify a means of including the allocation in a form, for 
example in monetary value, carbon/litres of fuel equivalence, which can be 
easily understood by respondents to the level where it can be used in the 
decision regarding preference between different options. 
The sample size and characteristics must be considered when interpreting the 
research findings. Hence, one of the most crucial areas for further research 
would be to observe any key differences in response amongst a large and 
nationally representative sample. As a result of the free permit allocation, the 
response to the TCP scheme would be less dependant upon income then the 
2 J% 
FPI and hence would not be expected to differ significantly amongst a lower 
income sample. However, it is possible that the response would differ amongst 
a sample with lower levels of concern for the environment. If so, it could be 
possible to increase response by increasing awareness of environmental issues 
prior to policy implementation. In addition, it could be useful to categorise 
responses through attitudes and beliefs including perceived behavioural control 
in recognition that socioeconomic characteristics do not always fully explain 
and/or predict behaviour. Since the research began the concept of carbon 
trading and issues surrounding climate change have appeared in the media on 
several occasions, hence it should be recognised that attitudes and/or 
awareness of the topic could have altered for this reason. However, the 
increased familiarity of personal carbon trading amongst the public could aid 
future research in that it may be possible to conduct a largely quantitative 
style investigation amongst a larger sample within a similar timeframe. 
During the interviews several respondents mentioned the need to include all 
personal energy use within the TCP scheme. Chapter 2 reviewed suggestions 
for a national personal carbon trading scheme to include all personal energy 
use. It is inevitable that all domestic energy would require regulation in order 
to achieve a 60% carbon reduction by 2050. Hence, there are several 
interesting and necessary areas for investigation regarding the impacts (in 
terms of effectiveness), public attitudes (including acceptability), and response 
(including trade offs between different energy use), towards a TCP scheme if 
applied to all domestic energy consumption. 
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Appendix 1: TCP scheme - financial costs, carbon budget and permit 
allocation 
Carbon Free Free permit Lost 
fuel 
TCP Permit Permit 
Year Annual 
% budget carbon allocation kg tax financial price and 
reduction Kg m 
budget /person/ revenue costs £m ; 
E/kg fuel/kg 
kg m week £m carbon carbon £ 
2005 1.34 26165 11351 4.73 231 594 0.05 1.41 
2006 2.68 25809 11197 4.66 463 777 0.06 1.43 
2007 4.02 25454 11042 4.60 694 1,008 0.08 1.45 
2008 5.36 25099 10888 4.54 925 1,239 0.10 1.47 
2009 6.7 24743 10734 4.47 1,156 1,470 0.12 1.49 
2010 8.04 24388 10580 4.41 1,388 1,702 0.14 1.51 
2011 9.38 24032 10426 4.34 1,619 1,933 0.16 1.53 
2012 10.72 23677 10272 4.28 1,850 2,164 0.18 1.55 
2013 12.06 23322 10117 4.21 2,081 2,396 0.21 1.57 
2014 13.4 22966 9963 4.15 2,313 2,627 0.23 1.60 
2015 14.74 22611 9809 4.09 2,544 2,858 0.25 1.62 
2016 16.08 22256 9655 4.02 2,775 3,089 0.28 1.65 
2017 17.42 21900 9501 3.96 3,007 3,321 0.30 1.67 
2018 18.76 21545 9347 3.89 3,238 3,552 0.33 1.70 
2019 20.1 21189 9192 3.83 3,469 3,783 0.36 1.73 
2020 21.44 20834 9038 3.76 3,700 4,014 0.39 1.75 
2021 22.78 20479 8884 3.70 3,932 4,246 0.41 1.78 
2022 24.12 20123 8859 3.64 4,163 4,477 0.44 1.81 
2023 25.46 19768 8576 3.57 4,394 4,708 0.48 1.84 
2024 26.8 19413 8422 3.51 4,625 4,940 0.51 1.88 
2025 28.14 19057 8267 3.44 4,857 5,171 0.54 1.91 
2026 29.48 18702 8113 3.38 5,088 5,402 0.58 1.95 
2027 30.82 18347 7959 3.32 5,319 5,633 0.61 1.98 
2028 32.16 17991 7805 3.25 5,550 5,865 0.65 2.02 
2029 33.5 17636 7651 3.19 5,782 6,096 0.69 2.06 
2030 34.84 17280 7497 3.12 6,013 6,327 0.73 2.10 
2031 36.18 16925 7342 3.06 6,244 6,558 0.77 2.14 
2032 37.52 16570 7188 2.99 6,476 6,790 0.82 2.19 
2033 38.86 16214 7034 2.93 6,707 7,021 0.87 2.23 
2034 40.2 15859 6880 2.87 6,938 7,252 0.91 2.28 
2035 41.54 15504 6726 2.80 7,169 7,483 0.97 2.33 
2036 42.88 15148 6572 2.74 7,401 7,715 1.02 2.39 
2037 44.22 14793 6417 2.67 7,632 7,946 1.07 2.44 
2038 45.56 14437 6263 2.61 7,863 8,177 1.13 2.50 
2039 46.9 14082 6109 2.55 8,094 8,409 1.19 2.56 
2040 48.24 13727 5955 2.48 8,326 8,640 1.26 2.63 
2041 49.58 13371 5801 2.42 8,557 8,871 1.33 2.70 
2042 50.92 13016 5647 2.35 8,788 9,102 1.40 2.77 
2043 52.26 12661 5492 2.29 9,020 9,334 1.47 2.84 
254 
2044 53.6 12305 5338 2.22 9,251 9,565 1.55 2.92 
2045 54.94 11950 5184 2.16 9,482 9,796 1.64 3.01 
2046 56.28 11595 5030 2.10 9,713 10,027 1.73 3.10 
2047 57.62 11239 4876 2.03 9,945 10,259 1.83 3.19 
2048 58.96 10884 4722 1.97 10,176 10,490 1.93 3.30 
2049 60.3 10528 4567 1.90 10,407 10,721 2.04 3.41 
2050 61.64 10173 4413 1.84 10,638 10,953 2.15 3.52 
0 
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Appendix 2: FPI - elasticities, demand reductions and fuel prices. 
Year Elasticity 
% price % reduction in Fuel price Price increase 
Price 
pence/ kg 
applied increase fuel demand pence/litre pence/litre carbon 
2005 -0.25 1 0.25 86 1 136 
2006 -0.25 1 0.25 87 2 137 
2007 -0.25 1 0.25 88 3 138 
2008 -0.25 1 0.25 88 3 140 
2009 -0.25 1 0.25 89 4 141 
2010 -0.3 1.5 0.45 91 6 143 
2011 -0.35 1.5 0.525 92 7 145 
2012 -0.4 1.5 0.6 93 8 148 
2013 -0.45 1.5 0.675 95 10 150 
2014 -0.5 1.5 0.75 96 11 152 
2015 -0.55 1.5 0.825 98 13 154 
2016 -0.6 1.5 0.9 99 14 157 
2017 -0.65 1.5 0.975 101 16 159 
2018 -0.7 2 1.4 103 18 162 
2019 -0.7 2 1.4 105 20 165 
2020 -0.7 2 1.4 107 22 169 
2021 -0.7 2 1.4 109 24 172 
2022 -0.7 2 1.4 111 26 176 
2023 -0.7 2.5 1.75 114 29 
180 
2024 -0.7 2.5 1.75 117 32 
184 
2025 -0.7 2.5 1.75 120 35 189 
2026 -0.7 2.5 1.75 123 38 
194 
2027 -0.7 2.5 1.75 126 41 
199 
2028 -0.7 3 2.1 129 44 
205 
2029 -0.7 3 2.1 133 48 
211 
2030 -0.7 3 2.1 137 52 
217 
2031 -0.7 3 2.1 
141 56 224 
2032 -0.7 3 2.1 146 
61 230 
2033 -0.7 4 2.8 152 
67 239 
2034 -0.7 4 2.8 158 
73 249 
2035 -0.7 4 2.8 164 
79 259 
2036 -0.7 4 2.8 170 
85 269 
2037 -0.7 4 2.8 177 
92 280 
2038 -0.7 4.5 3.15 
185 100 293 
2039 -0.7 4.5 3.15 
194 109 306 
2040 -0.7 4.5 3.15 
202 117 320 
2041 -0.7 4.5 3.15 
211 126 334 
2042 -0.7 4.5 3.15 
221 136 349 
2043 -0.7 5 3.5 
232 147 367 
2044 -0.7 5 3.5 
244 159 385 
2045 -0.7 5 3.5 
256 171 404 
256 
m 
2046 -0.7 5 3.5 269 184 424 
2047 -0.7 5 3.5 282 197 446 
2048 -0.7 5.5 3.85 298 213 470 
2049 -0.7 5.5 3.85 314 229 505 
2050 -0.7 5.5 3.85 331 246 522 
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Appendix 3: Example of 7-day travel dairy 
Monday 
Vehicle 1 make and model: Fuel type Age year 
Journey l Journey 4 
Journey 2 Journey 3 
Mode used  
Car Mode used  Mode used  Mode used  
Bus Car Car Car 
Train Bus Bus Bus 
Cycle Train Train Train 
Walk Cycle Cycle Cycle 
Motorcycle Walk Walk Walk 
Other: Motorcycle Motorcycle Motorcycle 
Other: Other: Other: 
Origin Origin Origin Origin 
Destination Destination Destination Destination 
Journey time Journey time Journey time Journey time 
Depart: Depart: Depart: Depart: 
am/pm am/pm am/pm am/pm 
Arrive: Arrive: Arrive: Arrive: 
am/pm 
am/pm am/pm am/pm 
Distance: Miles/Km Distance: Miles/Km Distance: Miles/Km Distance: Miles/Km 
(odometer reading if (odometer reading if (odometer reading if (odometer reading if 
possible) possible) possible) possible) 
Travelling with: Travelling with: Travelling with: Travelling with: 
I other person 1 other person I other person 1 other person 
people people people people 
Alone Alone Alone Alone 
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Appendix 4: main survey interview questionnaire 
Interview Questionnaire 
Section 1: Quality of life 
1.1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Very Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Very 
strongly disagree agree strongly 
disagree agree 
The impacts of global 
warming worry me 
Everyone should try to 
be more energy efficient 
I never think about the 
effects of local air 
pollution 
The destruction of 
tropical rainforests 
worries me 
More alternative energy 
(wind, solar, hydro) 
should be used 
The use of artificial 
fertilizers and pesticides 
does not worry me 
Recycling is a waste of 
time 
I'm not worried about 
sea levels rising 
I'm concerned about the 
loss of plant and animal 
259 
species in the UK 
Pollution of the 
waterways does not 
effect me 
1.2 Are there any specific problems that you would associate with current 
levels of road traffic? 
1.3 Are the following statements true or false? (Flash cards) 
True Not sure False 
The majority of local air pollution results from road 
transport 
Exposure to air pollution is the cause of 24,000 
premature deaths each year in the UK 
Exhaust emissions from road transport are the main 
source of lead emissions in the UK 
Emissions from road transport account for 48% of 
total UK Carbon Dioxide emissions. 
Emissions from road transport contain high levels of 
known carcinogens 
Emissions from road transport account for 22% of 
total UK Carbon Monoxide emissions. 
Road transport is the biggest source of UK Nitrogen 
Oxides emissions 
Pollution levels inside vehicles can be up to 18 times 
higher than those outside 
Road traffic accidents are the main cause of 
premature death in the UK 
Emissions from road transport are strongly linked 
with allergies 
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1.4 Do you think global warming is a serious threat? 
Section 2: The Tradable Carbon Permit system 
(Interviewees are informed of TCP system and shown the software) 
2.1 If the Tradable Carbon Permit system were introduced next month, would 
you try to consume within your free permit allocation where availability is 
certain or consume above the free allocation where availability is uncertain? 
2.2 In the long-term, what is the likelihood that you will do any of the 
following: 
Car share at least once each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Move house to live closer to work 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Change job to work closer to home 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Telecommute at least one day each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Have shopping delivered/order online 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Buy an alternatively fuelled vehicle 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Very likely 
Very likely 
Very likely 
Very likely 
Very likely 
Very likely 
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Buy a more fuel efficient vehicle than current 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Use public transport to work at least once a week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Cycle to work at least once each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Walk to work at least once each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
2.2a) Are there any other changes, not mentioned above, that you are likely to 
make to your travel behaviour in the long-term? 
2.3 Do you foresee any impacts upon your lifestyle resulting from the changes 
discussed? 
None at all 0123456 Very many 
2.4 How do you view these changes overall? 
Very negative -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very positive 
2.5 Would anything make it difficult for you to adapt to the Tradable Carbon 
Permit system? 
2.6 Are there any measures that would help you to adapt to the Tradable 
Carbon Permit system? 
2.7 Do you think there would be any personal and/or societal benefits or costs 
arising from the implementation of a Tradable Carbon Permit system? 
Personal 
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Very many costs -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very many benefits 
Societal 
Very many costs -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very many benefits 
2.8 Do you think the Tradable Carbon Permit system would be: 
To yourself 
Very unfair -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very fair 
To society 
Very unfair -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very fair 
Why? 
2.9 How effective do you think the Tradable Carbon Permit system could be in 
achieving a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions from personal transport by 2050? 
Not at all effective 0123456 Very effective 
Why? 
2.10 Do you expect the Tradable Carbon Permit system to have an impact 
upon the following? 
Very Much Worse No Improved Much Very 
much worse change improved much 
worse improved 
Greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Local air 
pollution 
Local noise 
pollution 
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Provision of 
local 
amenities 
e. g., shops 
Public health 
Traffic 
congestion 
Public 
transport 
services 
Access to 
amenities 
Cost of 
transport 
Social 
exclusion 
Frequency of 
road 
accidents 
2.11 Do you personally consider the Tradable Carbon Permit system to be: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Why? 
2.12 What was the most important factor when rating your acceptability of the 
Tradable Carbon Permit system? 
2.13 How do you think society as a whole would consider the Tradable Carbon 
Permit system? 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
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2.14 Would you alter any aspect of the system in order to make it more 
acceptable to yourself/society? 
2.15 If these changes were made, how would you then consider the system? 
Personally: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0+1 +2 +3 
To society: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
2.16 How would you feel about the inclusion of air transport in the Tradable 
Carbon Permit scheme? 
2.17 If air transport were included in the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme, 
would this affect your use of air transport, considering that air travel requires 
approximately 4.5 times more Carbon per passenger kilometre than car travel? 
How? 
Section 3: Fuel price 
(Respondents are given information about the fuel price increases). 
3.1 If the fuel price increases were introduced next month, would you try to 
maintain current weekly spending on fuel? 
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3.2 In the long-term, what is the likelihood that you will do any of the 
following: 
Car share at least twice each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Move house to live closer to work 
Very unlikely -3 - 2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Change job to work closer to home 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Telecommute at least one day each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Having shopping delivered/shop online 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Buy an alternatively fuelled vehicle 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Buy a more fuel efficient vehicle than current 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Use public transport to work at least twice a week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Cycle to work at least twice each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Walk to work at least twice each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
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3.2a) Are there any other changes, not mentioned above, that you are likely to 
make to your travel behaviour in the long-term? 
3.3 Do you foresee any impacts upon your lifestyle resulting from the changes 
discussed? 
None at all 0123456 Very many 
3.4 How do you view these changes overall? 
Very negative -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very positive 
3.5 Would anything make it difficult for you to adapt to the fuel price 
increases? 
3.6 Are there any measures that would help you to adapt to the fuel price 
increases? 
3.7 Do you think there would be any personal and/or societal benefits or costs 
arising from the fuel price increases? 
Personal 
Very many costs -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very many benefits 
Societal 
Very many costs -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very many benefits 
3.8 Do you think the increases in fuel price would be: 
To yourself 
Very unfair 
To society 
Very unfair 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Very fair 
Very fair 
267 
Why? 
3.9 How effective do you think increasing the price of fuel could be in achieving 
a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions from personal transport by 2050? 
Not at all effective 
Why? 
0123456 Very effective 
3.10 Do you expect an increase in fuel price to have an impact upon the 
following? 
Very Much Worse No Improved Much Very 
much worse change improved much 
worse improved 
Greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Local air 
pollution 
Local noise 
pollution 
Provision of 
local 
amenities 
e. g., shops 
Public health 
Traffic 
congestion 
Public 
transport 
services 
Access to 
amenities 
Cost of 
transport 
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Social 
exclusion 
Frequency of 
road 
accidents 
3.11 Do you personally consider the increase in fuel price to be: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Why? 
3.12 What was the most important factor when rating your acceptability of the 
fuel price increases? 
3.13 How do you think society as a whole would consider the increase in fuel 
price? 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
3.14 How do you feel about fuel price increases being applied to air transport? 
3.15 If fuel price increases were applied to air transport, would this affect your 
use of air transport, considering that air travel requires approximately 4.5 
times more carbon per passenger kilometre than car travel? How? 
3.16 Which measure do you consider most effective at achieving a 60% 
reduction of CO2 emissions from personal transport by 2050, the Tradable 
Carbon Permit scheme or the fuel price increases? 
Why? 
3.17 Which measure do you consider most acceptable, the Tradable Carbon 
Permit scheme or the fuel price increases? 
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Why? 
3.18 Is there any measure that you feel would be more effective than 
increasing the price of fuel or a Tradable Carbon Permit scheme at reducing 
CO2 from the transport sector? Why? 
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Appendix 5: Description of the TCP scheme used during the interviews 
The Tradable Carbon Permit system 
Purpose/aim? 
The purpose of the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme is to reduce C02 
emissions from personal road transport by 60% by 2050. This target is in line 
with the governments aim to reduce total UK C02 by 60% by 2050. 
How will this target be achieved? 
C02 emissions will be reduced by gradually reducing the amount of Carbon 
available for road transport each year. There is an absolute limit on the 
amount of Carbon that can be consumed each year. 
This is how the scheme works: 
Everyone aged 18 and over will receive a carbon card. This electronic swipe 
card will hold your Carbon account and will work in a similar way to bank 
accounts. Each person will receive a free allocation of Carbon permits each 
year and these will be added to your Carbon account. To give you an idea of 
the amount, in the first year you'll receive around 250 kilograms of Carbon. 
This will gradually be reduced each year in line with the Carbon budget, which 
is simply the total amount of Carbon available in any one year. The remainder 
of the permits will be released for sale. 
Each time you purchase fuel your card will be swiped and the corresponding 
amount of Carbon permits will be removed from your account. For example, if 
you buy fuel containing one kilogram of carbon, you hand over carbon permits 
worth one kilogram of carbon. To give you an idea, a litre of fuel contains 
around 600 grams of Carbon. If you don't have enough permits in your 
account, you can buy them at the fuel station. If you didn't use your free 
permit allocation, you could sell it through a central market using the internet, 
at the fuel station or the post office. 
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Public transport? 
You won't need any Carbon permits to use public transport. There will be a 
separate Carbon Permit Trading scheme set up between the public transport 
operators. 
Use of permit revenue? 
The revenue will be used to pay for the set up and running costs of the TCP 
scheme. A proportion will be invested into public transport to be used for 
service improvements. Any net revenue will be invested into a range of 
measures that reduce the need to travel, such as local shops. 
Any questions? 
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Appendix 6: Description of the FPI used during the interviews 
The fuel price scheme 
Purpose/aim? 
The purpose of the fuel price scheme is to reduce C02 emissions from 
personal road transport by 60% by 2050. This target is in line with the 
governments aim to reduce total UK C02 by 60% by 2050. 
How will this target be achieved? 
C02 emissions will be reduced by gradually increasing the price of fuel based 
on evidence of how people respond to fuel price increases. 
What does this mean for the individual? 
The price of fuel will increase each year. 
Use of revenue? 
The revenue will be used to pay for the set up and running costs of the fuel 
price scheme. A proportion will be invested into public transport to be used for 
service improvements. Any net revenue will be invested into a range of 
measures that reduce the need to travel, such as local shops. 
Any questions? 
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Appendix 7: Pre-pilot interview questionnaire 
Section 1: Quality of life 
1. Please rank the importance of each of the following issues, where 1 is 
very unimportant and 7 is very important (flash cards): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Immigration 
Terrorism 
European constitution 
National unemployment figures 
Quality of health care provision 
Standard of education provision 
War 
Crime/vandalism 
England not winning the 
European football championship 
Environmental pollution 
Transport 
2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Very Strongly Disagree Not Agree Strongly Very 
strongly disagree sure agree strongly 
disagree agree 
The impacts of 
global warming 
worry me 
Everyone should 
try to be more 
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. 
energy efficient 
I never think 
about the effects 
of local air 
pollution 
I am concerned 
about 
environmental 
pollution 
More alternative 
energy (wind, 
solar, hydro) 
should be used 
Air pollution does 
not effect me 
Recycling waste 
is a great idea 
Environmental 
problems cannot 
be ignored 
My personal 
contribution to 
environmental 
pollution is not 
great enough to 
warrant a 
reduction 
Global warming 
is a serious 
problem 
3. Are there any specific problems that you would associate with current levels 
of road traffic? 
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6L 
4. Does road transport contribute to the following? (flash cards) 
Global warming 
No contribution 1234567 Very significant contribution 
Local air pollution 
No contribution 1234567 Very significant contribution 
Local noise pollution 
No contribution 1234567 Very significant contribution 
Depletion of natural resources 
No contribution 1234567 Very significant contribution 
Destruction of wildlife habitats 
No contribution 1234567 Very significant contribution 
Water pollution 
No contribution 1234567 Very significant contribution 
5. Would you associate any particular pollutants with road transport and/or 
transport emissions? 
6. Would you associate any particular illnesses/health effects with road 
transport and/or transport emissions? 
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Section 2: The Tradable Carbon Permit scheme 
(Interviewees are informed of TCP scheme) 
1. If the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme were introduced next month, would 
you change the way you travel? 
(Software employed at this stage to record any changes to travel behaviour 
and to assess the impact of the stated changes upon carbon consumption). 
2. How would your response differ as the system progresses? i. e. how would 
you adapt to annual reductions of fuel availability in the long-term (use 
prompts if necessary)? 
o Working from home a feasible option? 
o Use of clean modes for some trips, e. g. cycle to work? 
o Investment in clean fuel technology? 
o Online shopping? 
o Reduction of leisure journeys/use of alternative mode? 
o Change occupation/job transfer to nearer location? 
0 Move house? 
3. Do you foresee any impacts upon your lifestyle resulting from the changes 
discussed? 
4. How do you view these changes (e. g., positive, negative)? 
5. Are there any measures that would help you to adapt to the system? 
6. Would anything make it difficult for you to adapt to the system? 
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7. How could the following organisations support your adaptation to the 
Tradable Carbon Permit scheme? 
o Government 
o Public transport operators 
o Vehicle manufacturers 
o Fuel producers 
8. How effective do you think the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme could be in 
achieving a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions from personal transport? 
Not at all effective 1 2 34 5 67 Very effective 
9. Do you think there would be any personal and/or societal benefits arising 
from the implementation of a Tradable Carbon Permit scheme? 
10. Do you think there would be any personal and/or societal costs arising 
from the implementation of a Tradable Carbon Permit scheme? 
11. Do you expect the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme to have an impact upon 
the following? 
Very 
much 
worse 
Much 
worse 
Worse No 
change 
Improved Much 
improved 
Very 
much 
improved 
Greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Local air pollution 
Local noise pollution 
Provision of local 
amenities 
Public health 
Traffic congestion 
Public transport 
services 
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Access to amenities 
Cost of transport 
Social exclusion 
Frequency of road 
accidents 
12. Overall, do you think the scheme would be: 
To yourself 
Very negative 
To society 
Very negative 
-3 -2 -1 012 
-3 -2 -1 012 
13. Do you personally consider the scheme to be: 
Completely unacceptable 
12345 
Why? 
3 Very positive 
3 Very positive 
Completely acceptable 
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14. How do you think society as a whole would consider the system? 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
1234567 
15. How do you think the permits should be allocated? 
16. How should any net revenue be used? 
17. Would you alter any aspect of the scheme in order to make it more 
acceptable to yourself/society? 
Section 3: Fuel price 
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As an alternative measure to the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme, fuel prices 
could be increased to achieve a 60% reduction of CO2 from personal transport 
between 2005 and 2050. 
1. If the increase in fuel prices were introduced next month, how would 
you respond? 
2. How effective do you think increasing the price of fuel could be in achieving 
a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions from personal transport? 
Not at all effective 1234567 Very effective 
3. Do you think there would be any personal and/or societal benefits arising 
from increasing the price of fuel? 
4. Do you think there would be any personal and/or societal costs arising from 
increasing the price of fuel? 
5. Do you expect an increase in fuel price to have an impact upon the 
following? 
Very 
much 
worse 
Much 
worse 
Worse No 
change 
Improved Much 
improved 
Very 
much 
improved 
Greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Local air pollution 
Local noise pollution 
Provision of local 
amenities 
Public health 
Traffic congestion 
Public transport 
services 
Access to amenities 
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Cost of transport 
Social exclusion 
Frequency of road 
accidents 
6. Do you think the system would be: 
To yourself 
Very negative -3 -2 -1 0123 Very positive 
To society 
Very negative -3 -2 -1 0123 Very positive 
7. Do you personally consider the increase in fuel price to be: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
1234567 
Why? 
8. How do you think society as a whole would consider the increase in fuel 
price? 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
1234567 
10. Is there any measure that you feel would be more effective than 
increasing the price of fuel or a Tradable Carbon Permit scheme at reducing 
CO2 from the transport sector? Why? 
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Appendix 7: Pilot interview questionnaire 
Section 1: Quality of life 
1.1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Very Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Very 
strongly disagree agree strongly 
disagree agree 
The impacts of global 
warming worry me 
Everyone should try to 
be more energy efficient 
I never think about the 
effects of local air 
pollution 
The destruction of 
tropical rainforests 
worries me 
More alternative energy 
(wind, solar, hydro) 
should be used 
The use of artificial 
fertilizers and pesticides 
does not worry me 
Recycling is a waste of 
time 
I'm not worried about 
sea levels rising 
I'm concerned about the 
loss of plant and animal 
species in the UK 
Pollution of the 
waterways does not 
effect me 
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1.2 Are there any specific problems that you would associate with current 
levels of road traffic? 
1.3 How much does road transport contribute to the following? (Flash cards) 
The contribution of road transport to UK Carbon Dioxide emissions is: 
0- 20% 21 - 40% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% 81 - 100% Not sure 
The contribution of road transport to UK Particulate Matter emissions is: 
0- 20% 21 - 40% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% 81 - 100% Not sure 
The contribution of road transport to UK Carbon Monoxide emissions is: 
0- 20% 21 - 40% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% 81 - 100% Not sure 
The contribution of road transport to UK Nitrogen Oxide emissions is: 
0- 20% 21 - 40% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% 81 - 100% Not sure 
The contribution of road transport to UK Lead emissions is: 
0- 20% 21 - 40% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% 81 - 100% 
1.4 Do you think global warming is a serious threat? 
Section 2: The Tradable Carbon Permit scheme 
(Interviewees are informed of TCP scheme and shown the software) 
Not sure 
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2.1 If the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme were introduced next month, would 
you try to consume within your free permit allocation where availability is 
certain or consume above the free allocation where availability is uncertain? 
2.2 How would your response differ as the system progresses? i. e. are there 
any other things you might do in the long-term? 
a) 
in the long-term, what is the likelihood that you will do any of the following: 
Car share at least twice each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Move house to live closer to work 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Change job to work closer to home 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Telecommute at least one day each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Have shopping delivered/order online 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Buy an alternatively fuelled vehicle 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Buy a more fuel efficient vehicle than current 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very 
likely 
Use public transport to work at least once a week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
I 
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Cycle to work at least once each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 
Walk to work at least once each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 
+2 +3 
+2 +3 
Very likely 
Very likely 
2.3 Do you foresee any impacts upon your lifestyle resulting from the changes 
discussed? 
None 0123456 Very many 
2.4 How do you view these changes overall? 
Very negative -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very positive 
2.5 Would anything make it difficult for you to adapt to the Tradable Carbon 
Permit scheme? 
2.5 Are there any measures that would help you to adapt to the Tradable 
Carbon Permit scheme? 
2.7 Do you think there would be any personal and/or societal benefits or costs 
arising from the implementation of a Tradable Carbon Permit scheme? 
Personal 
Very many costs -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very many benefits 
Societal 
Very many costs -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very many benefits 
2.8 Do you think the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme would be: 
To yourself 
Very unfair -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very fair 
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To society 
Very unfair 
Why? 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very fair 
2.9 How effective do you think the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme could be in 
achieving a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions from personal transport by 2050? 
Not at all effective 0123456 Very effective 
Why? 
2.10 Do you expect the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme to have an impact 
upon the following? 
Very Much Worse No Improved Much Very 
much worse change improved much 
worse improved 
Greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Local air 
pollution 
Local noise 
pollution 
Provision of 
local 
amenities 
e. g., shops 
Public health 
Traffic 
congestion 
Public 
transport 
services 
Access to 
amenities 
Cost of 
transport 
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2.11 Do you personally consider the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme to be: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Why? 
2.12 What was the most important factor when rating your acceptability of the 
Tradable Carbon Permit scheme? 
2.13 How do you think society as a whole would consider the Tradable Carbon 
Permit scheme? 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
2.14 Would you alter any aspect of the scheme in order to make it more 
acceptable to yourself/society? 
2.15 If these changes were made, how would you then consider the system? 
Personally: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
To society: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
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2.16 How would you feel about the inclusion of air transport in the Tradable 
Carbon Permit scheme? 
2.17 If air transport were included in the Tradable Carbon Permit scheme, 
would this affect your use of air transport, considering that air travel requires 
approximately 4.5 times more Carbon per passenger kilometre than car travel? 
How? 
Section 3: Fuel price 
(Respondents are given information about the fuel price increases). 
3.1 If the fuel price increases were introduced next month, would you try to 
maintain current weekly spending on fuel? 
(Software used to record and display any changes made to travel behaviour). 
3.2 How would your response differ as the system progresses? i. e. are there 
any other things you might do in the long-term? 
a) in the long-term, what is the likelihood that you will do any of the 
following: 
Car share at least twice each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Move house to live closer to work 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Change job to work closer to home 
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Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Telecommute at least one day each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Having shopping delivered/shop online 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Buy an alternatively fuelled vehicle 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Buy a more fuel efficient vehicle than current 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Use public transport to work at least twice a week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Cycle to work at least twice each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
Walk to work at least twice each week 
Very unlikely -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very likely 
3.3 Do you foresee any impacts upon your lifestyle resulting from the changes 
discussed? 
None 0123456 Very many 
3.4 How do you view these changes overall? 
Very negative -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very positive 
3.5 Would anything make it difficult for you to adapt to the fuel price 
increases? 
289 
3.6 Are there any measures that would help you to adapt to the fuel price 
increases? 
3.7 Do you think there would be any personal and/or societal benefits or costs 
arising from the fuel price increases? 
Personal 
Very many costs -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very many benefits 
Societal 
Very many costs -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very many benefits 
3.8 Do you think the increases in fuel price would be: 
To yourself 
Very unfair -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very fair 
To society 
Very unfair -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Very fair 
Why? 
3.9 How effective do you think increasing the price of fuel could be in achieving 
a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions from personal transport by 2050? 
Not at all effective 
Why? 
0123456 Very effective 
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3.10 Do you expect an increase in fuel price to have an impact upon the 
following? 
Very Much Worse No Improved Much Very 
much worse change improved much 
worse improved 
Greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Local air 
pollution 
Local noise 
pollution 
Provision of 
local 
amenities 
e. g., shops 
Public health 
Traffic 
congestion 
Public 
transport 
services 
Access to 
amenities 
Cost of 
transport 
Social 
exclusion 
Frequency of 
road 
accidents 
3.11 Do you personally consider the increase in fuel price to be: 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
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Why? 
3.12 What was the most important factor when rating your acceptability of the 
fuel price increases? 
3.13 How do you think society as a whole would consider the increase in fuel 
price? 
Completely unacceptable Completely acceptable 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
3.14 How do you feel about fuel price increases being applied to air transport? 
3.15 If fuel price increases were applied to air transport, would this affect your 
use of air transport, considering that air travel requires approximately 4.5 
times more Carbon per passenger kilometre than car travel? How? 
3.16 Which measure do you consider most effective at achieving a 60% 
reduction of CO2 emissions from personal transport by 2050, the Tradable 
Carbon Permit scheme or the fuel price increases? 
Why? 
3.17 Which measure do you consider most acceptable, the Tradable Carbon 
Permit scheme or the fuel price increases? 
Why? 
3.18 is there any measure that you feel would be more effective than 
increasing the price of fuel or a Tradable Carbon Permit scheme at reducing 
CO2 from the transport sector? 
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Appendix 9: Screening questionnaire 
Pre-interview questionnaire 
Availability of car (please delete as appropriate): 
0 cars 1 car 2+ cars 
Estimated annual distance travelled by car (please state Miles or 
Kilometres): 
Main mode used for all journeys (please delete as appropriate): 
Car Bus Train Bike Walk 
Other (please state): 
Postcode: 
Male/female: 
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Appendix 10: Respondent information 
ID Behavioural Annual 
cha nge Car car 
Main 
Gender Post Carbon 
number TCP FPI 
availability 
mileage mode code 
kg/week 
1 YES YES 1 9,000 Car F LS 18 8.9 
2 YES YES 1 9,000 Car F LS29 16.9 
3 NO NO 2+ 5,000 Car F LS17 22.9 
4 NO NO 0 1,500 Walk M LS2 0.6 
5 NO NO 1 11,000 Bus M YO30 2.7 
6 NO NO 1 5,000 mope F LS25 5.7 
7 NO NO 2+ 20,000 Car M YO24 16.8 
8 YES NO 1 9,000 Car F LS10 6.2 
9 NO NO 0 0 Bus F LS11 1.3 
10 YES NO 2+ 17,000 Car M S36 22.1 
11 NO NO 1 7,000 Car F LS17 9.1 
12 YES NO 2+ 36,000 Car M DN21 57.9 
13 NO NO 0 0 Bus F LS12 0.2 
14 YES NO 1 8,500 Car F LS21 9.6 
15 NO NO 1 Car F 7.4 
16 NO NO 2+ 8,500 Car M LS15 9.4 
17 NO YES 1 7,000 Car M LS11 4.3 
18 NO NO 1 2,600 Train F BD16 2.2 
19 YES YES 2 6000 Car F LS6 4.3 
20 YES YES 0 2,000 Cycle M LS13 25.8 
21 NO YES 1 780 Car F LS9 2.8 
22 NO NO 2+ 16,000 Car M LS12 17.4 
23 NO NO 1 7,000 Car F LS16 6.6 
24 NO NO 0 0 Bus F LS13 0.7 
25 NO NO 1 9,000 Car F BD11 5.1 
26 NO NO 0 300 Cycle F LS7 1.5 
27 YES NO 1 12,000 Car F LS21 16.7 
28 NO NO 0 0 Train F DN1 0.0 
29 YES YES 1 20,000 Car F 23.9 
30 NO NO 0 500 Walk F LS2 0.1 
31 NO NO 1 3,000 Car F LS6 0.2 
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32 YES NO 1 11,000 Car F LS25 7.2 
33 NO NO 2 8,000 Car F LS18 6.2 
34 NO NO 1 5,000 Car M BD10 2.8 
35 YES NO 2 13,000 Car M HD7 6.6 
36 NO NO 0 500 Train M HD1 0.4 
37 NO NO 1 2,500 Car F LS16 1.9 
38 NO NO 2 7,600 Car F LS21 0.5 
39 YES YES 1 10,000 Car M BD17 15.6 
40 YES NO 1 15,600 Car F WF9 10.9 
41 NO NO 1 3,000 Bus M LS18 2.7 
42 NO NO 1 6,000 Car F LS26 10.5 
43 NO NO 1 400 Bus M LS27 0.6 
44 NO NO 2 4,000 Car M LS25 6.7 
45 NO NO 1 1,800 Walk F YO10 0.9 
46 NO NO 0 2,000 Bus F LS16 0.3 
47 YES NO 2 16,000 Car F Y041 18.3 
48 NO NO 1 6,000 Car F LS6 2.3 
49 YES YES 1 2,000 Car M LS6 18.6 
50 NO NO 1 0 Train F HD7 0.6 
51 NO NO 2 5,000 Car M LS17 13.1 
52 YES NO 2 6,000 Car M LS17 16.3 
53 NO NO 1 400 Walk F LS10 0.0 
54 NO NO 1 1,000 Bus F LS19 2.9 
55 NO NO 1 9,000 Car M LS25 7.2 
56 YES YES 2 14,000 Car M S35 31.4 
57 YES NO 2 8,000 Car F 15 
58 NO YES 1 10,000 Car M WF5 11.9 
59 NO NO 0 50 Bus M LS19 0.0 
60 YES YES 1 9,000 Car F LS18 8.9 
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